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Résumé Français 
Plusieurs études ont révélé des liens intimes entre angoisse et douleur. 
Or, la douleur chronique met un terme à l'espoir de guérison et la 
perspective d'une souffrance interminable se présente comme une 
sombre éventualité pour celui qui en est atteint. Dans le cadre d'une 
recherche entre psychanalyse et phénoménologie, la présente étude se 
penche sur les angoisses subies par les malades souffrant de douleur 
chronique dans le contexte actuel de la réadaptation de la douleur. Pour 
accomplir son objectif, cette thèse comporte deux volets à la fois 
séparés et reliés entre eux. Deux recherches encadrent conjointement la 
problématique de l'étude et ouvrent la discussion sur une réflexion plus 
vaste sur l'angoisse de mort et sa place dans notre approche de la 
souffrance humaine. La première recherche utilise la notion de relation 
d'objet kleinienne pour explorer les témoignages de trois malades 
souffrant de douleur arthritique rhumatoïde chronique et démontrer 
comment les angoisses infantiles constituent la signification primitive de 
l'expérience de leur douleur. L'étude interprète les histoires recueillies 
au moyen d'un test projectif et démontre comment les histoires des 
participants fluctuent entre les angoisses d'anéantissement du moi et 
celles de destruction de l'objet. L'auteur soutient qu'une compréhension 
de la souffrance primitive est nécessaire, non seulement pour saisir 
l'histoire infantile de la douleur, mais également pour permettre aux 
malades de travailler sur la nature idiopathique de leur épreuve. La 
deuxième recherche se sert d'une approche phénoménologique pour 
explorer comment la psychologie de la santé interprète la souffrance et 
la douleur. En réponse à une interview semi-structurée, trois 
psychologues de la santé décrivent leur expérience auprès de patients 
souffrant de douleur chronique et expliquent leur compréhension des 
angoisses associées à la douleur. Le concept de souffrance en 
psychologie de la santé décrit la douleur que les malades ressentent 
souvent comme une menace de désintégration. La recherche pose la 
question de savoir jusqu'à quel point la psychologie de la santé exclut la 
signification de telles menaces en éliminant la signification primitive de 
la douleur. Elle indique que le cadre de la psychologie de la santé 
impose de sérieuses limites à l'écoute de la souffrance, à la subjectivité 
et à l'expérience de la douleur, en éliminant toute référence au contenu 
de l'angoisse et à l'expérience intérieure du patient. 
Introduction 
S'épanouir sans douleur est presque impossible, puisque nos réactions face à 
l'environnement deviennent alors sérieusement compromises. Cependant, une douleur 
intraitable peut éveiller en nous des angoisses dévorantes qui peuvent assombrir notre 
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existence entière (Bakan 1968 ; Scarry 1985). La douleur chronique, contrairement à la 
douleur aiguë, persiste sans soulagement significatif après trois mois de traitement. En 
travaillant auprès de patients souffrant de douleur chronique, les psychologues font face 
régulièrement à la détresse émotionnelle comme faisant partie intégrante de la souffrance. 
On rapporte fréquemment que la douleur accompagne des sentiments de menace et 
d'atteinte à l'intégrité du corps et du moi (Szasz 1957 ; Cassell, 1999). Dans des 
situations de maladie sérieuse ou de douleur chronique, Cassell (1982) décrit la menace 
comme étant celle d'une « destruction imminente» causant une « violente détresse », ou 
ce qu'il (1982) nomme, d'une manière appropriée, «de la souffrance ». Les questions 
concernant la nature de la souffrance et les sentiments de destruction imminente ont 
suscité des études mettant l'accent sur l'expérience vécue ou sur l'expérience 
existentielle de la douleur chronique. 
En rapportant les introspections d'un patient atteint de douleur chronique, Good 
(1992 : 41-42) montre comment la douleur bouleverse l'expérience du temps jusqu'au 
point où le patient peut se sentir prisonnier de l'instant. Le temps, tel qu'on le connaît 
pour être classé en passé, présent et futur, s'affaisse dans les intervalles de la douleur. 
Pour la personne qui souffre, la douleur chronique est une agonie sans moment autre ou 
sans fin. Good décrit clairement comment l'univers du patient devient englouti par la 
« peur de la dissolution du moi ». Affrontant cette peur, le malade lutte pour demeurer un 
psychologiquement. Pourtant, lorsque la douleur « inonde la conscience », la sensation de 
désintégration imminente et d'anéantissement prend le contrôle. Semblable à celle de 
Good, l'étude de cas de Brodwin (1992: 81) signale une patiente souffrant de douleur 
chronique qui décrit ses terrifiantes impressions d'être suffoquée par l'agonie. Elle se sent 
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littéralement étranglée par la douleur qui lui fait sortir la vie par la gorge. La patiente 
décrit sa douleur comme étant « atroce, déchirante, comme si mon estomac était I1Ùs en 
pièces ». Son compte rendu reflète de façon très frappante la pure agression de sa 
douleur. Dans une autre étude de cas, Garo (1992 : 119) décrit un patient souffrant de 
douleur chronique dont l'angoisse intense, surnaturelle « présage de possibles "épisodes 
psychotiques", une "désorganisation de la personnalité" ». En douleur constante, Scarry 
(1985 : 53) déclare « on ressent que quelqu'un agit sur soi, anéanti de l'intérieur comme 
de l'extérieur ». En fait, il n'est pas rare que les patients décrivent la douleur comme étant 
un «monstre» (Byron Good, 1992 : 39) terrifiant qui les attaque et qui les ravage 
violemment de l'intérieur. En expliquant cette réaction, Scarry (1985 : 52) ajoute que 
quoique la douleur «se produise à l'intérieur de soi, elle est tout de suite identifiée 
comme n'étant "pas soi-même", "pas moi", comme étant quelque chose de si étrangère 
que l'on doit s'en débarrasser immédiatement ». Faire l'expérience de la douleur comme 
n'étant «pas soi» fait que le patient se sent attaqué de l'intérieur par une entité étrangère 
au moi ou par un « non-soi» monstrueux. Les chercheurs et les cliniciens témoignent à 
l'effet que « la douleur est universellement décrite comme étant "elle" (White and Sweet, 
1955 :108 ; Cassell, 1976) ou comme étant une "présence étrangère" (Zaner, 1981 : 54­
55) ». 
Des sentiments observés si fréquemment montrent comment des angoisses 
grotesques colorent les préoccupations émotionnelles et les perceptions de plusieurs 
victimes de douleur chronique. La prévalence de telles angoisses chez les patients 
souffrant de douleur chronique soulève une question importante concernant la nature de 
la douleur et sa relation avec la menace imminente d'anéantissement. Comment les 
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angoisses liées à la souffrance en viennent à englober le plus grand sens de l'existence du 
malade est une question inépuisable qui doit être analysée sous plus d'un angle. 
Cependant, pour une grande paIt, la réponse à cette question peut dépendre de comment 
l'angoisse est d'abord définie et comprise. 
Le psychologue existentialiste Rollo May (1977 : 363-64) définit l'angoisse 
comme étant « notre conscience humaine du fait que chacun de nous est un être confronté 
au néant ». li présente la définition du non-être ainsi: «ce qui détruirait l'être, comme la 
mort, une maladie grave, une hostilité interpersonnelle, un changement trop soudain qui 
détruit notre enracinement psychologique ». May reconnaît que «l'angoisse est la 
composante psychique de chaque maladie» (91). Cette association peut être attribuée au 
fait que l'expérience de la douleur nous met souvent en garde contre une blessure et 
contre une maladie, et, en fin de compte, laisse prévoir l'approche de la mort. En tant 
qu'un des premiers signes et symptôme général de morbidité, elle fait pressentir la mort à 
l'humain. Cependant, May ajoute une information importante à sa discussion sur 
l'angoisse lorsqu'il explique «que les gens utilisent la maladie de la même manière que 
les vieilles générations utilisaient le démon - comme un objet sur lequel projeter leurs 
expériences de haine, de sorte à éviter d'avoir à prendre leurs responsabilités envers 
celles-ci» (86). Malheureusement, cette intuition impOltante n'apporte rien à la 
discussion de May sur l'angoisse, étant donné que celui-ci ne fournit aucune élaboration 
de plus sur le sujet. 
Dans son travail sur la souffrance et sur la maladie, Bakan (1968 : 65-85) puise 
dans les témoignages clinique et historique pour expliquer la terreur de l'anéantissement 
dont font l'expérience les patients souffrant de douleur chronique. «La douleur, déclare 
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Bakan, est un présage de mort au-delà de toutes les options associées à sa gestion» (78). 
TI soutient que dans les premiers stades du développement du moi, la douleur est ressentie 
comme étant une menace distincte d'anéantissement. il réfère à un complexe infantile 
dans lequel la perception de la douleur est à peine différenciée de la menace concrète de 
la mort, et il explique comment le moi de l'enfant fait l'expérience de la douleur en tant 
qu'être à la fois blessé et tué. Bakan reconnaît « l'expérience de la douleur primitive» 
comme constituant la source intrapsychique du complexe douleur-anéantissement. il 
définit le terme « primitive» comme étant « le stade premier du développement du moi », 
qui comprend les périodes infantile et préverbale. Dans l'idée de Bakan, le moi de 
]' adulte conserve un sens latent de «je suis blessé et tué », malgré ses capacités 
manifestes de différencier la douleur de l'anéantissement. En effet, «je suis blessé et 
tué» constitue l'histoire infantile de la douleur dont le moi s'est lassé, mais qu'il n'a 
jamais abandonnée. 
D'une manière pas teJlement différente de la conception existentialiste, la 
psychanalyse a reconnu la mort comme étant la source première de l'angoisse qui lie au­
delà de toutes les expériences ordinaires de l'angoisse. Cependant, Freud (J 920) voit la 
mort comme étant plus qu'une simple éventualité dans la trajectoire de la vie et il lui 
confère le statut de pulsion (Trieb) ou de tendance de destruction innée. Poursuivant la 
métapsychologie de Freud, Klein (1946, 1948, 1952 et 1958) soutient que dans son 
développement à partir de la première enfance, le moi prend deux positions dans sa 
relation avec l'objet primitif. Dans la position paranoïde-schizoïde, le moi et l'objet sont 
clivés. Le moi primitif projette l'instinct de mort sur les expériences frustrantes et 
douloureuses, tandis que sur les expériences satisfaisantes, il projette l'instinct de vie. De 
Vlll 
cette manière, le moi primitif en arrive à éviter la menace de désintégration apportée par 
l'instinct de mort, créant néanmoins l'objet mauvais, persécuteur. Comme résultat, un 
univers en noir et blanc émerge, lourd d'angoisses paranoïdes d'être attaqué et anéanti 
par un objet persécuteur pouvant contrôler et détruire à la fois la bonne partie du moi et 
l'objet idéal. Dans cette position, la douleur et la frustration sont vécues comme 
constituant une menace venant d'une force persécutrice étrangère. Cette angoisse donne 
naissance à des fantasmes sadiques-oraux de destruction dirigés vers l'objet mauvais et 
de contrôle tout-puissant comme défense. 
Dans la position dépressive, l'enfant intègre les bons et les mauvais objets 
fractionnés en un tout qui apparaît comme étant la source simultanée de la frustration et 
de la gratification. Cette qualité paradoxale de l'objet entier fait naître les sentiments 
d'ambivalence du moi et fait apparaître l'objet comme étant simultanément bon et 
mauvais, aimé et détesté ou craint et désiré. L'intégration du bon et du mauvais en un tout 
cause au moi des angoisses extrêmes de perdre l'objet qui est endommagé ou de dépendre 
d'un objet endommagé pouvant user de représailles. Le moi craint aussi de perdre les 
introjections qui créent son univers intérieur. L'angoisse dépressive est accompagnée 
d'un fort sentiment de culpabilité primitif envers l'objet endommagé. Dans cette position, 
le moi fait l'expérience de la douleur comme étant liée à un objet endommagé et perdu, 
ou comme étant une forte culpabilité. Cette angoisse met en branle un nombre important 
de mécanismes de défense, afin de faire taire la culpabilité primitive. Le mépris de 
l'objet, le contrôle compulsif, le déni de la dépendance et le triomphe par rapport à l'objet 
endommagé font partie des mécanismes de défense obsessionnels. 
IX 
Quoique la conception psychanalytique de l'angoisse reconnaisse l'impOltance de 
vraies situations de danger, elle admet que l'angoisse est modelée autant par des sources 
réelles de menace qu'elle est colorée de menaces intérieures et primitives. Ainsi peut-on 
soutenir que chaque angoisse liée à la douleur porte, à un plus ou moins grand degré, des 
traces des angoisses infantiles oubliées depuis longtemps, mais jamais abandonnées. De 
ce point de vue, donner un sens adéquat à la douleur signifie la comprendre comme étant 
une expérience enracinée dans l'histoire de l'enfance. Dans cette interprétation, la 
conception de Klein du développement infantile et de l'instinct de mort peut offrir une 
réflexion importante sur ce qu'on rapporte fréquemment en recherche 
phénoménologique, mais qui est laissé sans interprétation en profondeur. En fait, la 
conception de Klein sur la relation primitive avec l'objet peut faire la lumière sur 
plusieurs qualités primitives de l'expérience de la douleur. 
La relation controversée entre le langage et la douleur est perçue comme étant 
complètement déconcertante. La plupart du temps, lorsqu'une douleur atroce frappe, des 
cris et des gémissements remplacent les mots et les phrases convenables. Scarry attribue 
ce manque de mots à une qualité palticulière de la douleur, qui nie le langage. Elle fait 
remarque ceci: «La douleur physique ne résiste pas simplement au langage, mais elle le 
détruit activement, entraînant un retour immédiat à un état antérieur au langage, au son et 
aux cris que les êtres humains profèrent avant qu'ils n'aient appris à parler» (1985 : 4). 
En fait, toute tentative de verbaliser la douleur est engagée par des sons non lexicaux 
rappelant les vocalisations préverbales de détresse de l'enfance. Les cris de douleur qui 
exprimaient autrefois le besoin d'être nourri révèlent, chez l'adulte, le retour à un temps 
antérieur à l'apprentissage de la langue. Si donc de tels cris signifiaient plus tôt une 
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absence de langage, leur retour au moment de la douleur peut refléter la destruction du 
langage et un retour aux angoisses préverbales. Scarry déclare clairement que: « Dans la 
douleur physique, le suicide et le meurtre convergent ensuite. » (53) 
Une autre qualité primitive de l'expérience de la douleur est inhérente à son 
pouvoir de violer le sens de l'objectivité et le principe de réalité en brouillant la frontière 
entre l'intérieur et l'extétieur. Afin d'expliquer cette qualité, Scarry (1985 : 5) fait 
remarquer que tous les états de conscience comprennent des objets comme «contenu 
référentiel ». Elle explique que la colère, le bonheur, la tristesse, la haine, la faim et 
l'amour réfèrent tous à des objets. La douleur, cependant, n'a aucun çontenu référentiel 
en dehors d'elle-même. De plus, la douleur intense est «vécue spatialement comme 
n'étant ni la contraction de l'univers jusqu'à la proximité immédiate du corps, ni comme 
le corps se gonflant afin d'occuper l'univers entier» (35). En pleine douleur, la 
préoccupation du malade pour le monde extérieur perd son importance au profit de la 
présence écrasante de son corps qui fait mal. Leder réfère à cette «enflure du corps» 
comme à un «resserrement spatio-temporel », que Scarry décrit comme étant «une 
fusion presque obscène du privé et du public» (Scarry, 1985 : 53). Une telle frontière 
changeante rappelle le manque premier de séparation entre l'objet et la réalité, lorsque 
des événements somatiques concrets dominaient l' activité mentale de l'enfant. 
Par opposition à l'emphase psychanalytique et phénoménologique placée sur le 
contenu de l'angoisse, la psychologie de la santé explique la douleur comme étant un 
processus biopsychosocial généré par « un réseau d'événements, à la fois à l'intérieur et à 
l'extérieur du corps, aussi bien qu'à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur du système nerveux 
central» (Fordyce, 1989 : 52). Elle soutient que quoique la douleur puisse persister sans 
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beaucoup de soulagement, son impact affligeant peut être géré, si les patients apprennent 
à s'adapter à leur nouvelle situation de vie (Turner et Romano, 1989 ; Bradley, 1996). 
Les psychologues de la santé s'appuient fortement sur des stratégies cognitivo­
comportementales pour changer les comportements qui sont sources de mauvaises 
adaptations et cognitions en comportements adaptés. Dans ce but, Fordyce (1989 : 56) 
redéfinit la notion de souffrance de Cassel! ainsi: «Un stimulus qui produit de la peur, 
une menace ou l'anticipation de conséquences répugnantes peut mener à de la souffrance, 
et des comportements indicatifs de souffrance peuvent s'exprimer.» D'après cette 
théorie, la douleur persistante fait que la victime craint plus de mal, parce que la douleur 
possède une forte association expérientielle avec une blessure comme facteur antécédent. 
Selon Fordyce, si J'environnement renforce les réponses qui sont sources d'une mauvaise 
adaptation et d'une perception exagérée de la douleur chez le patient, cela encourage 
« l'expression et la continuation de la douleur ou du comportement souffrant et, ainsi, 
promeut la chronicité» (55). 
Cette redéfinition de la souffrnace élimine complètement toute référence à la 
menace imminente d'anéantissement. En effet, décrire la souffrance en tant que réponse 
au comportement soulève la question de savoir de quelle manière les comportements 
indiquant la douleur ou les comportements de douleur diffèrent des comportements 
exprimant la souffrance ou des comportements de souffrance. En fait, Fordyce maintient 
ceci: «Ainsi, la souffrance peut mener à l'expression de comportements de souffrance 
qui sont, ou qui peuvent être, pratiquement impossibles à distinguer des comportements 
de douleur» (56). Contrairement à cette conception, Cassel! et Bakan insistent sur le fait 
que la peur de l'anéantissement inuninente définit la souffrance non seulement comme 
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étant une expérience humaine distincte, mais également comme en étant une qui exige 
son propre mode de compréhension. En omettant l'angoisse de l'anéantissement, 
l'expérience du patient n'apparaît pas tellement dissemblable à une erreur cognitive ou à 
une réaction excessive face à la douleur, par opposé à une expérience significative qui 
pourrait être enracinée dans l'histoire primitive du moi. En redéfinissant la souffrance 
humaine dans les limites des comportements observables et de leurs contingences, 
Fordyce ne tient pas compte de l'ambiguïté de l'univers intérieur du malade. Comme 
résultat, Fordyce recommande l'utilisation de la rétroaction comportementale et de la 
restructuration cognitive, afin de réorganiser les comportements de souffrance en 
comportements d'adaptation. La stratégie a pour but de réduire la fréquence des réponses 
qui sont sources d'une mauvaise adaptation et de les supplanter éventuellement par des 
réponses adaptatives. 
Skevington (1995 : 4) déclare que la psychologie de la santé, avec son accent 
placé sur l'analyse du comportement, «n'envisage pas les gens et leurs histoires, mais 
elle regarde plutôt l'environnement dans lequel ils vivent et comment l'expérience et 
l'apprentissage ont modelé leur comportement en tant que victimes de la douleur ». Le 
béhaviorisme, comme Pérez-Âlverz (2004: 173) l'indique, «considère que les gens sont 
à l'intérieur de l'univers, et non que l'univers est à l'intérieur des gens ». Le but proclamé 
de la psychologie de la santé réside dans son effort pour réduire l'ambiguïté subjective de 
la souffrance à la clarté de paramètres concrets et de mesures. De cette manière, les 
psychologues de la santé donnent un sens aux angoisses terrifiantes et aux préoccupations 
étranges basées sur les interactions immédiates et observables entre l'individu et son 
environnement. Dans leur idée, contextualiser et comprendre la souffrance signifie 
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traduire l'univers intérieur du malade en comportements et en réponses liés aux stimulus 
ou dépendant de facteurs antécédents et de leurs conséquences. Les cliniques de la 
douleur, multidisciplinaires, pour la plupart, utilisent ce cadre béhavioriste pour la gestion 
clinique de la douleur chronique (Loeser et Egan, 1989, Long, 1996). 
Se servant d'un cadre phénoménologique et psychanalytique, l'auteur de la 
présente étude a exploré non seulement l'expérience du malade, mais également le 
discours des psychologues de la santé. Le but de l'étude est de jeter un éclairage sur les 
angoisses éprouvées par les personnes souffrant de douleur dans le contexte de la 
réadaptation d'aujourd'hui. En tant que recherche psychanalytique, elle cherche une 
explication au contenu des angoisses liées à la douleur, de sorte à explorer leur 
signification première. Cependant, en tant qu'étude phénoménologique, elle se penche 
sur les discours professionnels sur la douleur et sur l'angoisse en psychologie de la santé, 
de manière à examiner la compréhension normative de la souffrance. Par conséquent, 
notre étude entretient une double structure, qui comprend deux explorations interreliées. 
Dans la première recherche, nous nous demanderons jusqu'à quel point l'expérience de la 
douleur chronique contient et symbolise des relations d'objets primitives et, ultimement, 
jusqu'à quel point elle renouvelle les angoisses paranoïdes-schizoïdes d'être anéanti par 
une entité étrangère au moi. Dans notre seconde recherche, nous nous interrogerons sur 
comment la psychologie de la santé, en tant que modèle prévalant en gestion de la santé, 
parle de l'angoisse et interprète l'expérience de la douleur chronique. Ces deux questions 
encadrent conjointement la problématique de notre étude et ouvrent la discussion sur une 
réflexion plus grande sur l'angoisse de la mort et sur sa place dans notre approche de la 
souffrance humaine. 
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D'un point de vue historique, l'étude psychanalytique de la souffrance et de ses 
symptômes physiques a, jusqu'ici, tournée autour de la notion de conversion, considérant 
les événements somatiques inhabituels comme étant explicables par leurs causes et 
significatifs symboliquement en termes de dynamique intrapsychique sous-jascente. 
Ainsi, la psychanalyse classique percevait les maladies somatiques et leurs 
préoccupations comme étant des manifestations symboliques de souvenirs réprimés ou 
comme étant de l'hystérie de conversion (Freud et Breuer, 1895). Plus tard, la maladie 
psychosomatique a été présentée comme constituant le dérivé somatique du stress causé 
par les conflits intrapsychiques (Alexander) ou comme étant l'expression d'une structure 
de la personnalité primitive causée par un traumatisme et par une pathologie du moi 
(Marty, De M'Uzan et David). En effet, la psychanalyse classique et les théories 
psychosomatiques ont fermement établi l' horizon du débat, dans lequel le symbolisme du 
corps est exposé et retracé, de sa cause intrapsychique jusqu'à son dérivé somatique. La 
présente étude, cependant, est conçue pour s'écarter de cette tradition et pour initier un 
mouvement en direction opposée, c'est-à-dire du soma vers la psyché. Dans cette veine, 
elle explore la douleur persistante comme étant une expérience provocatrice d'angoisse, 
de laquelle le symbolisme inconscient peut surgir. Elle pose la question de savoir si la 
douleur intraitable ayant une physiopathologie et une cause connues peut raviver les 
angoisses d'anéantissement et de destruction primitives et ramener au présent la 
vulnérabilité infantile enfouie profondément à l'intérieur du malade. 
Encadrement Épistémologigue 
L'encadrement épistémologique de la thèse est basé sur une approche herméneutique 
critique. L'auteur cherche la vérité possible (et pas probable) dans le sens critique de 
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l'étrangeté inquiétante qui est cachée derrière la démarche clinique de la gestion de 
douleur chronique. Cet étude n'écarte pas les cliniciens des patients douloureux comme 
étant les participants. Par contre, elle consiste en deux recherches avec deux groupes des 
participants: un des patients et l'autre des psychologues de la santé. 
La première recherche, c'est une exploration critique et analytique qui révèle les 
aspects latents du discours des patients à propos des expériences vécues et terrifiantes de 
la douleur. 
La deuxième recherche, c'est une exploration critique et phénoménologique qui 
révèle ce qui est renié par les cliniciens à propos des angoisses vécues et rapportées par 
les patients douloureux. 
La petitesse des groupes participants permet à l'auteur d'analyser les discours 
accueillis en profondeur. Cette analyse profonde du symbolisme archaïque est nécessaire 
afin de révéler les sens sous-jacent, latent qui ironise les énoncés 'raisonnables' des 
psychologue par éclaircir les énoncés 'irraisonnables' des patients. 
Méthodologie 1 
La première étude qualitative pose la question de savoir jusqu'à quel point le fait de subir 
de la douleur chronique contient et symbolise des relations d'objets primitives et, 
ultimement, renouvelle les angoisses paranoïdes-schizoïdes d'être anéanti par une entité 
étrangère au moi. La méthodologie de cette étude implique l'analyse d'histoires 
collectées au moyen du test d'aperception de thèmes (T. A. T. ; Murray, 1943). En tant 
que narrations imaginatives sujettes à plusieurs interprétations, les histoires contiennent 
du matériel qui peut être utilisé pour explorer des références et des allusions à la douleur 
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et à la souffrance. L'interprétation met l'accent sur le passage entre les deux positions de 
l'angoisse, pour démêler le contenu latent des histoires. Casoni et Brunet (1989) ont 
conçu et testé une grille d'interprétation pour le T. A. T. basée sur la métapsychologie de 
Klein. Les auteurs établissent leur grille d'interprétation à partir de trois catégories de 
base: 1) l'angoisse; 2) les relations interpersonnelles; et 3) les stratégies défensives. Ces 
catégories sont ensuite divisées en leurs positions paranoïdes-schizoïdes et dépressives 
respectives. En analysant le matériel, notre étude met un plus grand accent sur l'angoisse 
que sur les deux autres catégories. 
Participants 
Un participant et deux participantes qui souffrent de douleur arthritique chronique 
prennent part à l'étude. L'arthrite rhumatoïde est une maladie douloureuse diagnosticable 
ayant une physiopathologie connue. Ces trois patients ont été choisis à l'aveugle à partir 
d'une liste de malades externes en pratique en rhumatologie. Ils ont reçu un traitement 
pendant au moins 5 années, ce qui a voulu dire une relation intensive avec le personnel en 
psychologie de la santé. Tous les patients ont terminé au moins une année d'un 
programme de gestion de la douleur. De manière à permettre l'analyse en profondeur 
exigée par cette étude, le point de saturation du groupe de participants a été établi à trois. 
De cette façon, une plus grande profondeur d'analyse a la priorité, de sorte à rencontrer le 
but d'interprétation de l'étude. 
Instrument d'interview 
Le test d'aperception de thèmes est le seul instrument de collecte de données utilisé. Le 
sous-ensemble recommandé pour l'administration générale a été utilisé dans cette étude. 
Ce sous-ensemble consiste en les cartes les plus communément utilisées et que toute 
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administration du T. A. T. doit inclure, indépendamment de la différence d'âge et de 
genre. Ces cartes sont identifiées par des nombres sans aucune lettre: 
1. Cartel: un jeune garçon avec un violon; 
2. Carte 2 : une jeune fenune avec des livres dans ses mains debout devant un paysage de
 
ferme;
 
3. Carte 4: une fenune s'appuyant sur l'épaule d'un homme;
 
4. Carte 5 : une femme ouvrant une porte donnant sur une pièce à partir d'un corridor
 
sombre;
 
5. Carte 10 : une femme et un homme s'étreignant ;
 
6. Carte 11 : une image ambiguë d'un crucifix au sommet d'un escarpement rocheux;
 
7. Carte 14 : un homme ouvrant une fenêtre pour éclairer un endroit complètement noir;
 
8. Carte 15 : un honune se tenant au milieu d'un cimetière;
 
9. Carte 19 : une maison dans la neige avec une cheminée;
 
10. Carte 20 : un homme se tenant sous une lumière de rue ;
 
Il. Carte 16 : une carte blanche.
 
Durant les interviews, des élaborations furent demandées en rapport avec la douleur ou
 
avec le matériel lié à la douleur. 
Données et analyse 
Les données consistent en la transcription des interviews. Chaque transcription passe par 
deux lectures initiales. La première lecture identifie toutes les actions ayant rappOlt avec 
les discours qui reflètent les thèmes de l'angoisse paranoïde-schizoïde ou de 
l'anéantissement du moi. La deuxième lecture explore les actions qui reflètent le thème 
de l'angoisse dépressive ou de l'anéantissement de l'objet. Les deux premières lectures 
impliquent une lecture image par image interprétant séparément le contenu latent des 
histoires. Cependant, la troisième lecture présente une analyse image par image en 
utilisant les deux premières lectures. Cette troisième lecture rend possible de retracer les 
fluctuations de l'angoisse dans les cartes et au cours du processus entier. Nous 
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présenterons maintenant la lecture finale, afin de montrer l'interaction entre les deux 
positions de l'angoisse. 
Analyse et Résultats 1 
La participante est une malade à la fin de la quarantaine. Madame A a vécu avec son mari 
pendant plus de 20 ans. Avant d'être handicapée par la douleur chronique, elle travaillait 
pour un organisme communautaire. Elle commence sa première narration par des 
sentiments dépressifs. Sa première narration reflète comment le moi est sollicité par 
l'objet, mais trop dévasté pour répondre. Elle éclate en sanglots. Le même sentiment 
d'impuissance se poursuit dans la seconde narration. Le moi ressent d'une manière aiguë 
la perte de la capacité de maintenir une relation d'objet gratifiante. Le sentiment 
d'attendre quelque chose d'anonyme devant se produire est mentionné. Dans les 
troisième et quatrième narrations, l'angoisse dépressive se poursuit. Dans la cinquième 
image, la narration reflète la peur d'être enlevée. Elle décrit la femme dans l'image 
comme étant souffrante et menacée par quelque chose d'inconnu. Elle associe la douleur 
à une force concrète qui peut arracher la vie. Dans la sixième narration, le clivage et le 
sentiment d'un danger imminent prédominent. Tout au long de sa septième narration, une 
noirceur menaçante apparaît. Elle élabore directement sur sa douleur et l'associe à 
« l'épeurante noirceur », qui signifie l'angoisse persécutrice du moi. La personne qui 
souffre peut seulement fuir cette noirceur épeurante dans ce qu'elle appelle «une 
pilule ». Dans la huitième, son angoisse paranoïde par rapport à la douleur comme force 
pouvant dépasser et détruire la vie continue. Elle se pose des questions sur la vie et sur la 
mort, et décrit la douleur comme « dépassant» la vie. Dans la neuvième narration, le moi 
essaie de réintégrer la noirceur et la lumière, et conserve le sens de l'intégration. Dans la 
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dixième narration, son attitude envers la noirceur dénote un changement marqué, étant 
donné qu'elle ne la décrit plus comme constituant une pure menace. On constate une 
tentative de réintégrer la noirceur au moyen de la lumière. Cependant, elle se reprend 
rapidement et révèle son angoisse d'être abandonnée dans la noirceur. Dans la onzième 
narration, le moi cherche désespérément une lumière abondante. Les choses sont 
soudainement lumineuses, et il n'y a plus d'obscurité. 
Le deuxième participant est une patiente à la fin de la soixantaine. Pendant plus 
de 25 ans, madame B a vécu avec sont mari, avec lequel elle a deux enfants. Ses enfants 
sont tous indépendants. Malgré sa douleur arthritique, madame B continue à réussir à 
travailler à temps partiel. Sa narration commence par la description de l'enfant dans 
l'image comme étant triste et malheureux à cause de la douleur. Dans sa seconde 
narration, les caractères en alTière-plan sont un mélange de figures maternelles et de 
figures en colère. L'ambivalence et la perte révèlent une angoisse dépressive. Dans la 
troisième narration, le moi traite avec un objet qui bouillonne de colère et menace de 
partir. Être abandonné par un objet endommagé reflète de l'angoisse dépressive. Dans la 
quatrième narration, le moi se tient sur le seuil qui divise le bon du mauvais et regarde 
une entité sans nom, à la fois douloureuse et dégoûtante. Le clivage et l'angoisse 
paranoïde-schizoïde prédominent. Dans la cinquième narration, le moi semble aspirer à 
une fusion avec un objet qui voit à tout, afin d'échapper à la peur et à la douleur. Dans la 
sixième narration, madame B nomme un certain nombre de créatures terrifiantes allant 
des monstres jusqu'aux têtes de serpents. Ensuite, tout ce qu'elle a nommé est décrit 
comme étant un portrait de sa propre douleur en tant que terreur concrète. Elle devient 
soudainement incohérente. Dans la septième narration, il y a les sentiments d'être piégée 
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et de peur. Alors qu'on présente la douleur, son compte rendu devient de plus mauvais 
augure. La douleur est associée à la mort, qui est suffocante et froide. Dans la huitième 
narration, après un début tranquille, elle aborde soudainement le sujet du suicide et parle 
de désespoir, de perte et de douleur. Les pertes causées par la douleur font que le moi se 
sent entouré d'objets morts, au sujet desquels il ressent une immense culpabilité. 
L'angoisse dépressive se poursuit dans la neuvième narration. La perte irréparable est 
partout. Dans la dixième narration, son angoisse dépressive devient évidente, alors 
qu'elle fait allusion au suicide. Dans la onzième carte, elle voit le vide ou le blanc comme 
étant un espace à remplir. Elle révèle ensui te l'autre signification du vide comme étant un, 
espace nul comme la mort laissée par la douleur. L'angoisse de l'anéantissement refait 
surface encore une fois comme étant la peur de l'anéantissement. 
Le troisième participant est un patient à la fin de la quarantaine. Pendant environ 
15 ans, monsieur C a vécu avec sa femme et ses trois enfants. Monsieur C a une 
éducation collégiale. Malgré ses douleurs arthritiques, il continue à travailler à temps 
partiel et fait tout pour continuer à vivre une vie assez normale. Sa narration commence 
par la description de comment son moi se sent contrôlé par les objets astreignants jusqu'à 
l'impuissance et à la culpabilité. Cependant, la deuxième narration de monsieur C ne 
porte plus sur des personnages contrôlés par d'autres. Ses personnages se sentent plutôt 
poussés par le devoir et par l'honneur dans ce qu'ils font. TI y a un sentiment à l'effet que 
le moi doive protéger le bon objet internalisé contre la perte. La troisième narration 
symbolise la dynamique complète d'être divisé entre l'amour et la haine. L'angoisse 
paranoïde-schizoïde semble être active sous l'angoisse dépressive concernant la sécurité 
de l'objet. Dans la quatrième narration, l'objet apparaît encore à la fois comme contrôlant 
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et comme aimant. Dans la cinquième narration, le moi continue à être ambivalent, mais il 
se sent moins capable de satisfaire aux demandes d'un objet endommagé. Donc, il y a 
une culpabilité concernant le fait de ne pas être capable de réparer et de restaurer l'objet. 
Dans la sixième narration, une lutte contre des créatures bizarres et un sentiment de 
conflit avec des forces impersonnelles de malheur et de nature bestiale (objets 
persécuteurs) imprègnent sa description. L'angoisse se transforme en menace 
d'anéantissement dans un monde dangereux. Le moi se sent résister à l'assault d'une 
force impersonnelle et tenace, qu'il associe à sa propre douleur. Sa description révèle le 
complexe d'anéantissement de la douleur. Dans la septième narration, il y a un désir 
d'échapper à la monotonie du présent, vers le frémissement du futur. La montée rapide de 
l'angoisse paranoïde-schizoïde a eu un effet d'aggravation et a activé les défenses 
obsessionnelles contre la perte et la culpabilité. Dans la huitième narration, monsieur C 
décrit la mort comme étant un événement craint dont on doit faire la conquête ou comme 
un état bienheureux pouvant être embrassé. Pourtant, dès que la douleur devient une 
partie de la narration, l'expérience concrète de l'anéantissement devient encore une fois 
manifeste. La douleur est par conséquent décrite comme rendant la vie pas plus 
intéressante que la mort, et le moi en douleur est perçu comme n'étant rien de plus 
qu'une pierre tombale. Le moi se bat contre la menace de l'anéantissement. Dans la 
neuvième narration, il y a un oasis idyllique de chaleur qui disparaît dans la douleur. Le 
moi ressent un froid de mort, il se sent blessé et seul, alors que la terreur remplace la 
chaleur. L'angoisse paranoïde-schizoïde est complètement dévorante; comme il le dit: 
« Tout est contre vous. » Dans la dixième narration, le moi s'efforce de réparer et de 
restaurer l'objet. Mais il y a la peur d'envenimer l'agression qui peut transformer la 
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réparation en rien de moins qu'un ennui compulsif ou une plus grande destruction. Le 
moi sort d'une relation de l'objet clivé, pour entrer dans une angoisse dépressive. Dans la 
onzième narration, l'ambivalence du moi, qui devient plus profonde, menace une fois de 
plus de ramener la division et l'identification projective, et de faire revivre les angoisses 
d'anéantissement. 
MÉTHODOLOGIE 2 
Dans la seconde étude qualitative, nous nous demandons comment la psychologie de la 
santé, en tant que modèle prévalent de gestion de la douleur, traite de l'angoisse et 
interprète l'expérience de la douleur chronique. La méthodologie de notre étude implique 
l'analyse des discours recueillis au moyen d'interviews semi-structurées. Les interviews 
vont au-delà d'une simple routine question-réponse et adoptent une formule dialogique. 
Contrairement aux questions de routine, le dialogue invite les participants à réfléchir à la 
signification de leurs expériences et « même à la réaliser pour la première fois durant la 
conversation» (Polio, Henley, et Thompson, 1997 : 31). 
Participants 
Le groupe de participants est composé d'un homme et de deux psychologues féminins de 
la santé, qui pratiquent dans des cliniques de la douleur multidisciplinaires financées par 
des fonds publics. Leur travail tourne autour de l'évaluation, de la gestion et du 
traitement des patients souffrant de douleur chronique. Tous les participants ont bien au­
dessus de 5 années d'expérience de pratique en tant que psychologues de la santé. De 
sorte à assurer l'analyse en profondeur du discours exigée par cette étude, le point de 
saturation pour le groupe de participants a été établi à trois. 
Procédure d'nterview 
xx III 
Les interviews sont réalisées au moyen d'un guide thématique, qui est utilisé pour 
introduire des thèmes dans le flot de la conversation. Le guide comprend les thèmes et les 
sous-thèmes suivants: 
1. La psychologie des patients souffrant de douleur chronique; 
2. Les angoisses des patients souffrant de douleur chronique; 
a. Angoisse concernant la perte; 
b. Angoisse concernant le moi corporel; 
c. Définition de l'angoisse en tant que concept; 
3. La peur de l'anéantissement; 
a. L'aggression ; 
b. La persécution. 
Dans le prerrùer thème, la psychologie du patient souffrant de douteur chronique permet 
aux participants de fournir une vue d'ensemble de ta condition psychologique du malade. 
Dans le second thème, les angoisses des patients souffrant de douleur chronique, on 
demande aux participants de décrire deux types de menaces: a) celle concernant la perte 
des aspects valorisés de la vie, ou l'angoisse par rapport à la perte et à la destruction de 
l'objet, et b) celle de la perte du corps en tant que médium de plaisir et d'action, ou 
l'angoisse concernant le moi corporel. De plus, l'intervieweur fait usage de ce thème 
pour demander une définition générale de l'angoisse. Le troisième thème, la peur de 
l'anéantissement, a été utilisé pour explorer la conception des participants concernant les 
menaces d'anéantissement et de désintégration. L'interview utilise ce thème pour poser 
des questions sur la nature agressive et persécutrice de telles angoisses. 
Données et analyse 
Les données consistent en enregistrements retranscrits d'interviews. Selon Lakoff et 
Johnson (1980 : 22-24), le choix des concepts, des définitions et des métaphores de la 
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personne qui parle peut mettre en valeur un aspect d'une expérience et en éliminer un 
autre. Cassell (1975) soutient que les cliniciens utilisent deux genres de pensées: la 
pensée analytique et la pensée appréciative. La pensée analytique, qui explique les 
catégories de maladies, est décrite comme étant scientifique, empirique et réductionniste. 
D'un autre côté, la pensée appréciative intègre les observations d'une manière sélective 
basée sur des jugements de valeurs. Cassel décrit ces deux modes de pensée comme étant 
interdépendants. Fondée sur ces indications, notre analyse met l'accent sur comment les 
actes de langage qui valorisent et qui dévalorisent sont accomplis. La première lecture 
identifie tous les actes de langage qui valorisent, qui reconnaissent, qui acceptent, 
valident ou mettent en lumière les thèmes de l'interview. La seconde lecture explore les 
actes de langage qui dévalorisent, qui invalident, qui dénient, ignorent ou cachent certains 
thèmes de l'interview. La troisième lecture a pour but d'explorer la relation entre les deux 
actes de langage dans les trois interviews. En effet, elle a pour objectif de révéler si les 
témoignages des participants se recoupent dans leur traitement des thèmes. Comme 
résultats, nous présenterons la troisième lecture et la dernière. 
ANALYSE ET RÉSULTATS 2 
Le premier thème, la psychologie du patient souffrant de douleur chronique, a ouvert le 
dialogue à l'expérience du participant avec le malade. Le premier participant dévalorise 
le fait qu'il n'y ait qu'un seul compte rendu pour ce thème et il pense que celui-ci 
nécessite une «gamme» d'expériences. Le second participant offre un compte rendu 
cohérent pour ce thème, qui comprend la perte, la dépression, la frustration, la colère et 
l'angoisse. TI croit que la peur de la perte est considérable et il reconnaît sa nature 
profondément personnelle et insaisissable (<< douleur privée de ses droits»). Le troisième 
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participant a fait remarquer comment la souffrance prolongée engendre la frustration, le 
désespoir et la colère. Elle réfère à la dépression et à l'angoisse comme étant des 
sentiments importants. Finalement, elle insiste sur l'impuissance comme constituant un 
ensemble de sentiments. Tous les participants valorisent la psychologie complexe des 
patients souffrant de douleur chronique, qui met en jeu l'impuissance, la dépression, 
l'angoisse et la colère. 
Le deuxième thème, l'angoisse des patients souffrant de douleur chronique, a 
permis aux participants de décrire deux principaux types de menaces souvent ressentis 
par les patients souffrant de douleur chronique: a) la perte des aspects valorisés de la vie 
et b) la perte du corps en tant que médium d'action et de plaisir. C'est pourquoi 
l'interview nous a permis d'utiliser ce thème pour explorer la définition générale de 
l'angoisse en tant que concept théorique. 
Le premier participant reconnaît le caractère envahissant des angoisses des 
patients souffrant de douleur chronique. Elle fait remarquer que la perte des aspects 
valorisés de la VIe peut être ressentie comme constituant une perte d'identité. Elle 
valorise la rupture avec le corps et le sens de l'aliénation et de la désintégration. 
Cependant, lorsqu'on lui demande de définir l'angoisse, elle met l'accent sur la réaction 
de peur physiologique et physique en termes concrets. Dans une tentative de connaître 
son opinion sur le contenu de l'angoisse, on lui demande jusqu'à quel point la peur de la 
désintégration pourrait être vécue comme constituant une agression contre le moi. Elle 
exprime sa surprise par rapport à la question. Elle tente alors de dévaloriser l'agression et, 
à sa place, valorise la nature concrète de la perte, qu'elle n'explique qu'en termes 
personnels et interpersonnels. Ensuite, alors que l'idée de la rupture avec le corps est 
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repnse, le discours du participant change, pour valoriser l'agression. Elle réfère à la 
relation avec son propre corps comme étant une «bataille ». Quoiqu'elle valorise le 
thème de la désintégration/agression, son discours se concentre sur comment celui-ci est 
limité à ses échecs réels à réaliser les aspirations interpersonnelles et sociales, et les 
demandes n'ayant aucun contenu intrapsychique. 
Le deuxième participant approche les angoisses des patients souffrant de douleur 
chronique en définissant l'angoisse comme étant le sentiment non souhaité de peur qui 
naît des incertitudes du futur et des insécurités du moi. Dans une tentative d'émettre son 
opinion sur le contenu de l'angoisse, il réfère à l'angoisse existentielle. Mais illa délimite 
à une perte interpersonnelle et sociale importante qui ébranle les idées et les attentes face 
à la vie, et qui menace l'identité du malade. Lorsqu'on lui demande son opinion sur la 
menace ressentie par le patient comme résultat de sa vie avec un corps qui fait mal, il 
renvoie à un sentiment de trahison et de punition. En expliquant les menaces violentes 
dont quelqu'un peut faire l'expérience comme étant le résultat de sa vie avec un corps qui 
« punit» et qui « trahit », il reconnaît que, pour certaines personnes, blesser peut vouloir 
dire endommager. Mais il attribue de tels sentiments à une erreur cognitive devant être 
corrigée. TI a donc dévalué toute signification latente de cette peur. En expliquant la 
rupture avec le corps, il recoUl1 à la métaphore du corps du malade qui est amputé par la 
douleur. Quoiqu'il valorise la rupture avec le corps, il prend soin de montrer qu'elle est 
nettement associée à l'ampleur des blessures réelles. 
Le troisième participant aborde les angoisses des patients souffrant de douleur 
chronique en expliquant le contenu de l'angoisse. Elle reconnaît que l'impuissance est 
constituée d'une gamme de sentiments qui comprennent les soucis des patients découlant 
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du fait d'être mal compris des autres, même de l'équipe soignante. Lorsqu'on lui 
demande une définition générale de l'angoisse, elle valorise l'angoisse en tant 
qu'ensemble de sentiments d'être menacée qui mèneraient à des réactions 
comportementales. Dans sa définition, elle explique le danger en termes de «menace 
envers la personne et le bien-être physique ». Elle valorise le sentiment d'aliénation 
venant du corps de deux façons. Premièrement, elle reconnaît «un sentiment de 
trahison» pouvant amener le malade à être «contre son corps ». Deuxièmement, elle 
décrit comment une telle rupture pourrait transformer le corps en un objet concret 
(<< externalisé », « personnifié») de peur et d' hostilité (dans une « bataille»). Cependant, 
elle dévalorise la prédominance de telles menaces et attribue de tels états émotionnels 
uniquement à des patients disposés psychologiquement. Elle reconnaît que pour ceux qui 
manquent de compréhension psychologique, le contenu de la souffrance pourrait 
apparaître plus nettement au psychologue qu'aux patients. Elle pense que les patients, 
dans l'ensemble, ne craignent que la perte de leurs capacités concrètes qui sont 
considérées comme étant importantes pour remplir leurs rôles sociaux et interpersonnels. 
Le troisième thème, l'angoisse de l'anéantissement, a été utilisé pour explorer les 
opinions des participants sur la menace de dissolution du moi. Après avoir exposé 
brièvement les menaces causées par la perte des aspects valorisés de la vie et du corps, 
nous demandons au premier participant si de telles angoisses peuvent constituer une 
menace d'anéantissement du moi. Après une longue pause, le premier participant 
dévalorise ce thème. Malgré sa mention préalable d'une menace pour l'identité, elle 
réagit avec confusion et surprise à notre question directe. Ensuite, elle rejette l'idée 
qu'elle est loin de son cadre de pensée. Puis, elle révèle son ambivalence, alors qu'elle 
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explique les angoisses épuisantes des patients souffrant de douleur chronique. Pourtant, 
elle évoque l'idée d'une vulnérabilité congénitale pour expliquer de telles angoisses. Elle 
admet finalement que l'idée « ne correspond pas» à sa conception des patients. 
En réponse à une question semblable, le deuxième participant dévalorise le thème 
en déclarant qu'il «n'a aucune idée ». Une expression non lexicale prolongée (<< u : : 
m ») et de longues pauses ponctuent sa déclaration. Ensuite, il poursuit en parlant de 
« réellement le perdre» ou de « devenir fou ». li valorise la présence de tels sentiments 
chez «certains patients ». Cependant, il définit le moi ou l'identité comme étant un 
ensemble social de rôles et d'attentes interpersonnelles. D'après cette définition, il décrit 
la menace de « réellement le perdre» comme étant un « changement dramatique dans les 
rôles» qui fait que le malade se sent perdu. Quoiqu'il aille aussi loin que de valoriser la 
scission avec le corps, il n'a pas valorisé le thème de se désintégrer. il l'a plutôt décrit en 
termes de ne pas être capable de remplir ses rôles sociaux. 
En réponse au même thème, le troisième participant exprime ses doutes sur le 
terme et sur son adéquation. L'intensité du terme lui-même semble faire partie de la 
raison pour laquelle elle pense qu'il est inapproprié. Cependant, elle lui donne une 
reconnaissance conditionnelle en parlant de «peur fondamentale» ou de «peur très 
solide» qu'elle ne rencontre que dans des situations extrêmes. Elle réitère le fait qu'une 
angoise si intense n'existe que lorsque la perte réelle culmine en un désastre 
professionnel, relationnel et financier total n'ayant aucune conséquence intrapsychique. 
CONCLUSION 
Les histoires des participants renvoient à un sentiment affligeant d'angoisse concernant 
l'objet endommagé et qui est sur le point d'être perdu comme résultat de l'incapacité du 
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moi à rendre la pareille. Le moi ressent les remords de conscience aigus d'une culpabilité 
cruelle et usant de représailles. Faisant face à un objet endommagé, les participants 
manifestent de l'ambivalence par rapport au fait de dépendre d'un objet qui est en colère 
et qui réagit. Les narrations démontrent comment le moi utilise des défenses 
obsessionnelles primitives pour faire taire son ambivalence et comment la situation 
dégénère alors en un clivage du moi et en angoIsse paranoïde suivant l'échec des 
défenses obsessionnelles. 
Les participants ne peuvent s'empêcher de se sentir comme s'ils étaient saisis par 
une force « douloureuse et dégoûtante », « vicieuse et dure» et « obstinée et acharnée ». 
Ils font allusion à la douleur comme étant une chose, une entité étrangère qui est capable 
de détruire le moi. L'association de la douleur avec des attaques agressives est, en fait, 
une réminiscence de la position paranoïde-schizoïde, lorsque l'instinct de mort produit la 
menace de l'anéantissement en liant le moi aux expériences frustrantes que vit l'enfant. 
Les participants à cette étude démontrent comment les sentiments terrifiants de menace 
ont eu un impact sur leur perception et ont coloré leur expérience de la douleur. À mesure 
qu'ils racontent leur histoire, les participants superposent leur expérience vécue à ce que 
l'on retrouve dans les thèmes illustrés et font des références révélatrices à la douleur, à 
l'angoisse, à la destruction et à l'anéantissement. À travers leur histoire, dès que la 
narration concerne l'angoisse, des images d'agression et de mort sont évoquées et 
associées à la douleur comme étant une entité assaillante ou une monstruosité. La peur 
apparaît aux participants à cette étude comme étant l'expérience concrète d'agression qui 
menace de détruire le moi et l'objet. La cohérence avec laquelle la douleur apparaît 
xxx 
comme étant la mort et la destruction à travers ces récits démontre l'importance de 
J'angoisse primitive pour comprendre l'expérience personnelle des malades. 
Analyser le contenu de ces angoisses est la clé du symbolisme du corps souffrant 
de douleur chronique. Les angoisses intenses associées à douleur ont une qualité 
primitive remarquable qui ne peut être interprétée et explorée qu'à travers l'analyse des 
libres associations des participants. Pour le moi infantile, la douleur a une qualité 
persécutrice qui est expérimentée concrètement en tant que peur de la persécution. Des 
sentiments semblables d'angoisse et de menace réapparaissent dans le moi adulte, qui est 
saisi par la douleur chronique sans pouvoir faire quoi que ce soit. L'impuissance ravive 
l'histoire primitive de la douleur du moi et réveille à nouveau les fantasmes et les peurs 
infantiles. En effet, l'expérience de l'adulte de la douleur chronique mène souvent à des 
sentiments grotesques qui sont explicables, si leur contenu n'est pas exclu ou ignoré. 
D'un autre côté, la psychologie de la santé et la médecine comportementale 
tendent à expliquer la réaction du malade par rapport à la souffrance comme étant une 
réponse liée à un stimulus, réponse qui a été élaborée et évaluée cognifivement en tant 
que tentative d'ajuster la douleur à l'environnement social et interpersonnel basée sur des 
cognitions apprises pour traiter les événements significatifs de la vie. De cette manière, 
les angoisses de destruction et d'anéantissement souvent rapportées par les malades 
deviennent rien de plus que des réponses mésadaptées à la douleur qui sont étiquetées 
comme étant des peurs disproportionnées. Au mieux, de telles angoisses sont considérées 
comme étant causées par un manque de soutien social ou par une dépossession de rôle. Si 
elles sont reconnues, de telles angoisses sont perçues comme étant disproportionnées par 
rapport au véritable espoir de réadaptation de la douleur chronique. Cette interprétation 
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de l'angoisse élimine toute référence à l'histoire primitive de la douleur et à la dimension 
intrapsychique de l'expérience de la douleur. Par cette élimination, la psychologie de la 
santé évite le besoin d'explorer l'expérience primitive de la douleur du patient. Alors que 
les images de destruction et d'agression sont ignorées, l'attention clinique se déplace de 
l'expérience subjective du patient vers les réactions comportementales concrètes et leurs 
conséquences observables. De cette manière, la signification terrifiante de l'expérience de 
la douleur chronique est perdue dans l'emphase placée sur l'accomplissement du rôle 
social, qui élimine de son compte toute référence à l'expérience intérieure du malade. 
Dans un résumé de cas, Fordyce (1996 : 41) explique comment ses collègues et 
lui répondent aux plaintes incessantes de douleur d'un patient par des réactions 
comp011ementaies négatives, afin de décourager ses comportements de douleur 
mésadaptés. Comme résultat, pendant qu'ils font la tournée des salles de l'hôpital, ils 
conviennent de répondre à « toute référence à la douleur en regardant à la fenêtre comme 
façon de modifier la rétroaction sociale ». Dans un autre exemple, Long (1996 : 8) 
déclare: «Les discussions sur la douleur n'étaient pas permises entre les infirmières et 
les patients ou avec les médecins, sauf à des moments spécifiques lors des tournées ou 
pendant les séances de thérapies.» Fordyce déclare: «Notez que les membres du 
personnel n'étaient pas pour ignorer les comportements de douleur; ils n'étaient que très 
légèrement réceptifs au point de vue social et ils portaient une attention spéciale aux 
efforts du patient pour augmenter le niveau de ses activités» (44). Fordyce (1989 : 55) 
soutient qu'une telle rétroaction négative « peut décourager et inhiber l'expression de la 
douleur ou des comportements de souffrance, et par conséquent promouvoir une 
résolution hâtive du problème de la douleur ». 
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Quoique nulle part les participants à cette étude ne suggèrent quoi que ce soit de 
loin semblable à l'approche de Fordyce, leur inclination à éviter de discuter du contenu et 
de la signification de l'angoisse du patient doit beaucoup au cadre prévalent de la 
psychologie de la santé tel que présenté explicitement par Fordyce et ses collègues. Dans 
notre autoréflexion sur le processus d'interview, nous avons reconnu que lorsque les 
participants décrivaient leurs observations directes et leurs impressions, nous avons 
moins ressenti le besoin de leur demander de clarifier ou d'élaborer. Leurs descriptions 
candides comportaient plusieurs observations habituellement rencontrées dans la 
documentation sur le sujet. Cependant, nous étions anxieux de demander des 
clarifications lorsque que le participant passait à un ton explicatif. Pendant que nous 
écoutions leurs explications, nous nous sentions ambivalent par rapport au modèle 
explicatif utilisé pour rendre compte des états intérieurs de la douleur des patients et de 
leurs expériences personnelles. Le passage graduel du discours d'un ton explicatif à un 
ton descriptif semblait avoir une fonction régulatrice et normative, en délimitant la 
signification des symptômes. En d'autres termes, cela diminuait la vivacité des premières 
observations et les rendait contrôlées, désambiguïsées et réduites. La saisie de la 
signification était basée sur la transformation de chaque état intérieur en un reflet d'une 
matière réelle et concrète. Ensuite, si celle-ci était proportionnée au réel et bénéfique à 
l'action, elle était considérée comme ne nécessitant aucune modification. Au moment où 
il passait au mode normatif, le monde intérieur du patient s'éloignait du premier plan du 
discours pour en occuper l'arrière-plan. À travers ces pratiques discursives, les 
psychologues de la santé font davantage que traduire diverses ambiguïté des symptômes 
(Sebeok 1994 : 65-82, et Balthes, 1994 : 202-213), ils construisent une conscience 
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particulière de la douleur et de la souffrance dans laquelle les patients doivent donner un 
sens à leurs épreuves et lutter pour saisir la signification de leur souffrance. Pour 
plusieurs de ces patients, les pratiques discursives de la psychologie de la santé limüent la 
signification douloureuse de leurs virulentes angoisses, étant donné qu'elles les laissent 
avec peu d'occasions d'explorer la souffrance au-delà de sa signification la plus concrète 
et extériorisée. 
Aujourd'hui, la gestion de la douleur cherche à redéfinir tous les sentiments 
subjectifs et toutes les menaces perçues en termes d'évaluation comportementale 
objective de la douleur chronique, de manière à réduire, la réponse «qui est source de 
mauvaise adaptation ». Faisant face à l'impuissance terrifiante des patients, les 
spécialistes de la réadaptation tentent de fournir une « dose de réalité », en éduquant les 
malades par rapport à leur douleur et à la perspective de la réadaptation adaptative. Ce 
qui reste de l'expérience vécue de la peur, de la dépression et de l'impuissance doit être 
corrigé par une rétroaction comportementale négative et par un recadrage cognitif. En 
effet, la psychologie de la santé crée une intervention clinique dans laquelle la 
signification est préfigurée en mettant l'accent sur le comportement adaptatif et 
l'expérience subjective est déformée par l'emphase sur la réponse liée au stimulus. 
Aujourd'hui, la gestion de la souffrance est fondée sur la conception que chaque état 
intérieur est le reflet d'une expérience réelle, publique ou interpersonnelle dépourvue de 
fantasme inconscient et qui doit rencontrer l'économie objective de l'accomplissement du 
rôle social et de la réciprocité interpersonnelle. Les cognitions en tant qu'activités 
mentales ayant des prétentions objectives à la validité sont plus valorisées que les 
émotions comme expériences personnelles et préverbales (Nussbaum, 2001 : 93). En 
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mettant l'accent sur le comportement, l'univers intérieur du patient et le fantasme 
inconscient perdent leur gravité existentielle et n'ont pas même un rôle marginal dans 
l'explication de l'expérience vécue de la douleur chronique. Par la suite, une écoute riche 
en contenu associatif est remplacée par une attitude clinique concentrée sur les réponses 
liées au stimulus et sur l'accomplissement du rôle social ou sur la dépossession du rôle. 
Dans le contexte de la présente étude, le symbolisme primitif du corps en douleur 
chronique diffère radicalement de celui qui a été discuté par les auteurs en 
psychosomatique. Réfléchissant sur la douleur, les participants utilisent des discours 
riches en langage figuratif et en contenu affectif. Dans leurs élaborations, ils ne laissent 
voir aucun signe de pensée fonctionnelle, non plus qu'on y rencontre quelque signe 
d'appauvrissement de l'affect, de la verbalisation ou de la relation d'objet. Le 
symbolisme primitif du corps observé au cours de la présente étude s'étend au-delà de la 
notion de structure psychosomatique en tant que formation primitive particulière causée 
par une rupture traumatique entre le désir impulsif et la conscience. On ne constate, en 
fait, aucune régression massive ni aucune pathologie traumatique du moi. Les 
participants reconnaissent l'arthrite rhumatoïde comme étant la cause de leur douleur 
chronique. La physiopathologie de l'arthrite rhumatoïde explique clairement la source de 
la stimulation nocive et de la nociception. Cependant, chaque fois que le traitement 
n'arrive pas à fournir des résultats concluants, être se réduit à ressentir de la douleur. 
L'éclatement ou la destluction de l'univers du malade reflète l'émergence d'angoisses 
primitives. Aussi longtemps que les malades ressentent leur corps et qu'ils ont des raisons 
de réagir désespérément face à leur douleur, leur corps ne serait pas dépourvu de 
symbolisme. Le symbolisme du corps est le symbolisme des angoisses primitives 
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réveillées dans le contexte du corps faisant continuellement mal. Poussées à la surface par 
la douleur, ces angoisses sont des dérivés de l'expérience somatique, et non le contraire. 
De cette manière, le symbolisme du corps s'étend au-delà de l'origine et de l'étiologie du 
symptôme, et est en parallèle à l'expérience du corps. 
Nous avons tenté de démontrer, dans cette étude, jusqu'à quel point, malgré les 
associations graphiques des malades, la pratique actuelle de la gestion de la souffrance ne 
veut pas reconnaître que souffrir de douleur chronique peut virtuellement contenir et 
symboliser des angoisses primitives d'anéantissement et de destruction. Au cours des 
dernières décennies, un changement sauvage des catégories nosologiques a inclus dans 
celles-ci la fibromyalgie, le syndrome de dysfonction de l'articulation 
temporomandibulaire, le syndrome du colon irritable, le syndrome de la fatigue 
chronique et le syndrome de la douleur chronique. Cependant, insérer la souffrance 
humaine dans des catégories de maladies comme des choses nous a permis d'ignorer la 
souffrance et sa signification intrapsychique. Pour les patients souffrant de douleur 
chronique et pour la société dans son ensemble, reconnaître ce déni tout-puissant et le 
contrôle peut signifier aller au-delà de l'approche restrictive qui a effectivement séparé de 
notre discours toute référence à la signification primitive de la souffrance. D'un autre 
côté, considérer la souffrance humaine comme constituant une expérience significative 
peut peut-être nous permettre de voir jusqu'à quel point nous réagissons aux angoisses 
primitives d'anéantissement et de destruction chaque fois que nous écrivons un projet de 
recherche, que nous cherchons ou établissons un diagnostic, que nous trouvons ou offrons 
un traitement, animons ou suivons un programme de réadaptation ou participons à un 
groupe d'intervention sur la douleur chronique. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The tragedy is that we are relying on our 
capacity for thinking to understand what is 
happening when what is happening stops 
us from thinking. 
Emilia Steuerman, The Rounds of Reason 
(2000) 
Chronic, unlike acute pam, persists without significant relief after three months of 
treatment. Frustrating the curative power of modern medicine, it evades the most reliable 
assays, and rarely corresponds to the extent of actual injuries or objective process of 
disease (Wall, 1979, 2000). Working with chronic pain patients, psychologists routinely 
confront suffering and anguish, with aIl its puzzling ambiguities. For sufferers, chronic 
pain brings about significant losses that shake their lives and upset their way of being. 
Regardless of its kind or duration, "pain defies our ordinary assumption that an 
experience is either real, that is, rooted in irnrnediate sensory experience of the world, or 
imagined, that is, the outcome of internaI psychological and mental processes" (Scarry, 
1985:46). Chronic pain, for its invasive impact, is felt beyond what is conventionally 
recognized by the physiological concept of disease or injury (Melzack and Wall, 
1982: 15-26). Hence, its veracity is not infrequently contested, questioned or viewed 
with scepticism. However, not long after being diagnosed, this so-called questionable 
agony becomes an agonizing question that blights the prospect of understanding and the 
feelings of self-sufficiency. When sufferers come to realize that there is no cure or 
respite, their pain assumes an adverbial quality that interlaces every act, experience, 
intention, state, or movement. In effect, emotional distress becomes an integral part of 
being in pain, when life means living painfully. 
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To relieve suffering and to restore hope and confidence, health psychologists and 
clinicians have to understand the sufferer's personal experience of pain. If they faU short, 
patients feel more exasperated about their healing prospect. However, to succeed, they 
ought to make sense of anxieties and fears that at times make chronic pain a shattering 
and soul-destroying experience. The task is far from unproblematic, since from 
professional point of view, understanding means using a generic system of specialized 
knowledge (nomothetic) to formulate a clinical opinion out of the inchoate and densely 
meaningful experience of the sufferer. In this process, chances are that we come to 
recognize and acknowledge only those aspects of suffering that are positively affirmed, 
and readily explained by our established framework of clinical practice. Hence, it seems 
reasonable to ask: are there aspects of suffering that are ignored or overlooked, because 
we may be not ready or capable of confronting them or seeing them as meaningful? 
Within literature, intractable pain is increasingly described and investigated as lived 
experience, Erlebnis that defies linear, coherent, and detached conceptualization (Good, 
1992). Human experience, as Erlebnis, unfolds firsthand for the individual by the virtue 
of being lived, and as such it is said to be irreducible to concept (Benjamin, 1968; 
Dilthey, 1985). By the same token, chronic pain, in its lived sense, seems to pervade aU 
facets of one's being in a manner so ineffable that defies objectification through spoken 
words of the ordinary language (Woolf, 1930; Scarry, 1985). It is therefore important to 
ask: to what extent our clinical understanding of the patient's experience is shaped and 
preconditioned by how we conceive of suffering and anxiety in our mainstream clinical 
practice. This question demands serious reflection, since the phenomenology of anxiety, 
3 
and pain extends beyond the limits of theoretical constructs, operationalized definitions, 
and measurement tools. Suffering echoes the individual's past and present at once, and 
encompasses one' s trepidation over future. 
Not infrequently, chranic pain sufferers speak of their teITifying anxieties, as 
though their sense of selfhood is about to disintegrate, dissolve, or annihilate. They refer 
to their painful bodies as something split fram them that threatens their basic integrity, 
self-sufficiency, and wholeness. In everyday clinical practice, health psychologists and 
pain rehabilitation workers refer to the patient's terrifying anxieties and bleak 
helplessness as catastraphizing. As part of today' s clinical nomenclature, catastrophizing 
offers a particular explanation for why distressing anxieties of death and destruction 
become a source of deep preoccupation for at least a subgroup of sufferers. Where such 
anxieties surface, health psychologists construe them as cognitive and emotional 
magnification of pain experience, brought about by a negative over-reaction to hurt, loss, 
and aggravation. This over-reaction is said to be mediated by cognitive 
representations-beliefs, attributions, and interpersonal-social expectations-that 
overstate the nature and the consequence of pain (Sullivan, Thorn, Haythornthwaite, 
Keefe, Martin, Bradley, and Leefebvre, 2001) and ultimately cause adaptive reactions 
and behaviours to become disproportionately woeful and to turn into suffering and 
distress. To undo this cognitive misrepresentation, patients are taught and encouraged to 
"stick to the facts and check out the assumptions" (Skevington, 1995: 213). In a sense, 
the remedy is plain and simple: let' s educate the patient and their families to see pain as 
what it is according to the science of pain behaviour and not what they might read into 
the situation and reinforce interpersonally. 
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As a result, the sufferer's dreadful and woeful feelings are deemed to arise from 
significant magnification of pain through unrealistically negative cognitions that are at 
times sustained by interpersonal reinforcement. However, is cognitive rnisrepresentation 
ail that is at stake, when terrifying anxieties of destruction consume a pain sufferer? Are 
such anxieties simply arising from magnifying and then misascribing actual losses to 
potential events through a biased cognitive appraisal, or faulty information processing? 
Would catastrophizing persevere as a result of being or having been interpersonally 
reinforced? How else can pain experience kindle the fear of death and how else can 
anxieties secondary to pain evoke anguish over death and destruction? Should clinicians 
focus primarily on the explicit content of cognitions or should they treat cognitive 
distortions as symbolic clues to a yet deeper set of entanglements? Would it be 
reasonable to think of cognitive processes as the apex and the rnirror of ail that shapes 
someone's experience of pain and suffering? To answer these questions, one has to 
explore how pain, anxiety, and death emerge in the sufferer's experience. Such 
exploration cannot assume the preponderance of overt cognitive processes over the 
experience of suffer, and must adopt an angle much wider than what has been so far 
prescribed in pain research. 
Despite the view that emphasizes rnisrepresentation, pain within the larger scope 
of human experience is as much distinct as emergent from death and anxiety (Scarry, 
1985: 118; Morris, 1991). Whenever unto death is the sickness, pain is sickness 
rendered sentient to consciousness and the ultimate harbinger of death. William James 
must be recognized as the first psychologist who focused on the contingency of life as 
visibly witnessed through illness and pain (James, 190211958). Historically speaking, 
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contemplating on pain and anxieties of death and destruction is by itself not a new idea. 
In his work, The Nature of Things, the Roman poet-philosopher, Lucretius (circa 96-55 
RC.), brings together the trilogy of pain, anguish, and death to reveal how through pain, 
human suffering involves of deeper anxieties over annihilation and destruction (Charles 
Segal, 1990). For the ancients, the kinship of pain, anxiety, and death was less a matter 
of misrepresentation than a tragic enigma, the underside of the human destiny (Motpat in 
Greek, or Parcae or Fata in Latin), worthy of serious reflection (Morris, 1991:245-255). 
The ancients, through such effort, uncovered the enigma of death, pain, and anguish 
within the ethos of their own age. In contrast, modern bio-medical advances in treatment, 
anaesthetics and analgesics have reshaped contemporary understanding of pain and 
suffering as what we must first and foremost strive to overcome and alleviate through 
diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation (Morris, 1991:9-30). Hence, the human enigma 
has transformed into a biopsychosocial puzzle with weil defined pieces, over which 
triumph becomes possible, once we understand and fit the pieces together. At the centre 
of this puzzle, organicity as nociception stands as a constitutional element and makes 
pain different from suffering as the mere affective sequelae of malaise (Ricoeur, 1994). 
However, with its invasive impact and indeterrninate nociception, intractable pain 
rekindles the age old enigma of death and pain. Chronic pain sufferers often struggle 
with grievous questions and trepidations regarding their prospect and future in the face of 
pain, threat, and anguish. When medical remedies prove ineffective, pain opens the 
yawning abyss of the questions that Lucretius found in many ways unanswerable but 
meaningful. 
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Existentialist philosophers and psychologists have explored pain and the anxiety 
of death from a perspective that is in many ways akin to the ancients. In their view, as 
the common sign of hurt, injury, and disease, pain becomes the harbinger of ail that can 
destroy life and bring about perdition and ruination. In this manner, it becomes 
inseparable from our awareness of finitude or death as the source of anxiety (misprision 
and Kierkeggard). It is, however, in psychoanalytic theory and practice that the kinship 
between death, pain, and anxiety is explored and its symbolism is argued in depth. 
Following Freud's late development of death instinct (Todestrieb) , Klein's work with 
children (1920, 1928, 1929, and 1933) inspired psychoanalysts to reconsider the 
importance of death instinct for understanding infantile anxieties and unconscious 
phantasies as the germinating ground of adult functioning. Klein argues that even the 
mature ego ultimately copes with painful anxiety situations of the adult life by drawing 
upon the psychic material of the earlier time. This primitive psychic material is shown to 
have developed through early object relation, when the infantile ego struggles with threat 
of annihilation and destruction. Based on Klein' s theory of infantile deve10pment, it is 
from primitive pain and frustration as unwanted and hated experience that the adult's 
pain perception and behaviour evolve and take shape. Hence, dreadful anxieties of the 
chronic pain sufferers cannot be taken as misrepresentations, as they are part of the 
primitive, preverbal history of pain that have returned at the moment of crisis. 
At first sight, the object relation theOl'y of infantile pain may seem less germane to 
what is readily recognizable as pain experience proper. It is quite contrary not only to 
self-evident common sense, but also to much of the established framework of today' s 
psychology. In many ways, such heavily interpretive approach may even risk being 
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called fanciful theorizing with little empirical validity and practical value. However, 
independent reports by many sufferers, clinicians, and researchers have revealed puzzling 
aspects of pain that one cannot easily dismiss or preclude from explanation as noise in the 
data, or as cognitive misrepresentations with little significance and import. Nor, can the 
prevailing explanatory models daim to have dealt with many puzzling aspects of pain 
sufficiently, either in theory or in practice. The ethnographers often marvel at the 
deficiency of ordinary language in objectifying pain, and wonder about the preverbal 
quality of suffering with little insight into the preverbal history of pain (Good, 1992). 
Researchers often speak of how pain inexplicably involves anger, hatred, and aggression, 
even when it is known to be the result of natural factors (Scarry, 1985; Bakan, 1968). 
Others have shown how pain appears to sorne as an alien entity that has invaded the self 
(Leder, 1990). Case studies are collected wherein patient report their fear of 
annihilation in a graphie and chilling manner (Good, 1992; Delvecchio Good, 1992). It 
becomes, therefore, necessary to ask whether pain has a primitive history, wherein the 
aforementioned puzzles are rooted, and whether this primitive history can be reawaken 
and relived as anxieties of annihilation and destruction. Tthese questions allow in a new 
understanding of pain that involves the primitive core of the sufferer' s inner world. 
However, for answering them, a fundamental rethinking of pain, death, and anxiety is 
required, a rethinking that is not unyielding to or disdainful of primitive object relation 
and infantile development. 
However, aside from what chronic pain sufferers endure, is there a larger import 
to such fundamental rethinking? In other words, is there any reason behind this 
undertaking that might make it significant not only to chronic pain sufferers, but to the 
" 
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society at large? In fact, exploring the primitive history of pain can have wider 
implications beyond that of clinical settings. For the most part, such exploration would 
encourage a reflection on our collective psychology and on our accepted ways of dealing 
with unwanted, threatening experiences, such as: destruction, loss, and death. Death, 
whether as existential finitude or as primitive destructive impulse, poses a challenge not 
only to human understanding, but more importantly to our collective habits of feeling and 
experiencing; to our cherished ways of living and understanding, or to what social 
philosophers generally cali our situated rationality (Heidegger, 1962). For 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis, when the spark of understanding radically undercuts 
the established frame of mind, it risks revealing what is too eerie to accept or to integrate 
into consciousness (Freud, 191912003). In fact, the close affinity between anxiety and 
death has been described as the uncanny, disquieting undertone of human existence, 
which we struggle to avoid (Davis, 1989; Becker 1973; Lifton 1983). 
If such avoidance is by any means extant, how we make use of disease and pain in 
the context of everyday life to deal with the unwanted and eerie side of existence can be 
an illuminating query and can lead to unsettling insights. In his study of anxiety, Rollo 
May (1977) questions our popular and professional attitude to pain and disease, by 
warning, "that people utilize disease in the same way older generations used evil-as an 
object on which to project their hated experiences in order to avoid having to take 
responsibility for them" (86). May's admonishment about the everyday use of disease 
contends that pain as the most common part of ailment has become a receptacle, onto 
which "hated experiences" are projected for the purpose of disowning and discarding 
them from consciousness. If this insight has any base or existential validity, it would be 
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indispensable to note that sufferers who walk into rehabilitation centers may bring to 
clinical encounter more than their pain syndromes. Equally, it is important to recognize 
that clinicians may be dealing with more than simple magnifications of doom and gloom 
as catastrophizing. However, we must ultimately ask how discarding hated experiences 
through disease would impact our everyday psychology and mental health. 
In effect, it would seem warranted to say that exploring the primitive history of 
pain can open a new outlook for the understanding of pain, suffering, illness, and disease 
and the unconscious symbolic content of these categories of discourse and experience. In 
this effort, our theoretical scope cannot be reduced and delimited to the prevailing modes 
of thinking about, or gathering data on pain. Rather, the choice of theoretical and 
methodological frame must closely follow the sufferers' experience and take into account 
the subjective experiences of the suffering as meaningful. Il is the interpretive approach 
to pain and suffering that can ultimately lead out the primitive symbolism of content. 
In other words, the present study can be construed as an attempt in rethinking the 
theory and practice of pain management from a phenomenological and psychoanalytic 
point of view. However, such interpretive project can equally be seen as a challenge to 
mainstream psychoanalysis which has traditionally focused on how pain as a symptom 
symbolizes the anxieties of depth caused by psychic conflict. Since Freud' s studies on 
hysteria (Freud and Breuer, 189512004), psychoanalysts have written extensively on the 
intrapsychic dynamics underlying pain. Various analytic schools have investigated how 
psychosomatic illness and somatic preoccupations can arise from repressed conflicts and 
primitive personality structures. In theory and in technique, the psychoanalysis of pain 
has hitherto inferred somatic events as the derivative of intrapsychic dynamics. This 
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postulation has defined the horizon of the debate, wherein body symbolism is constructed 
from the psyche as the seat of conflict to the somatic symptom as the compromise 
formation. In contrast, this study does not ask so much how intrapsychic conflict may 
begets pain as how chronic pain may beget intrapsychic primitive significance. In other 
words, it asks whether intractable pain reawakens the primitive anxieties of death and 
destruction, as part of the sufferer's debilitating and agonizing condition and bring back 
to present, aspects of primitive past that we are terrified to relive and re-experience. 
Similar to other human experiences, it is through verbalization, as insight-oriented 
and self-reflective interlocution, that our unwanted experiences are named, objectified, 
elaborated, and afforded a place in discourse and consciousness. Where this interlocution 
is rendered impossible or muted, our core anxieties and unwanted experiences are denied 
recognition and integration into consciousness. Then, the outcome can be described as a 
terrible foreclosure of meaning that may lead to a devastating impoverishment of the 
psyche or inner world. Hence, are there discourses in today' spain rehabilitation that can 
make these anxieties part of our understanding of suffering? In the context of 
rehabilitation where such meaning making is most expected, the discourse of health 
psychologists holds a unique position in educating millions of sufferers about pain. In 
fact, the prevailing model of rehabilitation largely relies on cognitive-behavioural and 
interpersonal psychology for defining and managing pain, suffering, and anxiety. 
Through pain management practices, the sufferer' s experience is construed according to 
what professionals consider as clinically valid problems and sound ways of complaining. 
Hence, the question becomes whether our prevailing practices allow clinicians and 
patients to talk about primitive angst associated with pain in a meaningful manner. The 
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importance of this question cannot be overstated in today's information driven society 
where the professional discourse steps beyond the clinic boundary, and informs as much 
the diagnostic criteria as the lay representations of suffering and pain (Handy, 1987; Fox, 
1994: 152-159). 
As a result, this study is comprised of a two-fold query. The first fold asks 
whether chronic pain patients experience anxieties of death and destruction as a 
meaningful part of their suffering, whereas the second inquires whether the prevailing 
discursive practices in today's clinical settings can allow articulation and meaningful 
elaboration of the primitive complexity of pain. The general aim of this study is to casts 
light on the anxieties experienced by the pain sufferers in today' s context of 
rehabilitation. To his end, it explores not only the experience of the sufferers , but also 
the discourse of the health psychologists. In effect, the present inquiry focuses on a 
problematic that cannot be sufficiently examined if investigated from the patients' end 
without reflection into the discursive practices of the clinicians. 
As a qualitative investigation, the present study negotiates a twofold interpretive 
framework that brings together two interrelated explorations. As a psychoanalytic study, 
it seeks insight into the content of anxieties that are commonly reported as being part of 
suffering from intractable pain. It ultimately asks whether there is any reason to think of 
a primitive history pain and a primitive significance of suffering. However, as a 
phenomenological study, it examines the professional discourses of pain and anxiety in 
health psychology. It asks how this normative understanding legitimizes talking about 
anxiety and pain and shapes our views of suffering. The two conjointly frame the 
problematic of this work and shape the journey from the sufferer's pain experience to the 
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normative clinical discourses that define pain as a social reality. If convincing, this study 
as a whole should persuade the reader to problematize the prevailing view of pain that 
naturalizes suffering in order to deal with through proceduralized strategies of 
modification. If successful, the alternative outlook of this study must emerge as a solid 
possibility for a deeper reflection on the primitive anxiety of death and its place in our 
approach to sufferjng and pain as human experÏence. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Literature Review: A Conceptual Framework for the Study of
 
Anxiety and Chronic Pain
 
Opposer l'être au néant comme la thèse et 
l'antithèse, à la façon de l'entendement 
hégelien, c'est supposer entre eux une 
contemporanéité logique. Ainsi deux 
contraires surgissent en même temps 
comme les deux termes-limites d'une série 
logique, mais le non-être n'est pas le 
contraire de l'être, il est son contradictoire. 
Jean Paul Sartre, L'Être et le néant (1943) 
1.1. Preamble 
Insofar as historical research testifies, our understanding of pain has undergone changes 
of radical and meaningful nature (Rey, 1993; Morris, 1991). In the context of the 
contemporary practice, it is the biomedical model that defines pain as a diagnosis by 
explaining and treating ail subjective complaints or symptoms as signs of an underlying 
disease. Whereas illness represents the patient's subjective experience of affliction, 
disease is what c1inicians objectively diagnose as an underlying physical mechanism 
(Eisenberg, 1977). Focusing on objective disease, the biomedical model is dedicated to 
trace every complaint to a specifie category of tissue pathology or concrete nosology. 
This model treats pain insofar as a particular disease can be identified and physically 
addressed. Pain perception is therefore validated to the extent that it proves to be 
commensurate to the underlying disease. Biomedical diagnosis becomes rather 
unyielding, in cases wherein pain perception and suffering exceed nociception or the 
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process of transmission of noxious stimulation from periphery to the central nervous 
system. For the most part, the disease-oriented understanding of pain precludes the 
subjective and idiosyncratic suffering and disqualifies any reference to the context of 
pain. For biomedical mode1, the only objective context to pain is pathophysiology. 
Despite its success in addressing acute pain, solid clinical evidence can testify to 
the fundamental shortfal1s of the biomedical model. ln fact, pain perception has been 
shown to be rarely the same across individual cases of a single disease. This puzzling 
variabi1ity has been attributed to the significance of iUness in the sufferer' s life (Beecher, 
1956; 2000). Hence, the intensity of pain associated with a palticular type of injury is 
expected to significantly vary according to the context of human experience and the 
bearings of illness on the prospect of general well-being and life (Wall, 1979). The 
growing complexity of the evidence that could testify to the importance of contextual and 
personal factors finally brought biomedicine to a concession with its emerging rival, the 
biopsychosocial model which placed stronger emphasis on the experience of illness. 
From biopsychosocial point of view, pain is a complex perception that extends 
beyond pathophysiology, and involves a much larger range of psychological and social 
processes that frame and give context to the experience of suffering (Melzack and Wall, 
1982). Consequently, the importance of concrete disease as the only true deterrninant of 
pain has been drastically reduced. Today, pain perception is understood as "a network of 
events, both inside and outside the body, as weil as inside and outside the central nervous 
system." (Fordyce, 1989:52). The biopsychosocial view has overhauled past definitions 
ta ensure that what is explained and treated as pain can include the sufferer's experience 
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and life context. In effect, the sufferer' s experience has come to serve as a key for 
planning pain management (Turk, 1996). 
As a preamble to this shift, a new neuropsychology of pain took over the stage 
and fundamentally revised the very basics of the nociception. Historically, pain was 
understood as a one-way mechanism of transnlission of noxious stimulation from 
nociceptors in the periphery to the central nervous system (Melzack & Wall, 1982). The 
transnlitted pain signal was thought to prompt the spinal cord and ultimately the brain to 
generate a perception and initiate proper response patterns. This one-way transnlission 
was described as a process that received no input or modulation from the brain in its 
ascending path to central nervous system. With the arrivaI of a new theory, this 
explanation was finally discarded and nociception emerged as a crosscurrent of 
influences of ascending (downward from the brain) and descending (upward from the 
periphery) path ways that led to a complex pain perception. 
Today, the gate control theory of Melzack and Wall (1965) informs our 
understanding of pain. Theil' revolutionary work finally succeeded to reconceptualize 
pain perception as a two-way process involving neural inputs from both central and 
peripheral regions of the nervous system. Theil' theory suggests that the ascending 
peripheral inputs are transnlitted (by C and A-delta fibers) to the dorsal horns (substantia 
gelatinosa) of the spinal cord, where the cells are organized in layers (laminae). Sorne of 
these layers (laminae 1 and 2) are shown to receive descending projections from brain 
and act as a gating mechanism that can inhibit or facilitate noxious stimulations from 
nociceptors (Melzack, 1986). Melzack and Wall (1982) propose that through the 
descending projections, the brain's cognitive control can mediate the input by inhibitory 
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or excitatory function of the gate. As a result, transITÙssion through the gate depends not 
only on the intensity of the stimulation as defined by the extent of injury, but also on the 
contribution of the central mechanisms of control that mediate the gate. As a result, gate 
control theory took a giant step forward in explaining the role of the brain and the 
deterITÙning contribution of the cognitive control processes in active mediation of pain 
experience. 
ln effect, when an adolescent goes through agonizing rites of passage with an 
unshakeable look of serenity and forbearance, such mechanism of central control are said 
to be working in favour of inhibiting pain (Melzack and Wall, 1982). Hence, charged 
with cultural beliefs and communal sentiments, the teenager can tolerate excruciating 
pain without falling into fatal shock. As a result, the gate control theory reworked the 
very basic physiology of pain to show the significant contribution of higher central 
systems in the modulation of noxious stimulation that occur at the level of the spinal 
cord, well before reaching the brain. In tbis manner, cognitive mechanisms are said to 
modulate the gate that triggers the cascade of neural events which leads to the perception 
and to the ensuing reactions. Unlike its biomedical predecessor, the gate control theory 
is not at odds with the subjective experience of suffering, as it changes pain from a 
simple, one-way sensation to a complex perception involving personal emotions, beliefs, 
socio-cultural teachings, and developmental history (Loeser & Melzack, 1999). 
Soon after the publication of the gate control theory, Melzack and Casey (1968) 
expanded the model to explain pain as a multidimensional experience. The expanded 
model maps the function of different systems that serve as the neural corollary for the 
motivational, affective and cognitive aspects of pain experience. The authors proposed 
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that beside neocortical tracts and epicenters that are responsible for cognitive-evaluative 
mechanism of control, there are two other systems involved in the process. The first is 
known as the neospinothalamic system that connects to ventral posterio-Iateral nucleus of 
thalamus and serves to process sensory-discriminative information. Its overall function 
allows us to determine the location, intensity and duration, as weIl as the different 
sensory shades of pain. In conjunction, the authors identify a second pathway known as 
the paleospinothalmic system that is phylogenetically more primitive than its counterpart. 
Its function involves processing the affective-motivational dimension of pain. It 
transmits information for processing to medial nuclei of thalamus, as weil as to reticular 
and limbic systems. An extensive web of pathways connects thalamus to the limbic 
system which is responsible for unpleasant affects and aversive motivations that 
accompany pain. The over aIl contribution of the cerebral systems, that previously 
though to be only secondary, gradually was shown to be central to the perception of pain. 
This revised version of the theory completed a tripartite model, wherein sensory­
discriminative and affective-motivational dimensions of pain were explained as the 
subordinate partners for the superordinate cognitive-evaluative system of control lodged 
within the epicenters of frontal cortex (Melzack and Casey, 1968). 
ln an important way, this neuropsychological development instigated the advent 
of biopsychosocial model which eventually redefined pain as a complex experience 
involving 4 distinct, but interrelated domains (Loeser, 1980; Turk, 1996). The first is 
nociception, which refers to the process of transmission of noxious stimulation from 
nociceptors through the peripheral nerves ta the dorsal horns of the spinal cord. Second 
is the perception of pain that occurs, when the central nervous system integrates afferent 
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information into the person's past memories, present experiences, and future expectations. 
The perception of pain emerges, as the central nervous system qualifies what has been 
received and deterrnines its significance. The third domain is suffering, which involves 
negative emotional reactions and feelings of threat that are associated with a painful 
condition. The last domain is pain behaviour, which refers to "what a person does or 
does not do or say that leads the observer to infer that the patient is suffering from a 
noxious stimulus" (Loeser & Egan, 1989:7). 
Not long after the publication of the gate control theory, Fordyce, Fowler, 
Lehman, and DeLatour (1968) formulated a behavioural perspective, whereby pain was 
exclusively explained and managed in terms of pain behaviour controlled by 
environmental contingencies and interpersonal feedback. Despite its initial success, 
follow up studies revealed that behavioural strategies were insufficient by themselves in 
maintaining a long-term improvement (Turk and Genest, 1979, Turk, 1996). In addition, 
behavioural explanations couId not account for the overall change of attitude and belief 
with regard to pain (Melzack and Wall, 1982: 333-337; Bradley, 1996). Based on the 
gate control theory, the modification of cognitive processes seemed still crucial, if 
clinicians were to change the sufferer's appraisal of pain. Eventually, Fordyce's (1976) 
behavioural intervention was complemented and tempered by an approach that targeted 
the cognitive-evaluative aspect of pain. Ironically, the techniques proposed for such 
modification came from strategies used in cognitive therapy for anxiety and mood 
disorders (Turk and Genest, 1979; Bradley, 1996). In their new application, they of 
course maintained the same therapeutic targets, but this time with pain being the focal 
problem and the generative ground of emotional suffering. 
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As a result, the biopsychsocial redefinition of pain and the resulting therapeutic 
developments were hailed by researchers and clinicians as a new approach to 
management of pain beyond the conventional concept of disease that brought nociception 
and suffering into a single process. Furthermore, in its revised version, the new theory of 
pain allowed clinicians to assess cognitive, affective, and sensory dimensions ofpain, and 
to make use of cognitive restructuring and behavioural techniques for its management. 
Bence pain management programs changed direction from anaesthesiology to health 
psychology and behavioural medicine to implement this new understanding with the 
promise of taking into account the larger personal experience whereby nociception 
becomes pain. Multidisciplinary clinics were therefore established to bring together 
various health care providers who worked to fit together the puzzle of pain, on a case-to­
case basis. This shift in the organization and philosophy of pain management translated 
into a shift in their therapeutic objective. As opposed to disease-oriented approach that 
sought cure by administering treatment, clin icians in multi-disciplinary pain clinics talked 
about collaborating with patients and their families to control the symptoms and to 
restore quality of living. What became important was not if pain continued after 
rehabilitation, but if the patient continued the live the same life of suffering as before. 
As a consequence of this important shift, suffering was eventually afforded a 
place in clinical discourse as a valid part of pain. The biomedical model and its sensory 
signal approach overlooked the importance of suffering and illness as meaningful aspects 
of the lived experience of disease and pain. It reduced aIl distress to mere derivatives of a 
physiological anomaly, a mere epiphenomenon of consciousness with unreliable 
ontological status. In contrast, the biopsychosocial interventions relied on a 
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multidimensional theOl'y of disease which allowed pain experience to include suffering 
and illness. They therefore engendered the hope that suffering can become not only part 
of the heuristic model of pain, but also part of its actual clinical management. However, 
this shift popularized a new public and professional discourse of suffering, one that was 
meant ta be treatable by prevailing strategies of health psychology and behavioural 
medicine. As opposed to past, in today's therapeutic culture, suffering and pain are 
given a new meaning, one that is defined, assessed, and treated according to the discourse 
and practices of health psychology. Given the magnitude and the scope of this change, it 
is necessary to ask how this shift to a new model has altered our notion of suffering. 
The above question acts as the exegetical stance for the following review of 
literature. To the counter-question that might ask why such a stance is even necessary, 
the answer can be that an exegetical stance allows for more than a systematic reading of a 
given area of research, or a theoretical perspective. For, it allows a wider cross-reading 
of diverse and dissimilar perspectives to take place around a single concern. However, to 
the counter-question that might ask why it is exegetical and not just review, the answer 
can be that as reading and counter-reading, a review must demonstrate concern for the 
meaning of reported findings in human context. Without exegesis (É(ytyûéJfJaz, literally: 
"to lead out"), there can be no unravel1ing of the arguments, no leading out of meaning, 
and no synthesis of texts. More importantly, this exegetical stance links the following 
literature review to the problematic of this research which asks what it means to suffer 
from intractable pain. Refusing the misapprehension of tacit questions, a key requisite of 
any reflective reading is to make its concerns explicit. 
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1.2. Biopsychosocial Model and Cognitive-Behavioural Health Psychology 
As aforementioned, the new theory of pain finally provided a solid ground for 
biopsychosocial model to speak about pain as a complex experience comprised of 4 
distinct but interrelated domains: 1) nociception, 2) perception, 3) suffering, and 4) pain 
behaviour (Loeser, 1980). Within the literature, pain is often depicted by 4 concentric 
rings encompassing one another, from the innermost circle, nociception, to the outermost, 
pain behaviour. Demarcating the core and the perimeter, these two dimensions are 
largely deemed as objective dimensions that are amenable to medical assays or to 
independent observation and measurement. ln between these two are the two 
intermediary circ1es, perception and suffering that are often characterized as the 
psychological and subjective dimensions of pain. They involve emotions, mental 
representations, and cognitions, including cultural and discursive constructions of illness 
(Turk, 1996). In this manner, conceptually and graphically, the subjective dimensions of 
pain are depicted as enveloped within the objective crust of nociception on one end, and 
pain behaviour on the other. 
As opposed to biomedical emphasis on concrete injury for operationalization of 
pain and suffering, biopsychosocial model concentrates on observable pain behaviour and 
self-reported cognitions or on what sufferers do and say in reaction to pain. While this 
change of emphasis more than ever confirmed that injury alone is no longer the sole valid 
indicator of pain, it introduced a new index of objectivity, namely that of pain behaviour. 
If detection of underlying pathology as the biomedical index of objectivity required 
specialized assays administered under medical gaze, pain behaviour as the psychosocial 
index of objectivity is readily observable and amenable to environmental monitoring and 
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control. In this sense, evaluating pain behaviour and cognition was believed to be a more 
reliable way of understanding pain experience than assessing the underlying injury. As a 
result, pain suddenly was removed from its locus in the physical interiority of the body 
and brought into the interpersonal exteriority of the interpersonal environment. 
By the same token, the underlying mechanism of pain underwent a dramatic 
redefinition. The success of control gate theory in explaining pain experience gave 
cognitive factors unprecedented prominence both in phenomenology (introspective 
experience) and in pathogenesis (aetiological mechanism) of pain. It highlighted the 
unique function of cognitive factors in shaping the experience of pain and sl1ftering by 
modulating noxiol1s sensory stimulations and by appraising the emotional responses to 
pain. The gate control theory expanded the contribution of cognitive processes through 
descending pathways to what takes shape at the level of spinal cord and dorsal homo 
"Pain", as Melzack and Wall (1983:332) explain, "can be treated not only by trying to 
manipulate the sensory input, but also by influencing motivational and cognitive factors". 
The significance of this statement from the authors of gate control theory cannot be 
overstated. 
However, what do these researcher mean by cognitive factors? Where these 
factors come from and how they do what we are told they do? Are they capable of 
shaping our feelings and sensations? How far they shape and control our suffering? In 
fact, what the researchers cali cognitive factors have been explained as learned thinking 
structures that provide templates or models for information processing (Skevington, 
1995: 109-110). Hence they are said to be in operation, when we mobilize attentional 
resources; direct awareness to particular events; organize sensory influx into recognition; 
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create regularities amid rupture; interpret the present in continuity with the past; provide 
perspective and meaning to situations; estimate prospects and goal approximations, set 
response options and strategies, assess feedback and outcome, and accordingly modify 
execution and implementation (Norman, 1986). These structures have become known as 
cognitive schema or in plural form, schemata. They are said to be representations or 
mental models and scripts that underlie how we attend, interpret, and relate to ourselves 
and the world (Bartiett, 1932). 
The concept of schema can be traced to Kant' s notion of a-priori categories of 
understanding and perception as necessary condition for any knowledge of reality 
(178112003). In his critique of empiricism and solipsism, Kant argued that our coherent 
and meaningful experience cannot be explained either as the mirror images of reality or 
as the direct derivatives of rational ideas. He proposed an active process of knowing, 
wherein "categories of understanding" transform what can be sensible to perception and 
pre-given knowledge of mind. He explained these categories as being independent from 
experience or pre-given; they are inherent properties of the mind responsible for 
rendering manifold sensations into consistantl knowledge and coherent perception 
according to a set of rules or schema. In recent times, Tarski (1944) adopted the term and 
brought it from epistemology and ontology to formal logic. His aim was to define the 
correct form of a true statement. Tarski argued that an unambiguous definition of what is 
true requires both material adequacy and formal correctness. He then proposed that 
formai correctness can be satisfied, if a psoposition assumes the form of a particular 
sentence, known as convention or T-schema [For ail x, True(x) if and only if cp(x); this 
statement satisfies the correspondence theory of truth]. In other words, to the question 
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that asks what would be the form of a true statement, TarslG answered by proposing a 
model sentence or a Iogicai operator, which has been known as T-schema. His end was 
to define true statement within a formaI language. For him, that formaI language was 
mathematics, in which the schema was a function. Th us, he redefined schema into what 
can hold the proper syntax for a true statement according to the rules of the formaI 
language ofmathematics. 
In one of its earliest applications in psychology, schema was used by a 
contemporary of TarslG, in a sense closer to Kant's meaning of the term than Tarskian 
logical operator. Bartlett (1932) invoked cognitive schema to explain why a story re­
narrated across people gets progressively altered to resemble what the group is 
accustomed or disposed to hear on the subject. In this sense, a schema was explained to 
be "an active organization of past reactions or of past experiences which must be al ways 
supposed to be operating" under aIl actual experiences (60). In his view, it is the 
operation of schema that slowly but surely renders the story congruent with the 
expectations of the narrators and the audience. However, he expressed his far-sighted 
worries about the inherent deficiencies of the concept: 
"1 strongly dislike the term "schema." It is at once too definite and too 
sketchy .... It suggests sorne persistent, but fragmentary, "form of 
arrangement," and it does not indicate what is very essential to the whole 
notion, that the organised mass results of past changes of position and 
posture are actively doing something aIl the time; are, so to speak, carried 
along with us, complete, though developing, from moment to moment." 
(200-201) 
For Bartlet, schema is a remnant of the past, which was incessantly lived in the present; a 
remnant that is not a vestige or a relic but the "organized mass result" of the past that is 
"carried along with us". He astutely points out the unexplainable and paradoxical 
25 
character of the construct as being "complete, though developing". As a result, he calls 
remembering "an imaginative reconstruction, or construction, built out of the relation of 
our attitude towards a whole active mass of past experience" (109). His emphasis on 
"active mass of past experience" shapes the foundation of his understanding of schema. 
Nontheless, his dissatisfaction with what the schema denotes can be read as a prescient 
admonishment regarding the later development of the concept in cognitive science. 
With the advent of information technology, the developmental, relational, 
imaginative, dynamic, paradoxical, and reconstructive qualities of schema, as initially 
described by Bartlett, were $uddenly muted and abandoned in favour a computational 
model established on the formaI manipulation of encoded symbols according to discrete 
synctactic algorithms (Horst, 1996). Although schemata were variably described in terms 
of core beliefs, implicit knowledge, learned expectancies, and habituaI appraisals, these 
psychological terms were said to be of no real theoretical value, and dispensable or 
extricable from the explanatory model of schema (Churchland, 1988; Benette and 
Hacker, 2003:366-377). In effect, the term was gradually remade to agree with 
architectural elements and syntactic operations of an abstract computational system. 
Eventually, it assumed a meaning c10ser to that of Tarski's syntactic model of logical 
operator. In this manner, Rumelhart (1980:34) redefined schemata as: 
"a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory 
. ... Inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory 
corresponds to the meaning of that concept, meanings are encoded in 
terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that 
concept" 
More extreme examples omit any kind of reference to concepts such as, meaning. In his 
renowned and seminal article on motor learning, Schmidt (1975:240) states, "a schema is 
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a learned relationship between the input and required output vectors of the controller." It 
seems hard to believe that this statement applies to anything but a machine application, 
yet the author means to explain human perception. Having been redefined in machine 
terms, schema loses aIl its existential content, its paradoxical character, and its 
indeterminate human qualities. More importantly, its phenomenological openness to self­
reflection and intersubjectivity is circumvented by the physicalism of the mathematical 
abstractions (for a favourable but rather ironic analysis of this development, see: Brewer, 
2000). 
Under the shadow of the contemporary computational theory, schema was remade 
ta fit the mechanical character and operations of a computation machine. The language 
employed for describing cognitive schema-the building block of human thought­
appears as though portraying an information system application and not the human world 
of relating, feeling and thinking. Hence, schema has been given definitions such as: "the 
situation calculus" (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969); "hierarchical representations" 
(Sacerdoti, 1973); "scripts" (Schank and Abelson, 1977); "story grammar" (Rumelhart, 
1975), and "frames" (Minsky, 1975). In a sense, schema has been literally described as a 
structure that holds the syntactic templates for manipulation of information as data 
(Rumelhart, 1980). The manipulation is characterized as a set of operations that 
transforms sensory information into coherent perception and knowledge of reality for 
action output. 
The actual operations of schemata are explained akin ta an information processing 
module with an output and a feedback loop. Hence, schemata, as knowledge structures, 
are said to contain information about generic concepts, such as: situations, objects, 
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events, and actions that are constants of our everyday experience. Within every schema, 
two kinds of information are structured and stored: 1) attributes (variables) of generic 
concepts, and 2) the relationship among the attributes (Rumelhart and Ortony, 1977). It 
is argued that this knowledge structure allows us to identifying particular instantiations of 
a concept from the torrent of sensory input. Through the automatic process of appraisal, 
sensory input is attuned to match with schematic templates, or as the case may be, to 
modify them with least amount of disruption and confusion. As a processing template 
guiding interpretation, schema is said to play a dynamic function in perceiving objects 
and comprehending situations, as weIl as in planning actions and anticipating events. 
Much of its operation is described to take place below the level of deliberate control as 
part of automatic information processing (Neuman 1984). 
At least one theory describes schemata as operating in an unconscious manner, 
dissociated from consciousness. Based on the concept of dissociation, Hilgard (1977, 
1986) defined an unconsciousness domain for schematic processes that is separated by an 
amnesic barrier. The notion of unconsciousness, introduced by the author, goes back to 
the classical works of Janet (1886, 1888, 1889) who proposed that hypnotic and hysteric 
states are the result of a psychic dissolution of the consciousness. Janet argued that such 
dissolution reduces conscious processing of stimulation and allows ideas to form beneath 
the level of consciousness. Such ideas are then dissociated, since the person can no 
longer recognize them as his or her own. Using contemporary research, Hilgard reworks 
Janet's conceptualization and proposes his neodissociation theory that defines schematic 
functioning within an unconscious realm. He argues that behaviour and cognition are 
structured into a hierarchy of schemata beneath a central system of control that is in 
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charge of planning and monitoring actions. These schemata can act as independent 
subsystems to the central control or the executive ego, at the top of the hierarchy. Hilgard 
argued that the executive ego is split into an unconscious compartment by an amnesic 
barrier. In this manner, the conscious executive ego has no understanding of memories 
and perceptions that lie across the barrier on the unconscious side. This allows the 
unconscious to create a parallei system of control whereby "attentive effort and planning 
are carried out without awareness" (HilgardI977:2). Hilgard recognized this unconscious 
realm as being responsible for bringing about hypnotic states through suggestion. As a 
result, schematic processes form the undergrid of a complex but divided executive ego 
that is not consciously monitored or controlled at aIllevels. 
In its latest application along the gate control theory, schema has been accorded 
an important function in cognitive information-processing of pain and suffering. The 
psychological studies of pain and a wide range of physical symptoms have shown that the 
way people understand and explain their ailment has a strong association with their level 
of distress and suffering, as weIl as with their functional disability and quality of life 
(Skevington,1995:109-111). What Melzack and Wall calI the central mechanisms of 
cognitive control are said to be operating through cognitive schemata as structured set of 
ideations or cognitions for processing pain (Dar and Leventhal, 1993; Leventhal and 
Leventhal, 1993). As a template for information processing, schemata underlie how we 
structure our inchoate sensations of ailment into coherent perceptions to anticipate risk or 
opportunity and to act accordingly. Researchers have identified three main areas of 
cognition as contributing to pain experience: 1) beliefs about pain, 2) perceptions of self­
control, 3) expectations regarding illness (Moreno, Garcia, and Pareja, 1999). Ideations 
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that constitute these areas are said to be part of three distinct but partially overlapping 
schemata. These schemata are identified as: pain, illness, and self. They are shown to be 
involved in the selective information processing of pain that results in distress and 
suffering (Pincus and Morley, 2001). 
The question that still remains unanswered is how pain and suffering as a 
manifold affective experience can be rendered cognitive or can be cognitivized as 
information processing? Even in terms of common descriptors, Melzack's (Melzack and 
Torgerson, 1971) study of semantics of pain shows how sufferer's adjectival references 
can be grouped into three distinct dimensions: 1) sensory-discriminative (e.g. sharp, 
throbbing), 2) affective-motivational (e.g. terrifying, depressing), and 3) cognitive­
evaluative (e.g. annoying, miserable). Later studies using signal detection, paired 
scaling, and multivariate methods have supported the distinctness of these dimensions 
(Melzack, 2005). Bence, pain is said to be the result of distinctly identifiable sensory, 
affective, and cognitive systems that work in parallel in order to process the separate 
aspects of emerging experience. Nonetheless, in spite of the heterogeneity of this 
tripartite division, it is the preponderant contribution of cognitive system that is believed 
to integrate this manifold phenomenon into a meaningful perceptual state. Moreno, 
Garcia, and Pareja (1999:75) explain the role of cognitive processes as: 
Among the different factors relevant to the psychological assessment and 
treatment of chronic pain, those of a cognitive nature play a prorninent 
role, due in large part to the fact that pain is a perceptual phenomenon. 
Indeed, cognitive factors are largely responsible for the final (cortical) part 
of the perception process, so that, without subtracting importance from the 
more sensorial and emotional aspects of pain, the final integrating point is 
cognitive in character. 
30 
Pain, defined as a perceptual phenomenon, is said to owe its form and meaning to the 
higher cortical process responsible for cognition. Assessing and restructuring these 
processes has therefore been the sole focus of psychological treatment and rehabilitation 
of pain. 
The cognitive organization of perception was first proposed in the field of vision. 
In their work on visual perception, Pomerantz and Kubovy (1981) showed how 
perceptual organization is formed not through the analysis of sensory features of an 
object, but through an early holistic registration involving top-down cognitive processes. 
By the same token, it has been argued that pain perception is formed not directly from the 
noxious sensations and aversive affects, but through a cognitive mediation above and 
beyond other forms of input. As Fernandez and Turk (1992: 214) maintain, "we may 
possess a smart perceptual mechanism that is capable of picking up a wealth of 
information about pain without the mediation of the (component) sensory and affective 
variables". In effect, this smartness is attributed to a top-down process that is controlled 
by cognitive mechanisms (Leventhal, 1982). The result is a cognitive model that 
"emphasizes the role of the individual's beliefs" and sees the sufferer as "continually 
appraising and interpreting his or her experience" (Novey, Nelson, Francis, Turk, 
1995:243). 
According to the cognitive theory, this continuous appraising and interpreting is 
shaped by cognitive schemata and guided by schematic operations that occasion the 
sufferer's beliefs about the attributes of pain, the perceptions of control, and the 
expectations regarding illness. In effect, what patients say and do or how they react to 
pain is said to be structured by their beliefs, perceptions, and expectations. Without such 
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cognitive factors, pain perception and behaviour may never assume the necessary 
organization, and the anxiety and distress may never be experienced as suffering. In 
cognitive therapy, this emphasis on the underlying cognitive factors has led to the 
preponderance of cognition over affective experience (Ellis, 1962; Beek, 1976). As 
Greenberg and Safran (1989:20) point out: 
In the cognitive behavioral approaches, affect has traditionally been seen 
as a postcognitive phenomena [sic.]. Cognitive behavioral theory has 
maintained that the meaning of an event determines the emotional 
response to it. ...Constructs such as automatic thoughts, irrational beliefs, 
and self statements have been posited as mediating between events and 
emotional responses to events, and cognitive therapists have tended to 
focus on the elimination of emotional responses to faulty cognitions by 
rationally challenging beliefs, by providing schema-inconsistent evidence, 
and by providing self-instructional training. 
Emotion-shaping beliefs or cognitions are described as the product of cognitive structures 
or schemata that control the appraisal of neural input. By the same token, cognitive 
factors are explained as more than constitutive aspects, and are afforded the special 
function of a determinant factor of pain perception and suffering. Even non-cognitive 
aspects such as attention, arousal, and motivation (or what is known as conative) are 
explained as involving cognitive processes for contributing to pain experience (Moreno, 
Garcia, and Pareja, 1999:83). 
Studies on pain beliefs, self-perception, and illness expectation have identified the 
style of cognitive processing and organization that leads to processing bias, erroneous 
cognition, and emotional distress among sufferers. Such bias is said to dis tort appraisal 
of painful conditions and leads to emotional distress. The term catastrophizing is used to 
refer to a kind of cognitive processing that is shown to be strongly associated with 
anxiety and suffering related to pain. As a way of thinking, catastrophizing involves bias 
32 
appraisal of illness that best serves feelings of doom and gloom and contributes to 
maladaptive pain behaviour and dysfunctional coping. It is therefore said to be a 
cognitive process with affective and behavioural dimensions (Sullivan, Thorn, 
Haythornthwaite, Keefe, Martin, Bradley, and Leefebvre, 2001). When it cornes to pain 
intensity, disablility, and distress, carefully designed correlational studies have shown 
that regardless of the level of impairment catastrophizing is a reliable and strong 
predictor (Severeijn, Vlaeyen, van den Hout, and Weber, 2001). Although no causallink 
can be inferred from such studies, researchers have left little doubt that there is a clear 
association between negative appraisal and suffering (Turner and Aron, 2001). 
Over the past two decades, the concept of catastrophizing has been used to refer 
to aIl excessive beliefs and extreme preoccupations of negative kind about pain and 
illness. As Turner and Aaron (2001) tell us, the term was first used by Albert Ellis 
(1962), the founder of rational-emotional who used it, when a patient's negative opinion 
made a situation seem totally unbearable or un-attemptable. However, Beck and his 
colleagues (1976, 1985) finally defined the construct "in terms of dwelling on the worst 
possible outcome of any situation in which there is a possibility for an unpleasant 
outcome" (as paraphrasd by Turner and Aaron, 2001:65). To Beck' s formulation, 
Turner and Aaron (2001 :65) add that "such thoughts are tied to the perception of oneself 
as vulnerable and as being subject to danger over which one has insufficient control". As 
a construct, it was coined to refer to the manner of thinking, or to the style of cognition 
that was said to be prevalent among those suffering from anxiety and depressive 
disorders. Its entry into literature is firmly rooted in Beck's cognitive reformation of 
anxiety and panic. ln his view, those with mood and anxiety disorder tend to think 
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largely along two different variations of catastrophizing which persistently interprets 
situational uncertainty as forthcorning peril or misery. 
Ever since its appearance in literature 4 decades ago, catastrophizing has been 
studied and discussed in relation to anxiety and panic disorders, and rather lately with 
respect to depression (Turner and Aaron, 2001). Before being introduced in pain, as a 
concept, it played a major heuristic role in cognitive models of affective disorders and 
particularly of anxiety. As a descriptor, it refers to the loorning thought content of 
anxious individuais. It characterizes their beliefs, expectations, and perceptions as 
involving negative appraisals. As a result, it has been used to characterize the 
maladaptive quality of cognitions in assessment questionnaires (Sullivan, Bishop, and 
Pivik, 1995). On the other hand, it has been recognized as a cognitive process that has 
been shown to be strongly associated with clinical anxiety and depression. In this sense, 
catastrophizing is a style of thinking and processing information which has been 
investigated as a potential factor in the pathogenesis of mood and affect disorders. 
Cognitive models explain how catastrophizing as a style of automatic thinking 
contributes to attention and interpretation bias, whereby the individual pays undue 
attention to unusual internai and external eues, and appraises every uncertainty as threat 
(Beek, Emery and Greenberg, 1985; Beek and Clark, 1997). Such automatic thinking is 
believed to create internai models for appraising, perceiving, memorizing, and recalling 
experiences in a bias fashion, hence aggravate the normal level of stress and lead to a 
full-blown anxiety. 
Such persistent automatic thinking is shown to involve an "internai dialogue" 
(Davey and Levy, 1998) that admonishes against uncertainties and possibilities. In its 
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extreme form, it is said to be the "what if. .. " style of questioning that reads catastrophy 
into mostly neutral but uncertain events. For its persistent and repetitive quality, this 
internaI dialogue is recognized as having a "perseverative iterative style. Aside from the 
worry thoughts and worrying thinking, catastrophizing is said to have an iterative quality 
that takes control of the indinvidual's internaI dialogue and diminishes one's problem 
solving capability. As a result, one 's ability to deal with situations and to initiate 
adaptive response can be affected. Consequently, a sense of vulnerability and 
helplessness develop which results in anxiety and depression. 
For its automatic quality, catastrophizing is identified as a form of thinking that 
gets triggered by seemingly analogous situations. Robins and Hayes (1993:209-210) 
describe automatic thinking as: 
"These types of thoughts (or images) are referred to as "aiJtomatic" 
because they typically arise spontaneously, frequently are very fleeting, 
and may even go unrecognized unless the patient is directed to 
deliberately monitor them. These automatic thoughts, which reflect the 
individual's appraisal of a situation rather than the actual objective 
situation, lead directly to the patient's emotional and behavioral responses. 
These responses will be maladaptive to the extent that the appraisals are 
distorted or exaggerated, which will occur when they arise from the 
operation of dysfunctional schemata." 
In the authors' view, "Schemata can be considered internaI models of aspects of the self 
and the world" (208). As such, the authors argue, "Automatic thinking can be considered 
a surface level of cognition that can be brought into awareness fairly readily by the 
patient and clinician" (211). In its adaptive form, such automatic thinking facilitates 
spontaneous and efficient information processing. However, unrealistic beliefs and 
appraisals can bias automaticity and eventually lead to disproportionate level of affective 
reaction. As a result, catastrophizing is described as a biased, automatic, and iterative 
35 
process that responds to certain situations with worrying threatening thoughts leading to 
distressful feelings and maladaptive behaviours. Evidently, catastrophizing is explained 
as rising from cognitive schemata, and as being a cognitive determinant of distressful 
emotions. In effect, its iterative and automatic qualities are explained through schemata 
theory, while cognitive theory of emotion is used to hypothesize its operation as being 
generative of anxiety and suffering. 
However, about two decades after its introduction into theory of anxiety and 
affective disorder, catastrophizing was recognized as a major psychological factor in pain 
perception and in adaptive coping among patients with althritic pain (Keefe, Caldwell, 
Queen, et al., 1987). Subsequently, a number of key studies demonstrated that those with 
a propensity to catastrophize were prone to more intense pain perception and higher 
emotional distress (Keefe, Brown, Wallston, et al., 1989). In its earliest usage, the 
concept was called "awfulizing" and was defined as "a negative bias in the appraisal of 
threat" (Ciccone and Grezesiak, 1984: 1342). In an often quoted article on cognitive 
determinants of chronic pain, Ciccone and Grezesiak identify 8 patterns of cognitive 
misappraisal that can be seen as underlying chronic pain. Amongst them, awfulizing as 
weIl as "overgeneralization," "low frustration tolerance," and "self-downing" are said to 
be the key forrns of cognitive misappraisal that result in chronicity and ernotional 
suffering. In summing up their view, the authors state that "hurnans are prone to both 
misinterpreting and misappraising the nature of reality", and that "mistaken inference is 
the prirnary if not the only cause" of suffering, anguish, and chronic pain (1341). Despite 
this strong cognitive view, researchers are still careful not to infer causal relation, since 
much of what has been known cornes from correlational studies. 
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As terms such as awfulizing and self-downing changed into catastrophizing, the 
evidence of its association with higher pain severity, disability and somatic complaint 
grew stronger. Nonetheless, the evidence of strong and consistent association has 
compelled research in this area. There are at least 5 major findings that point at the 
importance of catastrophizing: 
"Catastrophizing has been associated with heightened pain in clinical and 
in experimental studies with adults and with children. It has also been 
shown to be associated with heightened disability and to predict disability 
better than disease-related variables or pain. In addition, catastrophizing 
has been associated with increased pain behavior, increased use of health 
care services, longer durations of hospital stay, and increased use of 
analgesic medication. In the absence of intervention, catastrophizing 
seems to be relatively stable over time, although there are indications that 
it may decrease with age (at least in adult samples)." (Sullivan, Thorn, 
Haythornthwaite, Keefe, Martin, Bradley, and Lefebvre, 2001 :57) 
When compared to disease-related variables, the predictive value of catastrophizing with 
regard to pain-related complications tends to be higher. However, the importance of 
catastrophic thinking seems incontrovertible not only for coping with chronic pain, but 
also for the outcome of other painful life situations. For instance, in their study on 
pregnancy pain, Ferber, Granot, and Zimmer (2005:826) report, "Labor pain 
catastrophizing rather than labor pain intensity predicts postpartum maternaI adjustment". 
Catastrophizing has, therefore, been redefined, as "an exaggerated negative 'mental set' 
brought to bear during actual or anticipated pain experience" (Sullivan, Thorn, 
Haythornthwaite, Keefe, Martin, Bradley, and Lefebvre, 2001 :53). 
In their comprehensive review of the research literature, Sullivan et al. (2001) 
report that the catastrophizing disposition is shown to exist among both children and 
adults with younger populations suggest that catastrophizing appears early in life, and if 
left untreated, tends to be an enduring mode of thinking that only declines at older age. 
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According to literature, pain sufferers with catastrophic thought can improve coping by 
receiving intensive cognitive-behavioural therapy. This has convinced sorne researcher 
that despite its perseverative style, catastrophizing does not show the immutability of a 
character trait. Nonetheless, it shows a strong association with pain behaviour (ail 
responses one makes or verba11y expresses in reaction to pain), as wel1 as to i11ness 
behaviour (a11 solicitous responses of the patient including those for receiving or 
continuing treatment). 
However, what makes catastrophizing peculiar is how as a construct, as an 
operationalized definition, or as a measurement variable, it tends to be identical to 
cognitive features of both anxiety and depression. For, it can envoke and accompany 
both frightful anguish and dark despair. In a comprehensive review of literature, Sullivan 
and his co11eagues admit, "Theoretical accounts of catastrophizing have not been 
elaborated substantively beyond investigators' operational definitions of the construct" 
(53). Else where in the same review, the authors point out: 
"Questions regarding the degree to which catastrophizing is a general 
phenomenon or one that is restricted to pain-related outcomes have yet to 
be examined. Nevertheless, there are grounds for proposing a general as 
opposed to a pain-specific view of catastrophizing. For example, 
catastrophizing has been discussed as a cognitive component of depression 
and anxiety. The significant relations between catastrophizing, depression, 
and anxiety (discussed below) are consistent with the view that individuals 
who catastrophize in pain-related situations might also catastrophize in 
problem situations that do not involve pain." (56) 
Despite an obvious overlap, the authors believe that mapping this concept into existing 
models of schema-activation, appraisal, attention, and coping may actua11y provide 
catastrophizing with a substantive definition and help deflect the argument of construct 
redundancy. However, such mapping can provide a substantive account for 
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catastrophizing, insofar as anxiety and depression are kept out of such modeling. 
Applying any of the aforementioned models to cognitive aspects of depression and 
anxiety may otherwise lead to a bigger overlap and redundancy for catastrophizing. This 
raises the question that whether this overlap is by itself meaningful. In other words, even 
though catastrophizing can be observed in the absence of clinical depression or anxiety 
(Sullivan et al., 2001), it is valid to ask whether pain catastrophizing has something in 
common with depressive and anxious mood. If pain catastrophizing and catastrophizing 
in depression and anxiety have something in common, how should our characterization of 
pq.in, anxiety, and depression change to allow for certain continuity among these 
experiences without becoming reductive? 
On the other hand, it would be possible to argue that this redundancy and the lack 
of substantive definition for catastrophizing may reflect an aspect of pain, and suffering 
that has not been adequately explored and indeed left out of the discussion, so far. This is 
an argument that has not been even remotely considered in health psychology, since 
sensory and affective dimensions of pain are consistently explained in reference to the 
presumed preponderance of adult cognitive processes. In effect, the psychology of pain 
is largely articulated from a cognitive-behavioural point of view that clearly favours adult 
mental representations and responses, for being realistic, workable, and adaptive. By the 
same token, suffering has come to mean stress that has become unmanageable due to 
unrealistic cognition, and maladaptive coping. In this view, what is non-cognitive is seen 
as non-representational and is described in purely physiological terms as neural processes 
and bodily changes that at best provide input for the cognitive faculty to appraise, 
interpret, and encode as representations. Assuming a preponderant role for cognitive 
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faculty has made it hard to define in a substantial manner pain-related catastrophizing and 
to explain its kinship with negative cognitions in depression and anxiety. In other word, 
to resolve the question of what constitutes catastrophizing may require considering the 
link with anxious and depressed mental states beyond what is simply explainable in terms 
of adult cognition. 
However, when pain insensitivity in schizophrenia and psychosis is considered, 
yet another interesting puzzle emerges regarding catastrophizing and its link to anxiety 
and suffering. For long, clinical observation reported an astonishing lack of sensitivity to 
pain amongst patients suffering from schizophrenia and psychosis. As pioneers of the 
field, Kraeplin (1919) and Bleuler (1911/1951) left the earliest case studies of 
insensitivity to serious injuries and painful complications among psychotics. Despite 
case-related repolts, population-based studies seemed needed to establish for many, what 
was clinically described for the few. In their review of research, Singh, Giles, and 
Nasrallah (2006) show how researchers have revealed the significant prevalence of 
insensitivity to pain among people with schizophrenia and psychosis. Eventually, studies 
of experimentally induced pain managed to demonstrate that people with schizophrenia 
and psychosis are generally less sensitive to pain. In one study of this kind, Mersky, 
Gillis, and Marszalek (1962), using pinprick and pressure, found that patient with 
paranoia are specifically less sensitive to pain than those suffering from other types of 
psychosis. However, this insensitivity to pain is in obvious contradiction with the 
research that describes catastrophizing as the cognitive style for persecutory deIusions 
and anxieties (Startup, Freeman and Garety, 2006). As Startup et al. report, the 
persistence of psychotic delusions and the intensity of persecutory anxieties are shown to 
40 
be positively correlated with the number of catastrophic steps involved in the patient's 
reasoning. If persecutory deiusions and anxieties are associated with catastrophizing as a 
cognitive style of processing, what can justify the lack of sensitivity to pain among 
paranoid schizophrenies who are said to be strugg!ing with catastrophic worries? More 
importantly, if a general theory is to explain pain catastrophizing, how can it at the same 
time explain the pain insensitivity among paranoid schizophrenies? 
By the same token, more interesting puzzles are raised, if we consider the 
research into the kind of cognitive organization involved in pain catastrophizing. It has 
been argued that catastrophizing is the result of a excessive enmeshment of key 
cognitions that define self, pain, and illness (Pincus and Morley, 2001). This theory 
postulates self, pain, and illness as three distinct but interrelated cognitive schemata, that 
play an important role in coping with pain, and in experience of suffering and distress. 
Based on comparing the self-reports of normal subjects with those of pain patients 
(copers and non-copers), researchers have argued that excessive overlap among the three 
can cause enmeshment of self, pain, and illness schemata which results in poor self­
control, negative be!iefs and expectations, and eventually emotional distress. However, 
cognitive structures among schizophrenies are known to be disorganized, instable, with 
fluid interconnections and fusions. Yet, such unstable organization and fusing structure 
seem to contribute very !ittle to highten sensitivity to pain, even though catastrophizing is 
identified as part of delusional persecutory anxieties. In fact, the lack of sensitivity to 
pain among paranoid schizophrenie l'aises serious question about how much 
hypersensitivity to pain can be explained as a cognitive anomaly. As a result, while 
cognitive view emphasizes catastrophic misappraisal and misrepresentation as the real 
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source of suffering, it seriously falls short of explaining the insensitivity to pain among 
those whose experience of the world is literally haunted by the most terrifying 
misappraisals and vivid misrepresentations. 
Sullivan et al. (2001) reports that searching for the aetiology of catastrophizing 
have brought researchers to identify social learning, unresolved attachment issues, and 
temperamental sensitivity to uncertainty and fear reaction as possible factors responsible 
for shifting schematic processes to a bias catastrophic outlook. However, the 
determinants and the processes that may underlie catastropizing are still shrouded in 
uncertainty and mystery. Regardless of the definitional and aetiological uncertainty, 
catastrohizing is clinically viewed as maladaptive cognitive processes maintained by 
maladaptive interpersonal behaviours. It is therefore primarily seen as a cognitive­
behavioural phenomenon and addressed through cognitive-behavioural intervention, with 
strong emphasis on psycho-education (Skevington, 1995). In rehabilitation, this means 
cognitive techniques of examining thought patterns, restructuring erroneous schemata, 
learning new skills and information, and at times using thought-stopping strategies that 
are used to encourage the suppression of reiterative negative thoughts. In conjunction, 
behavioural strategies are used to establish and reinforce active coping and eliminate 
maladaptive illness behaviour through negative feedback. In this vein, as suffering 
becomes tantamount to cognitive misappraisal and maladaptive behaviours, therapeutic 
intervention becomes synonymous with rehearsal in corrective restructuring, accurate 
reasoning, realistic appraisal, and adaptive behaviour. In this manner, biopsychosocial 
model has advanced psychological understanding of pain, but only insofar as couching aH 
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subjective, inward, and private aspects of suffering into overt cognitions and behaviours 
of the sufferer. 
For biopsychosocial model and health psychology, the importance of behaviour, 
particularly pain behaviour, can hardIy be overstated. Defined as "what a person does or 
does not do or say that leads the observer to infer that the patient is suffering from a 
noxious stimulus" (Loeser & Egan, 1989:7), pain behaviour is an over-arching concept 
that at once encompasses what has been conventionally known as behaviours (what the 
person does), together with what can be reported as cognitions (what the person says). It 
is used to make the private experience of the sufferer into a publicly observable 
phenomenon that can be studied and explained in terms of what can be overtly elicited, 
measured, and verified by an independent observer with certain degree of consistency. In 
effect, the concept is meant to render the sufferer's experience overt and public through 
self-reported cognitions and observed behaviours. This allows the observer to assess the 
content what is taken to be the sufferer's experience according to the adaptive quality of 
what the person does and says as a result of pain. For biopsychosocial model, reliance on 
this overarching concept has allowed a rethinking of pain that still upholds a reliable, 
valid ground for assessment and treatment of pain. 
The preponderance of pain behaviour particularly increases In the practice of 
health psychology, which as a clinical discipline is dedicated to the use of cognitive, 
behavioural, and interpersonal strategies for promoting healthy and autonomous living. 
When it cornes to reliable and valid inference of pain, health psychologists place special 
emphasis on what sufferers do, and say is response to pain. By the same token, when it 
cornes to intervention, they rely on cognitive-behavioural strategies to change what 
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sufferers say and do in reaction to pain. It is therefore thought that when people change 
their expressed ideations and behaviours and accomplish good results, they have 
managed to restore quality of life, to regain autonomy, and to feel less anxious and 
depressed. ln this vein, for health psychologists, the emphasis on pain behaviour extends 
beyond its mere inferential or observational value and shapes their outlook of therapeutic 
strategies and interventions. 
Consistent with the clinical emphasis on symptom management, health 
psychology suggests that although pain and disability can persist without relief, its actual 
impact on life can be rendered manageable, if patients learn to adapt to their new living 
situation and cope actively with pain (Turner and Romano, 1989; Bradley, 1996). Life 
with pain is reframed as a new living situation, to which one has to learn to adapt, and 
with which one has to cope. Health psychology predicts that as patients learn to cope, 
they become more active, less dependant on others, and less anxious about their prospect. 
ln helping the patient cope, health psychology heavily relies on behaviour modification to 
change the sufferer' s reaction to pain, disability, and loss. Case formulations offer 
detailed and systematic account of observed behaviours and reported cognitions as a way 
of establishing what is not working and what needs to be changed (). For the pU11Jose of 
cognitive-behavioural modification, health psychologists need to know how catastrophic 
rnisrepresentations, antecedent factors, maladaptive behaviours, and reinforcing 
consequences, intel1Jersonal and social roles come together (Egan, 1989). Thereupon, 
therapeutic techniques ranging from operant conditioning (Fordyce, 1996) to cognitive 
restructuring and suggestions (Turk, 1996, Chapman, 1986) are applied to address what is 
considered as maladaptive behaviours and catastrophizing cognitions. 
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Ultimately, all perturbing feelings and mental representations that are labelled as 
maladaptive are characterized as no other than erroneous, unviable, and unworkable 
cognitions and behaviours that have to be restructured into coping cognitions and 
behaviours of viable type. When the content of the sufferer's experience is reduced to 
maladaptive pain behaviour, it would be logical to describe it as being conclusively 
contingent upon how cognitive appraisals take account of antecedent stimuli and 
occasion a course of action in anticipation of consequences. Bence, for health 
psychology, pain is a subjective perception insofar as it can be felt in the absence of 
nociception and noxious stimulation. Bowever, it can still be observed, rated, and 
objective explained based on pain behaviour as a set of cognitively mediated stimulus­
bond response. As a result, what was lost when nocicpetion proved to be an unreliable 
objective foundation for pain is regained in pain behaviour as the objective measure and 
the verifiable index, to which all subjective aspects can be translated and in terms of 
which suffering can be remedially addressed. As a result, wherever pain is assessed for 
research and experimentation, for diagnosis and intervention, or for forensic and 
disability compensation, it is the assumed inferential authority of pain behaviour that 
empirically-minded clinicians can trust with confidence. 
By the same token, suffering as an integral part of pain experience has not been 
spared from the ubiquity of cognitive-behavioural discourse. If pain experience can be 
explained in terms of what patients overtly do or say with respect to pain, suffering can 
be understood as the fear and threat caused by what people erroneously say and 
ineffectually do in response to pain. In this sense, it becomes nothing other than 
exaggerated, catastrophic misappraisals and maladaptive behaviours that can be modified 
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to adaptive and viable ones. The pioneering health psychologist, Fordyce (1989:56) 
states, "A stimulus producing fear, threat, or anticipation of aversive consequences may 
lead to suffering, and behaviors indicative of suffering may be expressed". He 
reconceptualizes suffering as distressful feelings of "fear, threat or anticipation" that are 
contingent on the "anticipation of aversive consequences". Similar to any other response, 
suffering is described in terms cognitive appraisals of antecedent factors and aversive 
consequences. Hence, for the reason that pain has by and large a strong association with 
injury and loss, it is said to have the effect of making the sufferer anticipate and fear 
further harm and grief. This anticipation can be embellished by catastra,phizing that 
would make the patient anticipate greater harm and feel beset by escalating fears without 
much control or recourse (Bowers, 1968). Such fears render the sufferer incapable of 
meeting social demands and interpersonal expectations, and further aggravate "the 
perception of noxious stimuli" and threat (55). According to Fordyce, if the environment 
reinforces the patient's maladaptive responses and exaggerated pain perception, it 
encourages "the expression and continuation of pain or suffering behavior and thereby 
promote chronicity" (55). 
In a case vignette, Fordyce (1996:41) explains how he and his colleagues respond 
to a pain patient's incessant complaint by negative behavioural consequences to 
discourage his so-called maladaptive pain behaviours. To this end, while doing ward 
rounds, Fordyce and his cOlleagues decide to respond to "any references to pain by 
looking out the window as a way of modifying social feedback" This blatant strategy of 
showing disregard for what is regarded as unwarranted pain complaint is not unique to 
Fordyce. In another example, Long (1996:8) states, "Discussions about pain were not 
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allowed between nurses and patients or with physicians except during specifie times at 
rounds or in therapy sessions". Trying to give this blatant strategy of avoidance a 
positive spin, Fordyce states, "Note that staff were not to ignore pain behaviors; only to 
be minimally socially responsive and to direct special attention to patient effort to 
increase activity levels" (44). It would be indeed valid to ask, how "minimally socially 
responsive" clinicians can get before ignoring suffering? Nonetheless, Fordyce 
(1989:55) argues that such negative feedback "may discourage and inhibit expression of 
pain or suffering behaviors and thereby promote early resolution to pain problem." 
This redefinition of suffering successfully eliminates all reference to any meaning 
beyond what is overtly tallied as expressed ideations and observed behaviours that are 
modifiable by behavioural feedback and cognitive reframing. In effect, describing 
suffering in cognitive-behavioural terms raises the question that, in what way the 
behaviours and cognitions indicative of pain or pain behaviour differ from the behaviours 
and cognitions expressing suffering or suffering behaviour. In fact, Fordyce maintains, 
"Thus, suffering may lead to the expression of suffering behaviors that are, or may be, 
virtually indistinguishable from pain behaviours" (56). Fordyce's redefinition casts 
human suffering within the limits of observable behaviours and verbalized cognitions, 
and what they may mean according ta external reality and environmental contingencies. 
However, Fordyce's view omits much of the ambiguity of the sufferer's internaI world by 
eliminating any reflection on the content and the manifold significance of pain-related 
anxieties. It reduces subjective experience to a mere shadow of observable events. In 
effect, suffering becomes no more than a learned strategy of processing and responding ta 
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noxlous stimulation that can be remedied using proper techniques of cognitive 
restructuring, skiIJ training, and behavioural modification. 
Despite engaging with the sufferer's appraisal and ideations, the cognitive 
approach to pain and suffering establishes no better outlook for understanding the internai 
world of the sufferer. The patient's feelings of immanent threat are often seen as 
rnisinterpretation of hurt caused by nociception. Hence, as part of today's therapeutic 
routine, patients are often told that hurting does not "represent a threat to well-being" or 
harm (Bradley, 1996: 132). This differentiation between hurting and harming is 
reinforced as a key part of cognitive restructuring aimed at alleviating anxiety and 
suffering. Yet, reducing the perceived threat to "cognitive distortion" or "cognitive 
errors" (Lefebvre, 1981) detracts from exploring the significance of such anxieties. 
Consequently, the reason why pain invokessuch deep anxieties is explained as "Iearnt 
beliefs" (Turk, 1996: 13-20) that erroneously picture pain as catastrophic, mysterious, and 
uncontrollable. The emphasis on cognitive variables that mediate the experience of pain 
and suffering culminates in the concept of catastrophizing as a schematic structure and 
process responsible for the misrepresentation of noxious stimulation. Ali worrisome 
mental representations that are incongruent with objective information are seen as leading 
to maladaptive coping style in real life. ln effect, cognitive approach presupposes 
correspondence with, and adaptation to the real life contingencies as the only criteria for 
examining the perceptions, beliefs, and mental imagery involved in suffering. As a 
result, Williams and Keefe (1991) suggest training programs for patients with 
"mysterious" indeations about pain, in order to acquaint them with the objective nature of 
their painful condition. However, no question is ever asked regarding the potential 
48 
meaning of the ideations that picture pain as Ha mysterious phenomenon". Despite the 
fact that catastrophizing fails to explain the vicissitude of pain experience among 
psychotics and schizophrenics, cognitive psychology treats the sufferer' s anxious 
representations as dysfunctional castrophic thinking that requires corrective restructuring 
into rational thinking (Ciccone and Grzesiak, 1984). However, such restructuring has 
shown to have unstable long-term effects and a high rate of relapse (Turk and Rudy, 
1991). Yet, the evidence of relapse has also been met with more restructuring of the 
same kind. As a result, Johnson and Kanzantzis (2004:208) suggest a more extensive and 
systematic use of homew,ork to "to enhance treatment outcomes and maintain therapeutic 
effects beyond the end of treatment." 
Skevington (1995:4) states that health psychology "looks not at people and their 
histories, but at the environment in which they live and at how experience and learning 
have shapes their behavior as pain sufferers". In other words, the proclaimed goal of 
health psychology lies in the effort to reduce the subjective ambiguity of suffering to the 
clarity of concrete environmental parameters and behavioural observations. 
Behaviourism, as Pérez-Âlverz (2004: 173) states, "considers that people are inside the 
world, not that the world is inside people." Likewise, health psychologists make sense of 
the internaI world of the sufferers based on observable interaction between the individual 
and the environment. In their view, contextualizing and understanding suffering means 
transIating the internaI world of the sufferer into behaviours and stimulus-bond responses 
mediated by cognitive factors that are contingent on antecedent events and consequences. 
Multidisciplinary pain clinics, in most part, deploy this cognitive-behavioural framework 
for clinicaI management of chronic pain (Loeser & Egan, 1989, Long, 1996). In fact, 
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today's chronic pain rehabilitation is shaped by the way health psychologists talk about 
pain and suffering and reconstruct its meaning in terms of a cascade of stimulus-bond 
responses mediated by an imperfect cognitive faculty prone to misrepresentation. As a 
result, the gruesome images conjured up and the terrifying anxieties stirred deep within 
the stream of consciousness of those who suffer from prolonged painful conditions are 
deemed as by-products of misrepresentation. They are germane to health psychology 
only as far as their restructuring into adaptive, rational thinking may be of concern. 
Ultimately, the discourse of health psychology reconstructs suffering from a private, 
meaningful, ambiguous experience to a mere deviation from public norms of 
functionality and adaptability. This reconstruction filters out and inhibits the alternative 
notions of pain, suffering, and anxiety as a composite subjective experience with 
multiplicity of meaning that may involve more than adult, reality-oriented cognition, and 
observable, environmental contingencies. 
1.3. From Phenomenological Studies of Pain and Suffering 
Is there, however, any other perspective for clinicians to understand suffering and to 
relate to sufferers? To this end, one has to look conceptually and theoretically beyond the 
limits of cognitive-behavioural health psychology. Therefore, it is necessary to ask how 
other psychological paradigms construe pain and human suffering, and explain the 
strange imagery and inflated representations of pain. In contrast to the emphasis on 
objective norms of functionality and adaptability, it is widely acknowledged that pain 
accompanies subjective feelings of threat and harm to the integrity of the body and the 
self (Szasz 1957; Cassell, 1998). Although such feelings are more or less true of every 
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senous illness, chronic pain suffers are reported to experience the protracted and 
terrifying impact of anxiety, anger, and depression (see review by Robinson and Reily, 
1999). Denying the sufferer any sense of control and any prospect of termination, 
chronic pain seems to engender a deep sense of threat (Bowers, 1968). If acute pain 
alerts us to imminent harm, chronic pain makes us deeply anxious about our well-being 
and prospect. Not infrequenlly, the ordinary concern about unusual sensations turns into 
a "morbid health preoccupation" (Salkovskis and Warwick, 1986). For those pain 
patients whose distress leads to the state of suffering, these morbid preoccupations are 
coloured with a sense of threatto the integrity of the body, and feelings of dread over the 
annihilation of the self. 
As the fear of annihilation, phenomenology and psychoanalysis consider anxiety 
as a profoundly meaningful, emotional state that can serve as the key to the 
understanding of human experience (Freud, 1926; Heidegger, 1962, 1985). Although 
they differ in their definitions and outlook, they unequivocally proclaim anxiety as the 
emotion, most reflective of the ordeal of being and becoming a person, particularly in its 
modern sense. They see beneath our most mundane actions, the unique human awareness 
of death as an ever-present possibility, and as a source of profound anxiety. In their 
view, "1 will die," rather than "one will die," (Heidegger: 1985:316-7) becomes the 
inevitable possibility that we anxiously strive to understand, to overcome, to control, to 
transcend, and to deflect (Kierkegaard 1957; Jaspers, 1971). 
Under the shadow of this possibility, as Heidegger (1962, 1985) maintains, life 
becomes Being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode). He argues that death makes us acutely 
aware of our finitude, and anxious about the temporality of being. He explains anxiety as 
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the mood (Stimmung) that attunes us to what is generally taken for granted as Dasein or 
as being-there. In this sense, Heidegger calls anxiety the ground-mood that discloses the 
ever-present possibility or the indefiniteness (Unbestimmtheit) of death as the ground of 
being. In his view, living resolutely in the face of death allows one to see how illusively 
the public (Das Man) and shared views disburden and shelter us from death. In this 
sense, those anguished can no longer accept the way of the crowd, as they feel ill-at-ease 
(unheimlich) with the commonly shared, all-to-familiar sense of being. As anxiety tunes 
the person to the possibilities of Dasein, "the meanings and truths making up the fabric of 
the world become alien to the individual" (Hoffman, 1993:203). The anxious individual 
can no longer trust the publicly avowed truths, as anxiety of death shows "the fabric of 
the world" to be illusory. In this manner, existentialism promulgates anxiety as the key 
to the authentic understanding of human condition. They recognize anxiety as "the 
disturbing and 'uncanny' mood, which summons a person to reflect on his individual 
existence and its 'possibilities'." (Cooper, 1990:128). From phenomenological­
existential point of view, the anxiety of death associated with pain cannot be reduced to 
maladaptive misrepresentations and embellishments, or misappraisal of noxious stimuli. 
To the contrary, as a lived experience largely invisible to others, pain is observed to set a 
rupture between everyday world of shared experiences and the liveworld of the suffering 
patient. When attending to the world and making sense of persistent agony becomes 
unworkable, terrifying anxiety necessitate new horizons of meaning that lie beyond the 
limit of shared beliefs and dominant discourse. 
Familiar to every personal history, are experiences of conflict, rupture, and pain 
that have caused intense and conspicuous anxiety. Yet, depending on their resolution and 
52 
significance, such experiences are later recalled to mind as challenges, or banished from 
consciousness as unwanted experiences. In effect, anxiety paradoxically involves both 
the harrowing and the inspiring experiences that shape our sense of identity. As every 
life resembles a journey between birth and death, what lies in between is in many ways 
fused with, and characterized by anxiety which equally accompanies exhilarating and 
terrifying anticipations. Similarly, living is not devoid of pain, even for the most 
gratifying examples of life. In fact, as pain is emblematic of injury, harm, loss, and hurt, 
its presence occasions a sense of threat that is often the hallmark of every anxiety 
situation. The kinship of anxiety and pain that often becomes palpable in suffering may 
be said to arise from a deep existential parallel between the two that we undeniably live, 
from birth to death. 
Undoubtedly, an intrinsic quality of being alive is irritability or the ability to feel 
paIn. Without such ability, thriving becomes impossible, as responding to environment 
becomes seriously impaired (Melzack & Wall, 1982:15-19). Yet, intractable pain stirs in 
us consuming anxieties that can overshadow our entire existence (Bakan 1968; Scarry 
1985). Given the importance of pain for our lives, anxieties associated with an aching 
body cannot be simply explained and dealt with as experiences that are extraneous to the 
context of being, and to the process of becoming an individual. How such anxieties 
involve the sufferer' s greater sense of being is an important and inexhaustible question 
that must be explored from more than one point of view. Despite their obvious 
differences, psychoanalysis and phenomenology can provide a valuable theoretical 
framework for understanding the anxieties associated with paIn. In fact, their 
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introspective and reflective approach to human expenence seems necessary for a 
meaningful grasp of human suffering. 
Based on narrative of suffering and illness, Cassell (1982) and Bakan (1968) 
argue that the dread of impending annihilation defines suffering not only as a distinct 
human experience, but also as one requiring its own mode of understanding. ln suffering, 
the patient is not only ill with pain, but feels the overpowering threat of being destroyed 
and helplessly reacts to such violent threat. ln situations of serious illness or chronic 
pain, such preoccupations become "severe distress" or what Cassell (1982) calls 
suffering. Although generally defined as negative emotional reactions to pain, suffering 
rises from a particular kind of distress. 
"Suffering occurs when an impending destruction is perceived; it 
continues until the threat of disintegration has passed or until the 
integrity of the person can be restored in sorne other manner. .. although 
suffering often occurs in presence of acute pain ... or other bodily 
symptoms, suffering extends beyond the physical. Most generally, 
suffering can be defined as the state of severe distress associated with 
events that threaten the intactness of the person." (640) 
ln effect, although the feelings of threat can be induced by unusual physical sensations, 
its experience can expand "beyond the physical" and trigger deeper threats at the basic 
level of existence. 
ln a more recent work, Cassell (1999:531) states, "suffering is the affliction of the 
person and not the body." As such, suffering is a personal experience, which involves 
how the afflicted person perceives the severity, the effect and the meaning of pain. 
Focusing on this personal dimension, Cassell reminds clinicians that disease and the body 
are more than just "directly observable, objectively existing, and purely material state of 
affairs" (533). He emphasizes the living body of the person whose current affairs have to 
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be meaningfully woven into the fabric of past experiences. In Cassell's view, pain and 
affliction constitute an impending destruction, when they tear the person's fabric of life 
and become senseless. However, the prevalence of such deep threats among pain patients 
seems contrary to the fact that most instances of chronic pain are not in-themselves fatal 
or life-threatening, even though the suffers lose control over their lives. Therefore, the 
nature of psychological mechanisms that activates such deep fears remains obscure. As a 
possible explanation, Cassell goes as far as recognizing the subjective nature of suffering, 
and advocates for a "non-discursive" and "intuitive" thinking that does not rely on 
propositional, verbal reasoning to understand suffering. He finds such intuitive thinking 
more appropriate for diagnosing and treating suffering for those who work closely with 
the afflicted. 
Questions about the nature of pain-related suffering, and the ways of talking and 
thinking about it, have prompted studies to focus on the existential or lived experience of 
chronic pain. In his phenomenological reflection on illness, Schutz (1971 :218-22) 
recognizes that being ill engenders two types of ruptures in the world of the sufferer. 
First, it imposes on patients a sentient condition that is not shared or felt by others. If 
common sense provides the security of living in an "everyday world" shared and 
cohabited by others, Schutz maintains that illness ruptures the sentient commonality of 
experience between the self and the other. Suddenly, one feels a pain that no one else can 
experience and lives in a discomfort that no one can share. For patients, the felt symptom 
is a solitary experience, isolated from the everyday flow of the public world, and 
partitioned from the immediate experience of others (Sebeok, 2001 :66-70). Although 
those around them definitely react to their ordeal, only patients can experience the 
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sentient quality of the pain, and its debilitating effects. Second, Schutz points out that in 
our everyday world, the self acts as an agent capable of authoring actions and assuming 
control. However, this rather confident sense of agency is possible as long as the self 
remains comfortably embodied. Without the able body, the self loses its self-assuring 
sense of embodiment, and eventually the sense of agency. According to Schutz, illness 
breaches the embodied self and undermines the unison between the body and self. 
Hence, the self feels being acted upon by an aching body, as the preoccupation with body 
grows to a disproportionate level. In reaction, Schutz maintains that the self assumes 
distance from the body, and begins to feel un-whole, ruptured, or "divided." 
As chronic pain puts an end to the hope of recovery, the ruptures in the self-other 
and in the self-body engender a terrifying sense of threat. Melzack and Wall (1982:54) 
remind us, when pain is acute, it "encompasses the unpleasantness of past injury and the 
hope of future recovery". Since acute pain is responsive to treatment, the prospect of 
healing can reassure the sufferer of rather uncomplicated recovery. Certain about the 
future, the patient can tolerate the ruptured world of illness to let healing take place. 
However, in chronic pain, the prospect of permanent agony overshadows the present and 
the future. Melzack and Wall candidly state, 'The pain becomes evil-Ît is intolerable 
and serves no useful function" (55). The authors' observation precisely reflects the 
feelings of patients who see pain as wickedly pointless or as senselessly malicious. 
Ethnographic case studies have elaborated on this experience of malevolence and evil. 
Reporting the introspections of a chronic pain patient, Byron Good (1992:41-42) 
demonstrates how pain shatters the experience of time. He reports that the patient feels 
trapped in moment. Time, as known to be ordered across past, present, and future, 
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collapses into intervals of pain. The flow of moments is consumed by intractable agony, 
punctuated by moments of relative calm that is bereft of joy ar hope. In a vivid manner, 
Byron Good demonstrates how the patient's "inner time" slows to haIt, while time, as 
experienced by the rest of world, "speeds by and it is lost" (1992:42). For the sufferer, 
chronic pain is an agony without a discrete course or an end in sight. 
Not infrequently, the diagnosis of chronic pain does not foster any prospect of 
comfort, or any sense of reassurance for the patients. Good (1992:39) maintains: "as 
locus of pain, the body takes on agency over and against the self'. Feeling acted upon, 
the self is beset by the aching body. No longer in control, the person feels separated 
from, and controlled by the body in pain. The self-body unity caves in, and the pain 
becomes a menace to the overall integrity of the self. Using the discourse of the patient, 
Byron Good reports this sense of threat. 
"In this context, Brian's repeated expressions of concern about "losing 
control" have special meaning. The ward "control" appears thirteen 
times in the manuscript at eight points in the interview. Twice he 
expresses concern about his ability to control pain or that monster 
banging about in his body. Once he describes himself as a "victim of 
life rather than someone who has sorne control over it." Once he 
describes his ability to control time, to regain what has been lost. And 
four times he discusses the terror that he simply may lose control. .. .This 
theme expresses a profound fear of dissolution of the self and the 
experienced life world. The assumption that the world possesses 
stability is replaced by a sense of arbitrariness, a feeling that will is 
required that control is necessary to maintain the self and the world. 
Together with the attacks of panic and anxiety, the pain floods the 
consciousness, dominates inner time, and breaks down the ordered 
relationship between the conscious self and the world to which it relates. 
The pervasiveness of the body expands its boundary, shuts out attention, 
and threatens dissolution ....Thus, the world of chronic pain, the separate 
world inhabited by its sufferer, is at the same time a world unmade." 
(42) 
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Good vividly describes how the patient's world becomes engulfed by "the fear of 
dissolution of the self'. As the threat gains intensity and thrust, the sufferer struggles to 
remain psychologically together. Yet, when pain "floods the consciousness," the sense of 
imminent disintegration and annihilation takes over. The fear of "dissolution of the self' 
overcomes the patient whose lifeworld is shattered by the pain. The lived experience of 
the patient appears as one ruptured by agony, fraught with fears, and beset by 
helplessness. 
As a result, chronic pam sufferers describe their expenence of impending 
destruction as that of being violently attacked, being helplessly diminished, or being 
aggressively invaded. In another ethnographic case study, Brodwin (1992:81) reports a 
chronic pain patient who describes her terrifying feelings of suffocation by pain. "lt 
starts off like being short of breath, then gasping for the air," says the patient, "it's like 
having an elastic around my neck, preventing me from breathing". For her, suffering 
from an asphyxiating pain seems terribly real and vividly dreadful. She literally feels 
being strangled by the elastic-like pain that squeezes life out of her. The same patient 
portrays her pain as "agonizing, tearing, like my stomach is being pulled apart". Her 
account vividly portrays the sheer aggression of her pain. Tt is this violent threat that 
makes her feel shaken and panicked. In fact, she states, "1 panicked, 1 felt really 
odd ... because 1 had this incredible feeling of anxiety ... 1 was very tense, my stomach was 
in knots". This excessive anxiety is commensurate to the violent threat felt by the 
patient. In another case study, Garro (1992: 119) describes a chronic pain patient whose 
intense, trance-like anxiety "portends to possible 'psychotic episodes,' 'personality 
disorganization."' In fact, derealization and depersonalization can accompany intense 
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episodes of pain. In pain, Scary (1985 :53) states, "one feels acted upon, annihilated by 
inside and outside alike". As a result of such extreme anxieties, Garro repOlts that the 
patient continues to feel ravaged, long after a period of intense pain has subsided. The 
patient clearly states, "even though my sense of my pain diminished, my sense of myself 
was also so diminished that it hadn't achieved anything" (122). In effect, the short-lived 
periods of relief only allows the patient to become cognizant of the damage to the self. 
Byron Good (1992:39) reports his patient feeling under attack from "a monster banging 
about in his body". It is not uncommon for patients to describe pain as a terrifying 
monster, or as a vicious creature that is violently attaclùng and ravaging them, from 
within. Explaining this reaction, Scarry (1985:52) points out that although pain "occurs 
within oneself, it is at once identified as 'not oneself,' 'not me,' as something so alien 
that it must right now be gotten rid of." Experiencing pain as "not-me" makes the 
patients feel aggravated and harassed by an ego-alien entity, or from a monstrous "non­
self' within them. Such excessive and tangible anxieties of annihilation drive the patient 
into total helplessness and despair. Delvecchio Good (1992:59) quotes a patient who 
says, "1 cannot envision a future that has anything worth loolùng forward to." A sense of 
helplessness overshadows the patient's prospect, as intractable pain violently takes over. 
The devastating impact of suffering erodes the self, and dims every glimmer of hope for 
the sufferer. 
In many ways, what these case reports aptly describe cannot be simply reduced to 
an outlandish series of misappraisals of suffering. From phenomenological point of view, 
what becomes important is how this existential parallel of pain and anguish is lived in the 
experience and consciousness of the sufferer. Hence any explanation of suffering must in 
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one way or another rise from the sufferer's lived and articulated experience rather than 
from the disinterested gaze of an observer. In other words, any explanation of suffering 
must in one way or another rise from the sufferer's lived (Erlebnis) and reflectively 
articulated experience (Erfahrung), rather than from the disinterested gaze of an 
observer. Scarry's (1985) valuable historical and literary analysis of lived and 
reflectively articulated suffering makes an important revelation. She argues that 
uncontrollable, intense pain unmakes the world of the sufferers, as it shatters the 
language and obliterates the world beyond the body in pain: 
"It is the intense pain that destroys a person' s self and world, a destruction 
experienced spatially as either the contraction of the universe down to the 
immediate vicinity of the body or as the body swelling to fill the entire 
universe. Intense pain is also language-destroying: as the content of one's 
world disintegrates, so the content of one' s language disintegrates; as the 
self disintegrates, so that which would express and project the self is 
robbed of its source and its subject." (35) 
The disintegration of the world, language, and self closely echoes what chronic pain 
patients often recognize as the dissolution of self. This unmaking and shattering can be 
regarded as the core of the sufferer's vulnerability, shrouded in the mysterious haze of 
indeterminacy that makes pain a source of both fear and fascination. It is at this juncture 
that the prevailing public discourse (das Man) seeks to subdue pain and to put suffering 
to the service of normative discourse, as it is made part of the shared mundane reality. 
Far from being a personal misappraisal, Scarry reveals how historically and 
culturally this vulnerability and indeterminacy is recognized and remarkably used in 
social domination. She argues that, although pain is lived as a world-shattering 
experience, it can be also a reality-producing opportunity. As a lived experience 
(Erlebnis), pain can shatter the world of the sufferer by reducing it to ineffable agony and 
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anguish. On the other hand, when human creativity utters the unutterable, pain as a 
reflectively articulated experience (Erfahrung) can undercut the normative construction 
of the mundane reality. In contrast, the failure on the paIt of the society to render a first­
person account of the pain or to refleet back on the first-person body that lives the pain 
leads to "debased forms of power". 
"The failure to express pain--whether the failure to objectify its attributes 
or instead the failure, once those attributes are objectified, to refer them to 
their original site in the human body--will always work to allow its 
appropriation and eonflation with debased forms of power; conversely, the 
successful expression of pain will always work to expose and make 
impossible that appropriation and conflation." (14) 
The potential for undercutting the normative and interposing a new perspective is one 
reason why pain and suffering are often the object of a larger disciplinary and 
institutional "effort that seeks to locate, identify, and act upon it" (Frank, 2001 :355). 
In effect, how pain is seen from the standpoint of the normative discourse can in 
many ways be contrasted with how it is lived inchoately or reflectively articulated in a 
manner that exceeds discursive norms (Holmes and Chambers, 2005; Wandless, 2005). 
Reflecting on the normative discourse of pain, Morris (1985) situates our understanding 
of pain in a larger historical context ta reveal how distinctly pain becomes nothing other 
than a sign of disease in contemporary society. As a sign of physiological anomaly, 
Morris argues, pain becomes devoid of meaning and merely reducible to nosographie 
categories. In his view, it is this meaninglessness that has created the "invisible 
epidemic" of painfulness or the larger than life problem of chronic pain in the 
contemporary society where search for illusive cure has replaced the search for meaning. 
However, despite the critique of pain as the sign physiological anomaly, what 
Morris, Scarry, and many others may be rnissing is how suffering as an integral part of 
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pam, as well as of any prolonged and serious illness has been reduced to a sign of 
cognitive-behavioural anomaly. Hence, abandoning the disease model for a 
biopsychosocial approach has been perhaps an incomplete remedy, since the anguish and 
anxieties associated with pain are still seen as anything but meaningful. In fact, suffering 
is yet to be seen as what makes a person feel other to oneself. As a scholar surviving 
chronic illness, Arthur Frank (2001) candidly describes this othering quality of suffering 
and eruditely voices his recalcitrant disconnection against the normative dictum that 
commands him to speak and instruct him to reconnect. As his reflection treads between 
ineffability and uttering, he relates his "contrasting illness experience" that marks his 
struggle with chronic illness in the absence of pain. His long passages oscillate between 
impassionate explanation and anxious plea, allowing no ellipsis: 
"My contrasting illness experiences convinced me there are dichotomies, 
but these are within the category of suffering. These dichotomies began in 
my feeling of being disconnected from my life as 1 had been living it and 
from the lives of those around me. Suddenly, they (including my recently 
healthy self) were standing on one shore, and 1 was in a small skiff being 
carried toward an opposite shore. 1 could still call to them and they 
answered, but the distance separating us was growing rapidly. In 
contemporary academic usage, 1 was becoming other to the person 1 had 
been and to those who knew that person. The feeling of becoming other 
has nothing to do with social support-I had generous support. It was 
precisely my high quality of support, along with my absence of pain or 
physical distress, that placed my suffering in such stark relief. My sense 
of being set apart had nothing to do with any material resource 1 could 
imagine having had. 
Let me tell a story that illustrates this sense of disconnection and 
begins to suggest why suffering is so difficult to define and to research. As 
part of the preoperative routine before my biopsy surgery, 1 was 
interviewed by a nurse who asked me, at the end of her inventory of 
required questions, how my wife and 1 were coping with my possible 
cancer. 1 told her that we had a new baby, my wife was still recovering 
from a difficult pregnancy and birth, and we were doing very badly 
indeed. Her reply confirmed my worst suspicions about medical pretenses 
to caring and also taught me much about suffering. "You have to talk to 
each other," she admonished as she closed her clipboard and left. End of 
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interview; no follow-up was offered. Of course she was right; we certainly 
needed to talk to each other. But our suffering was why we could not talk. 
Our suffering was what we could not say. We feared saying what we felt, 
and we feared our words could never convey what we felt but would 
reduce those feelings to complaints and specifie concerns. "Don't you 
know," l wanted to shout to that nurse as she walked away, "it's what your 
patients can't say." 
Suffering involves experiencing yourself on the other side of life as it 
should be, and no thing, no material resource, can bridge that separation. 
Suffering is what lies beyond such help. Suffering is the unspeakable, as 
opposed to what can be spoken; it is what remains concealed, impossible 
to reveal; it remains in darkness, eluding illumination; and it is dread, 
beyond what is tangible even if hurtful. Suffering is loss, present or 
anticipated, and loss is another instance of no thing, an absence. We suffer 
the absence of what was rnissed and now is no longer recoverable and the 
absence of what we fear will never be. At the core of suffering is the sense 
that something is irreparably wrong with our lives, and wrong is the 
negation of what could have been right. Suffering resists definition 
because it is the reality of what is not. Anyone who suffers knows the 
reality of suffering, but this reality is what you cannot "come to grips 
with." To suffer is to lose your grip. Suffering is expressed in myth as the 
wound that does not kill but cannot be healed. (254-55) 
Frank' s helpless appeal is met by a ritual of repudiation, congruent with the current 
behavioural model that stipulates, "Discussions about pain were not allowed between 
nurses and patients or with physicians except during specifie times at rounds or in therapy 
sessions." (Long, 1996:8) As a scholar of medicine and literature, Frank is, of course, no 
naive patient. Hence, being disclaimed makes mm more determined to reclaim his 
undeniable ordeal: ""Don't you know .. .it's what your patients can't say." Although pain 
patients in general may not be able to make such graceful defense of their suffering, what 
they feel cannot be presumed to be in any way less than what Frank reflective articulates. 
His eloquent portrayal of suffering as "the reality of what is not" alludes to his fateful 
confrontation with non-being through loss as "another instance of no thing, an absence." 
Franks concept of "no thing" echoes the existential concept of non-being or 
nothingness. In his broad review of literature, the Existentialist psychologist, Rollo May 
63 
(1977:363-64) defines anxiety as "our human awareness of the fact that each of us is a 
being confronted with nonbeing". In his account, he offers the definition of nonbeing as 
"that which would destroy being, such as death, severe illness, interpersonal hostility, too 
sudden change which destroys our psychological rootedness". In this sense, anxiety is 
understood as our experience of non-being that involves the threat of destruction and 
death. Although May refers to anxiety as "the primaI and original reaction" to threat and 
sees fear as "a later development," he does not reduce their difference to simple 
maturation in the perception and evaluation of danger. Rather, he emphasizes how 
anxiety involv~s a quality of danger that makes it entirely distinct from fear. 
"We speak of anxiety as basic not only in the sense that it is the general, 
original response to threat, but also because it is a response to threat on a 
basic level of the personality. It is a response to a threat to the core or 
essence of the personality rather than peripheral danger. Fears are the 
responses to threats before they get to the basic level. (225) 
For those who confront such core threats, the being faces its antithesis in the non-being. 
Hence, anxiety becomes the experience of the ultimate otherness that stands opposite of 
being and threatens to annihilate the self. In other words, it is the radical dread of 
otherness that is experienced, when we confrant non-being and death as a personal 
possibility. This is how Frank describes the essence of suffering as "experiencing 
yourself on the other side of life." 
May adds an important insight to his discussion of anxiety, when he observes 
"that people utilize disease in the same way older generations used evil-as an object on 
which to project their hated experiences in order to avoid having to take responsibility for 
them" (86). This revelation admonishes to how public discourse (das Man) has 
appropriated disease to the service of self-denial and self-repudiation. But, how such 
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appropriation would become possible? Regrettably, this important insight remains mute 
in May's discussion of anxiety and illness, as he provides no further elaboration on this 
precarious, contemporary, social disposition. In other words, he stops short of 
unravelling the significance of such projection and self-repudiation, which would not 
only deepened investigation of pain, but also shed light on the relation of pain and 
imagination. 
The phenomenological analysis of pain and imagination unravels the underside of 
May' s insight. As Scan)' contends, intense pain destroys the world, by reducing the 
universe to the immediate aching body. In contrast, she points out that imagination 
constructs an unreal world made of unreal objects. In this sense, if pain annihilates the 
sentient experience of the real world objects, imagination (fantasy) creates the experience 
of a world made of unreal objects (163-164). However, Scarry's phenomenology of pain 
and imagination misses the subtle dynamics between the two. In The Wall (1957), 
Sartre's hero, Ibietta acutely experiences this fantastic transfiguration of body in pain. 
Reflecting on Ibietta's soliloquy, Oliver (2003) demonstrates how the obliteration of the 
real transfiguers the body in pain into an unreal object of fantasy: 
"But Scarry understands this obliteration in terms of unmaking the real 
instead of entering an unreal state. In Sartre's story however the body not 
only unmakes, but "makes" us experience an unreal state. The body 
creates an enormous vermin, tying us to itself, swallowing the entire 
world. Ibietta's body gradually invades his whole existence. Sartre 
meticulously scrutinises a subtle progression of this invasion. On the one 
hand Ibietta experienced mere bodily suffering. His body was trembling 
and sweating and stinging with many pains. But the more the night 
progressed, the more this physical suffering gave way to indifference 
(Sartre, 1957, 229ff). Ibietta gradually reported pains in his neck and head, 
which he could not call "real pains", but something even worse (Sartre, 
1957, p. 231). His suffering body was progressively giving way to pain, 
which made ail sensory experience unreal. He described this state as a 
horrible calm: "my body, 1 saw with its eyes, 1 heard with its ears, but it 
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was no longer me; it sweated and trembled by itself and l didn't recognise 
it anymore. l had to touch it and look at it to find out what was happening, 
as if it were the body of somebody else" (p. 235). 
Ibietta's body became the focal centre of his attention. His body was his 
entire abject. But in a peculiar way this object remained a state. He was 
feeling his body, but as an object. Unlike Scarry's Ibietta, Sartre's Ibietta 
was indeed in a state of pain, which became its imaginative object. Pain 
made his body a figure of fantasy, an imaginative object, a vermin, which 
he was tied to... Ibietta was experiencing an unreal state, he was 
imagining astate that was his utmost reality. Pain made him experience a 
sensory unreal state." (42) 
Obliterating the sentient experience (Empfindung) of the real, paIn occasions the 
transmogrification of the "body in pain" into an unreality laced with rampant fantasy. 
However, how such imaginary construction becomes a receptacle for the projection of 
hated experience is a question that requires a deeper exploration into unconscious 
phantasy. 
Although this conclusion, if judged by the evidence of the argument, may seem to 
be largely based on literary examples, it has been corroborated by the empirical research 
which indicates the significant contribution of subjective and personal factors to suffering 
and pain behaviour. In a study designed to investigate the influence of personality factors 
(neuroticism and extraversion) on pain, Wade, Dougherty, Hart, Rafii, and Price (1992) 
analysed four stages of sufferers' experience: 1) nociceptive-sensory, 2) perception of 
unpleasantness, 3) pain suffering, and 4) pain behaviour. Using a canonical correlation 
analysis, the authors showed that personality factors contribute significantly to the stages 
3 and 4, while their contribution is small to the first two stages of pain. Referring to the 
results of this important study, Gendrault (2001 :35) argues, "It is at this level that the 
vacuum created by pain experience is filled not so much by stereotypical data, but 
instead, by private, personal, and subjective data." 
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1.4. Psychoanalytic View of Pain, Anxiety, and Suffering 
Clinicians often confrant a serious quandary: either they would make sense of the 
terrifying images of body in pain, or they repudiate it in the name of functional and 
adaptive norms. As intense and persistent pain can turn the experience of the aching 
body into an imaginative and terrifying unreality, what meaning this construction can 
assume is a question that a serious investigation of pain cannot easily ignore. Ignoring 
this question would foreclose the meaning of distressful representations reported by the 
sufferers, and reduce them to errors of cognition or misrepresentations. On the other 
hand, if investigation focuses on the range of conscious significance, it may never result 
in making sense of the meaningful irrationality of such constructions both at the 
individual and collective levels. Furthermore, restricting the investigation to the 
conscious meaning may complicate any explanation of pain experience among sufferers 
with thought disorders, psychotic disorders, and dissociative orders, where the self, 
language, and experience are not conùng together, seamlessly. These concerns make it 
necessary to look beyond conscious range of significations and to consider the 
unconscious side of imagination. 
As aforementioned, for many sufferers, the experience of the body engenders 
terrifying feelings of "dissolution of the self' and "obliteration of the real". As the threat 
of non-being becomes the main emotional preoccupation for many chronic pain sufferers, 
pain becomes the only reality and indeed a bizarre and terrifying one. Researchers and 
clinicians testify that "pain has almost universally been described as 'it'" (White and 
Sweet, 1955: 108; Cassell, 1976) or as an "alien presence" (Zaner, 1981:54-55). Such 
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thing-like, alien entity is experienced as an estranged object that acts upon the self 
(Schutz, 1971; Good, 1992), and deprives the self from the sense of ease and autonomy. 
In effect, when pain portends to anxiety of annihilation, it triggers extreme revulsion and 
disgust that is at times extended to the entire body. Children refer to pain as the "The 
most disgusting ever." A 5-year-old girl was reported simply saying, "Oh, somehow you 
feel sort of anxious. Like, you don't know what to do." (Kortesluoma and Nikkonen, 
2006) In fact, May acknowledges that "anxiety is the psychic component of every 
disease" (91). For the most part, this can be attributed to the fact that the perception of 
pain or affliction commonly alerts us to injury and harm that are characteristic of disease, 
disorder, and ultimately death. At sorne point during its course, every disease can 
become anxiety-inducing, as it subjects the afflicted to discomfort that makes ordinary 
living impossible. Bodily aches as the most common symptom of disease impact our 
sense of being and make us shrink away from life. "Pain", Bakan bluntly states, "is a 
harbinger of death beyond aIl options associated with its management" (78). As one of 
the first signs and a general symptom of morbidity, pain portends to situations of loss, 
rupture, hurt, damage, injury and eventually death. Bakan acknowledges this moribund 
portent, in spite of the prevailing practice in pain management to focus on non­
threatening, controllable experience suffering. 
In his work on suffering and disease, Bakan (1968:65-67) draws on clinical and 
historical evidence to explain the dread of annihilation experienced by pain patients. 
Exploring the phenomenology of experience, he describes how pain perception recedes 
from the skin, and sinks deep into the body. As oppose to other senses that extend 
beyond the skin to grasp distal objects, pain is meant to reflect primarily the status of the 
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hurting body. "The distality of pain is less than zero." (66) Despite its inner-receding 
quality, the ego mostly treats pain and its bodily locus as a thing-like entity distinct or 
split from the self. To explain this reaction, Bakan turns to psychoanalysis and depth 
psychology. He argues that in the early stage of ego development, pain is experienced as 
the concrete threat of annihilation. He refers to an infantile complex, in which pain 
perception is hardly differentiated from with the concrete treat of death. He explains how 
the infantile ego experiences pain as at once being hurt and killed. 
"In the early stage of ego development, there is a rather primitive pain­
annihilation complex in which pain and the sense of the possibility of 
annihilation are not yet separated. We may, in our own more mature and 
sophisticated stage of ego development, analyze the primitive pain 
experience into two components of pain pel' se and annihilation. But 
primitively the ego experiences pain as an undifferentiated "I-am-being­
hurt-and killed." (80) 
In his reflection on pain and annihilation, Bakan acknowledges the "primitive pain 
experience" as the germinating ground of their entanglement or complex. He defines 
primitive as "the early stage of ego development" which in most part involves the 
infantile and pre-verbal period. In Bakan's view, the ego retains a latent sense of "I-am­
being-hurt-and-killed," despite the manifest adult capabilities in differentiating pain from 
annihilation and in objectivating fear. Although his overall discussion is not firmly 
grounded in psychoanalytic theories of infantile development, he clearly recognizes the 
importance of "pain-annihilation complex" as the enduring psychic remnant of the ego's 
primitive legacy. 
While May (224-226) attributes the fear of destruction to the inability of the 
person to objectivate intense danger, Bakan believes such perception involves the ego's 
infantile development. During this period, pain and annihilation are experienced as a 
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single phantasmatic complex. Thus, the threat of annihilation and the feelings of 
impending destruction rise from the primitive history of pain that rests in antechambers 
of the unconscious, within the core of adult psyche. In Bakan's view, although "I-am­
being-hurt-and-killed" constitutes the infantile history of pain that the ego has been out­
grown, it has never been left behind or totally abandoned. It remains only latent, ready ta 
be reawakened by actual circumstances. Segal explains this universal quality of the adult 
ego, which is as much an aspect of "normal" development as it is of the pathogenic one: 
"No experience in human development is ever cast aside or obliterated; we 
must remember that in the most normal individual there will be sorne 
situations which will stir up the earliest anxiety and bring into operation 
the earliest mechanism of defence." (35) 
Although the psychoanalytic view of anxiety recognizes the importance of real dangers 
and noxious situations, it acknowledges that anxiety is as much caused by real sources of 
danger as it is by intrapsychic and primitive threats. Hence, the patient confronts 
objective threats involving noxious or painful stimulation in here-and-now, with a 
primitive history. In this manner, every pain-associated anxiety bears to greater or ta 
lesser degree, traces of infantile anxiety of a time long-gone but not forsaken. What is 
however of particular significance is how this view can explain sorne of the distinct 
qualities of pain experience that keeps puzzling the students of pain. Based on what 
Bakan demonstrates, to take adequate account of the psychic components of pain 
experience requires at least two things. In the first place, a deeper discussion of the 
theOl'y of infantile development is necessary ta explain the intrapsychic importance of 
pain-annihilation complex. In the second place, the discussion must use the theory of 
infantile development to shed light on the distinct and primitive qualities of pain 
experience as revealed by phenomenological research. 
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Due to the sheer diversity in theory and practice of depth psychology, it is 
necessary to review how psychoanalysis has thus far understood and defined pain, before 
advancing further into this area. As the present study concerns itself with the 
psychology of pain and anxiety, it is important to deliberate carefully upon the greater 
analytic inquiry into the psychology of the bodily symptoms. The psychoanalytic 
investigation of pain as a symptom of intrapsychic conflict has a weil evolved history that 
expands over two continents and spans beyond two centuries. Ever since Freud, 
psychoanalysis has tried to show how unconscious conflicts are relevant to pathogenesis 
of physical symptoms. For the most part, the analytic work has challenged us to, see how 
body and pain fundamentally can involve intrapsychic symbolism. Insofar as history 
testifies, psychoanalysis began with the study of unexplainable physical symptoms and 
mysterious pain. Freud and Breuer (1895) recognized hysterical complaints as symbolic 
representations of the split off and repressed memories of traumatic and emotionally 
intolerable experiences of their patients. Their views revealed the importance of the 
symbolic dimension of physical symptoms, which Freud (1910) deciphered by analyzing 
their unconscious meanings. His recognition of the repressed emotional conflicts was 
indeed a break from his predecessor Pierre Janet whose weIl publicized view at the time 
held sway over the study of hysteria. 
In his theory of mental illness, Janet (1886, 1888, 1889) argued that elaborate 
symptoms, found in hysteria, were caused by a psychic dissolution or loosening (la 
désagrégation psychique) that diminished self-control, reduced the conscious processing 
of stimulations, and made the patient highly suggestible. He observed that where 
consciousness narrowed (rétrécissement), the self lost its capability for synthesizing 
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somatic sensations and stimulations into personal perceptions. To this narrowing, he 
referred as psychological dissociation (Janet, 1887). ln his view, the idea of sub­
conscious did not involve repression and unconscious conflicts; it largely meant a registry 
for stimulations that by intensity fell beyond or below the threshold of consciousness. 
Janet stressed the synthesizing function of the self, and argued that the narrowing 
(rétrécissement) of the self meant letting this integrating function loose (désagrégation) 
beyond the realm of conscious, personal perception. ln his view, a degenerative 
predisposition for loosening caused the doubling (dédoublement) of the synthesizing 
faculty across the divide between conscious and sub-conscious. By the means of this 
doubling, complex set of activities evolved at the sub-conscious level, which resulted in 
the formation of elaborate symptoms and fixed ideas beyond the patient's grasp and 
control (Janet, 1893). Janet (1891) viewed over-stimulation caused by trauma as an 
exacerbating factor that could set off the degenerative predisposition of the patient. To 
remedy hysteria, Janet proposed the use of hypnosis for making corrective suggestions, 
along with involvement in craft making and simple activities. 
ln contrast to Janet, what Freud (190Sa) found in his case studies could not be 
attributed simply to a congenital predisposition for psychic dissolution. He encountered a 
strong resistance on the part of the patients to recall memories that involved the 
pathogenesis of the symptoms. He recognized that these memories were resisted for their 
disturbing lack of congruence with the self. Freud (1910) acknowledged the pathogenic 
nature of psychic conflicts caused by the intolerable memories of a sheering trauma or a 
forbidden impulsive desire. He managed to show how these memories induced deep 
anxieties, and how their resurfacing involved intense pain. To avoid this agony and to 
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ward off the anxiety-inducing materials, these memones were banished form 
consciousness through the mechanism of repression (Verdriingung). Freud's analytic 
work showed that forgotten memories were buried deep in the unconscious only to 
become manifest through the formation of the symptoms. Within the intricate hysterical 
symptoms of his patients, he discovered the symbolic, albeit distorted and compromised, 
manifestations of the underlying pathogenic memories. In effect, Freud's interpretation 
unravelled the repressed meaning of seemingly meaningless and exaggerated hysterical 
symptoms. His analytic approach conferred the status of causality to the repressed 
memories and conflicts of the patient, and made the cause of the symptom synonymous 
with its unconscious meaning. In his analytic technique, he stressed the symbolic latent 
content, and highlighted by the same token the need for understanding body symbolism 
(Freud, 1900 and 1905b; Synnott, 1993:24-27). 
The case of Elisabeth von R. was Freud' s (1895) earliest study of the analytic 
treatment of pain as the only symptom (chronic pain in lower limbs) and the case of 
Emmy von N. was his earliest study of treatment of pain as a mixed symptom (pain in 
lower limbs). However, Freud's research on pain began much before his studies on 
hysteria. As a neurologist, he took a keen interest in pain and spoke about its mystery 
and its importance across the span of his long writing career, as the founder of 
psychoanalysis. By 1895, Freud abandoned hypnosis as a mainstay of his therapeutic 
technique, and committed himself to development of psychoanalysis. In Project for a 
Scientific Psychology, Freud (1895:306) offers his most rudimentary definition of pain 
based on quantity of excitation, and attributes its aetiology to the unmanageable intensity 
of stimulation. In a rather mechanical manner, he argues that sensory stimulation beyond 
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certain level can become noxious. However, rus early analytic work with hysteria (Freud, 
1895) generated more than a theory of repression and talking cure. In effect, Freud 
realized in an unexpected manner the limits of his scientific training as a neurologist and 
the inadequacy of a reductive mechanical approach: 
"1 have not always been a psychotherapist but was trained, like other 
neuropathologists, to use local diagnosis and electro-prognosis, and 1 
myself still find it strange that the case histories that 1 write read like 
novellas and lack, so to speak, the serious stamp of science. 1 have to 
console myself with the thought that the nature of the object rather than 
my own preference is clearly responsible for this; local diagnosis and 
electrical reaction are simply not effective in the study of hysteria, 
whereas an in-depth portrayai of the working of the inner life, such as one 
expects to be given ,by novelists and poets, together with the application of 
a few psychological formulas, does allow me to gain a kind of insight into 
the course of hysteria. Case histories such as these demand to be judged 
as psychiatric, but they have one advantage over the latter, namely the 
intimate relationship between the story of the patient's suffering and the 
symptoms of their illness ... " (The case of Elizabeth von R., 165) 
Freud's candid and reflective account of his deviation from scientific method intimates a 
paradoxical sense of apprehension and confidence about the growing similarity between 
his case studies and literary texts. However, as his resolute search for understanding 
leads him away from the scientific canon, he discovers a new appreciation for the 
personal lives of his patients and their. In their "inner world," he finds a source of 
valuable insight into illness, neglected by procedures of science. This important 
methodological transformation as one of the major achievements of Studies in. Hysteria is 
often overlooked by commentators. In this sense, these early caseworks awakened Freud 
to more than just repression, unconscious symbolism, and talking cure. Through them, 
Freud essentially developed a deep and lasting appreciation for the personal and 
subjective experience of pain, illness, and suffering, an achievement that was at odds with 
the intellectual habits of his time and is still dismissed as anecdotal, more than 100 years 
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after its publication. However without this turn to subjectivity, it is doubtful that what 
eventually followed could have at all been possible. 
After hysteria, Freud's discussion of pain continued, albeit after a pause, and 
became an important part of his theory of instinct and instinctual gratification. ln the 
original text, he often made used of two German terms to refer to the concept of pain, 
Un/ust and Schmertz. Gendrault (2001 :36) explains the difference between these two 
terms: 
"For instance, the German words Un/ust, or unpleasure, and Schmertz, or 
pain, have both been translated From German texrs to English as "pain." 
Un/ust or unpleasure which can be referred to as suffering, belongs mostly 
to the ethical and psychological realm. Schmertz, on the other hand, refers 
to pain arising From soma, even though it rejoins dialectically the domain 
of mental processing and thereby the construct of Un/ust." 
Freuds shift From Schmertz to Un/ust marked a change From neurology to psychology and 
mental phenomenon. This change that was evident from the study of hysteria only 
gathered momentum as Freud further developed the psychoanalytic theory and technique. 
However, the shift was never eliminative; he never precluded one side for the other. It 
was rather an illuminative shift whereby pain (Schmertz) and unpleasure (Unlust) finally 
become two ends of a continuum. It is therefore hard to say where one stops and the 
other one begins. Yet, as we will see Freud attempts to show that when one suffices to 
induce the entire continuum of suffering. 
Freud's view of pain follows a long and winding path of development. After 
hysteria, he revisits the concept of pain, in On Narcissism: An Introduction (Freud, 
1914), wherein he describes how pain can cause the sufferer to withdraw From the 
external world, and From all that is not directly germane to the suffering. He explains this 
withdrawal as an instance of the divestment of libidinal energy. However, it is in Beyond 
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the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920) that he further develops his notion of anxiety and 
pain. Freud explains pain as the rising tide of afferent excitation as the result of noxious 
stimuli breaching the "protective shield of the body" (31). He then adds that such 
breaching causes an overinvestment (hypercathexis) of libidinal energy to the site of 
injury or undermined organ as a protective measure to diminish anxiety. He describes 
"the element of fright" "as caused by a lack of preparedness for anxiety." Seeing pain as 
being intertwined with anxiety and threat, Freud confers the status of a pseudodrive on 
pain whose aim is to initiate action to terminate injury and harm. Freud continues his 
libidinal theory of pain and anxiety in The Ego and the Id (Freud, 1923). He once again 
turns his attention to the psychology of pain which he describes, "a thing intermediate 
between external and internai perception, which behaves like an internai perception even 
when its source is in the external world." (22) Designating a liminal position for pain at 
the boundary of internai and external, Freud expands his earlier formulation of organ to 
ego hypercathexis. He argues that pain leads to an overinvestment of libidinal energy on 
the Ego as "bodily ego" (26). Thereby, Freud expands his definition of pain to a 
perception at the service of the ego development, a perception like touch, through which 
ego acquires "its special position among other objects in the world of perception (25). 
This development further brings together the analytic study of pain and ego development. 
His idea of pain along with pleasure as ego's perceptual means of positioning itself in the 
world evolves into a larger social reflection in Civilization and lts Discontent (Freud, 
1929). In this key work, Freud reflects on the philosophical view, and formulates a tragic 
view of life, where pleasure is only the reduction of pain, irritation, and frustration, 
whereas pain (Unlust) is regarded as the governing feature of life. However, In 
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Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety (Freud, 1926), Freud finally offers his late theory of 
pain and anxiety. He distinguishes physical pain as accompanying narcissistic cathexis 
and mental pain as relating to object-cathexis. He states, "The transition from physical 
pain to mental pain corresponds to a change from narcissistic cathexis to object­
cathexis." (171) In this manner, as Ego recognizes the loss of the object, it makes an 
important transition to mental pain. In effect, Freud demonstrates his commitment to 
phenomenology of pain, when he manages to provide a non-physiological explanation for 
physical pain. He also clarifies the distinction between and anxiety and pain to explain 
their interconnection. Freud explains pain as analogous to anxiety, in that they both serve 
as "a warning of the danger of loss" of the body, body part, or the object (59). But, he 
specifies pain as "the actual reaction to the loss of the object, while he sees anxiety as 
"the reaction to the danger that the loss entails." (170) In short, by growing beyond the 
physiological concept of pain and quantitative definitions, Freud develops an 
appreciation for the phenomenology of pain and thereon continues to establish a 
metapsychology of ego development based on pain and anxiety. 
Following Freud, the clinical study of hysteria took many turns and twists. By 
and large, the later effort expanded the focus to include a larger investigation of the 
relation between psychological suffering and physical ailment. As a result, what took 
shape borrowed, integrated, and furthered ideas from both Freud's psychoanalytic and 
Janet's psychological theories. Chief amongst later developments were two rival schools 
that have exerted significant influence on the study of the psyche and soma. Franz 
Alexander, the founder of what came to be known as the Chicago School, proposed the 
idea of psychosomatic medicine. Although Alexander (1954) accepted Freud's definition 
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of hysteria, he recognized a distinction between symbolic conversions of internai 
conflicts and what he called the psychosomatic disease. He argued that as opposed to 
voluntary motor reactions, involuntary visceral reactions involved adaptive response to 
stress at the vegetative level. For lacking representational content and motivational 
control, these vegetative responses were said to be devoid of symbolic meaning and 
hysterical symbolism. Emphasizing the non-symbolic and vegetative mechanisms, 
Alexander (1955, 1961) viewed emotional conflicts and trauma as contributing to the 
physical straining of the body through excessive mobilization of cardiovascular and 
neuro-endocrinal systems. He maintained that such stress-oriented mobilizations, if left 
unmitigated, could aggravate organic predispositions and strain vulnerable organ systems 
to psychosomatic disease. In this vein, whereas the meaning of symptom was for Freud 
central to the aetiology and cure of hysterical conversions, such matters played a 
contributing role in Alexander's psychosomatic medicine. ln fact, he argued that 
emotional conflicts contributed to the pathophysiology of psychosomatic disease, by 
setting in motion the non-symbolic stress response at the vegetative level. In Alexander's 
view (1954), the meaning of any conflict was deemed clinically important insofar as 
specifying the stress (i.e., oral incorporative anxiety with gastrointestinal manifestation), 
and the affected organ system (i.e., peptic ulcer of digestive system). In this vein, the 
abreaction of the intrapsychic conflict was redefined from the key remedy to a subsidiary 
intervention that is undertaken as part of a medical treatment. As stress reaction became 
a vegetative response bereft of mental representation, the theoretical emphasis on the 
preponderance of the repressed content in symptom formation diminished. In effect, 
Alexander' s psychosomatic medicine accepted the irredeemable lack of symbolic content 
78 
and significance that in many cases seemed puzzling, and called for a shift to medical 
intervention in conjunction to psychotherapy. 
In contrast to the theory of vegetative response, the Psychosomatic School of 
Paris offered a different theoretical approach to explain the bedevilling absence of body 
symbolism in psychosomatic illness. In their influential work, Marty, de M'Uzan, and 
David (1963) recognized the lack of symbolic content as palt of a complex psychic 
structure. Their detailed clinical observation revealed to what extent psychosomatic 
patients lived a life impoverished in terms of emotion, object relation, verbalization, and 
imagination. The authors described the striking relational poverty with regard to both 
internaI and external objects. In their case studies, the absence of affective experience 
was all-too-pervasive, making life mechanical and listless for those suffering from 
psychosomatic illness. Nocturnal dream activity and diurnal reverie were both 
diminished to nulI, markedly incapacitating imagination. AlI symptom anomalies were 
reduced exclusively and rigidly to somatic complaints and preoccupations which seemed 
completely eut off from any mental elaboration. The authors observed a pervasive 
rigidity and sterility of verbalization. So striking was the verbal constriction and so 
concrete the thinking process that the authors used the term, "operative thought" (pensée 
opératoire), to refer to the mental activity of the psychosomatic patients (Marty and de 
M'Uzan, 1963). 
However, Marty and his colleagues did not search for a physiological process or a 
purely degenerative predisposition to explain the pervasive lack of symbolic content 
demonstrated by patients. From the very beginning, they (de M'Uzan and David, 1960) 
recognized their task as that of explaining not psychosomatic illness (maladie), but 
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psychosomatic patient (malade). The authors explained the illness as a result of a specific 
psychic structure that failed to admit the impulse to the consciousness. As a result of this 
failure, the unconscious was severed and split away from any conscious representation, 
making mental activities totally devoid of affective content, and without any association 
with fantasy, dream, or reverie. Relying largely on an economic model, Marty and his 
colleagues explained that the partitioning of unconscious directed the impulse away from 
the ego' s elaborating and integrating functions, and projected the energy into concrete 
somatic disturbance of bodily functioning. The authors identified the mechanism of 
projective duplication (reduplication projective) as being involved in the creation of a 
double and isolated order of somatic events, segregated from the impulse desire and 
unconsclOus. 
Underscoring the importance of explaining the patient (malade), Marty and his 
colleagues argued that psychosomatic structure is a primitive (archaïque) formation 
marked by a deeply partitioned unconscious and overly concrete mental representation. 
To establish their point, the authors found it necessary to explain this structure not only in 
its own terms, but also in differentiation form neurosis and psychosis. As a result, the 
formation of the psychosomatic structure was recognized as a preverbal development 
distinct from others. The pathogenesis of this structure was said to involve a fundamental 
alteration of the boundaries of the ego (de M'Uzan 1967, 1983, and 2000) that caused an 
irredeemable split between the self and non-self. As a result of this alteration, the ego 
was reduced to the concrete body-ego, preoccupied with concrete sensory-motor 
representations. Direct trauma, early and prolonged neglect, and the persistent lack of 
congruency between maternaI care and impulse des ire were shown to be the source of the 
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over-excitation that undermined the balance of the psychic economy; shook the ego at its 
seams (ébranlement), and strained the synthesizing function of selfhood (identité). 
Although the possibility of constitutional predisposition was not totally overruled (de 
M'Uzan, 2003), it was only considered as a contributing factor in the overall process. 
Above ail, the ego' s total failure in admitting and integrating impulse into consciousness 
was explained based on the central notion of being shaken at the seams (ébranlement). In 
this manner, the absence of symbolic content in psychosomatic illness was not seen as 
arising from non-symbolic vegetative processes or constitutional factors. Beneath the 
concrete somatic preoccupations, Marty and his colleagues revealed a massive 
dissociation of mental activities from the affective source of impulse desire. ln effect, the 
absence of body-symbolism, the concretization of mental activity, the contraction of 
verbalization, the suppression of fantasy, and the partitioning of the unconscious were ail 
explained as part of a primitive psychosomatic structure caused by the ego's experience 
of being shaken at the seams. By and large, their psychosomatic theory of ego 
disintegration and identity distortion is predicated upon the notion of traumatic over­
stimulation and not on the notion death instinct. 
Aside from the aforementioned schools of thought, three authors have made major 
independent contribution to the study of pain. The first is Anna Freud (1952) whose 
study on children offers a new understanding of how pain and bodily symptoms are 
interpreted and given meaning. Her work expands beyond the predominant analytic 
model of pain as the symptom and symbolic expression of intrapsychic events and 
conflicts, and looks at pain and other physical symptoms as bodily events with 
intrapsychic interpretations. She point out: 
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The mental interpretation ofpain. - The manner in which the child invests 
bodily events with libidinal and aggressive cathexis and significance 
creates a phenomenon which has baffled many observers. Parents and 
others who deal with young children comment frequently on the 
remarkable individual differences in children's sensitivity to bodily pain; 
what is agonizing for one child may be negligible to another. The analytic 
study of such behavior reveals as different not the actual bodily experience 
of pain but the degree to which the pain is charged with psychic meaning. 
Children are apt to ascribe to outside or internalized agencies whatever 
painful process occurs inside the body (accidentaI hurts, fall, knocks, cuts, 
abrasions, surgieal interference as discussed above, etc.) Thus, so far as 
his own interpretation is concerned, the child in pain is a child maltreated, 
harmed, punished, threatened by annihilation. The "tough" child "does not 
mind pain," not because he feels less or is more courageous in the real 
sense of the word, but because in his case latent unconscious fantasies are 
less dominant and therefore less likely to be connected to the pain. Where 
anxiety derived from fantasy plays a minor or no part, even severe pain is 
borne weil and forgotten quickly. Pain augmented by anxiety on the other 
hand, even if slight in itself, represents a major event in the child's life and 
is remembered a long time afterward, the memory being frequently 
accompanied by phobie defenses against its possible return. 
According to the child's interpretation of the event, young children react to 
pain not only with anxiety but with other affects appropriate the content of 
the unconscious fantasies, i. e., on the one hand with anger, rage, and 
revenge feelings, on the other hand with masochistic submission, guilt, or 
depression. 
The correctness of these assumptions is borne out by the fact that after 
analytic therapy fOl'merly oversensitive children become more impervious 
to the effect of pain. (75-76) 
Anna Freud's emphasis on pain as an active construction led by unconscious fantasy 
provides a key insight into the psychology of bodily events. She emphasizes the role of 
unconscious fantasy over the actual sensory quality of pain and offers. More importantly, 
her formulation complements the earlier theory of libidinal body cathexis with the 
economy of aggressive energies. Although she is not clear as to how such cathexis and 
fantasies shape the experience of pain and body, she recognizes two distinct kinds of 
feelings: 1) those of a sadistic, angry, and vengeful quality, and 2) those of a masochistic, 
depressive and guilty type. 
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Szasz (1957) is the second key author. His study of pain begins by elaborating on 
the ego-body relationship. His analysis adopts an object relation stance and posits body 
as an object, in relation to which ego essentially finds its definition. In this sense, Szasz 
not only views ego and body as inseparable, but also argues that ego's desire to master 
the body leads to progressive integration of ego and body during maturation. Szasz 
describes both pleasure and pain as affects that are at once private and public. He 
attributes this duality to the fact that at ail times ego is simultaneously directed toward 
body and another person. Hence, the experience of one involves the experience of the 
other. Szasz believes that pain functions as a signal sirnilar to anxiety. However, while 
ego reacts to the threat of object loss with anxiety, it experiences the threat to body as 
pain. Szasz also expands the notion of pain to include certain aspects of learning. He 
expands the interpersonal dimension of pain as the biological signal that results in 
soliciting help, or as an infant demand nursing. As a result, pain represents symbolically 
the demand for the object both past and present and what the ego has learned through 
fulfilment of such demands. 
The third key author is Nasio (1996) whose recent publication has rekindled much 
interest in the psychoanalytic theory pain. Like Szasz, he views pain as an affect. 
However, unlike Szasz, he describes pain as secondary to tissue damage distinguished by 
an imaginary peripheral perception. He argues that the degree of the ego involvement is 
relative to the extent of injury. Hence, extensive injury forces the ego to abandon the 
peripheral perception and become the body. Nasio distinguishes injury from its mental 
representation. He argues that despite ego' s rnisperception pain rises from the mental 
representation rather than from the wound itself. He proposes that the real sources of the 
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pain is in the brain where nociception is processed in the dark recesses of the ego, in the 
id that generates the painful emotion. Using a Lacanian model, Nasio proposes a 
tripartite model of pain. The register of real is said to entail somatosesnsory perception 
of the physical abrasion. The register of imaginary subsequently holds the experience of 
the body as peripheral to the ego wherein the injury is seen as a secondary body. 
Ultimately, the symbolic register holds the promptly shaped and largely conscious mental 
representation of the spatio-anatomical location of the wound. Yet, what Nasio really 
achieves is the formulation of a dual system of parallel processing comprised of an 
internaI and external perception. The former is saiç! to entail somatosensory perception, 
while the latter essentially contains psychic elements. In addition, the former often seems 
to underlie the sensations of "1 am hurting', while the latter lies behind the feelings of 
being overtaken by pain (as the source of the affect). Like Freud, Nasio views pain as a 
drive whose aim is to safeguard the body as a protective shield. 
The above review of the psychoanalytic literature traces a rough historical 
trajectory for the on-going discussion in the area of pain. As Gendrault (2001:38) points 
out, psychoanalysis has studied two pathways of pain perception: the psychosomatic and 
somatopsychic. Those focusing on the psychosomatic pathway have been interested in 
contribution of unconscious factors to the pathogenesis of pain (i.e., studies in hysteria, 
and Chicago and Paris schools of psychosomatic medicine). Theil' writings explain 
unconscious cont1icts, dynamics, and structures as psychic elements underlying the pain 
that symptomatically reveals the unrevealable. However, those following somatopsychic 
pathway tend to see pain as a bodily event that resonates deep in the unconscious and 
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occasions an affective perception that involves a variety of psychic influences (Anna 
Freud, Szasz, and Nasio). 
Although Freud shows an interest in both, much systematic effort has 
concentrated on the former pathway while the latter has received marginal attention and 
disjointed treatment. At best, the literature appears to be partial toward issues of hysteria, 
somatization, hypochondria, and psychosomatic illness as the clinical ground for analytic 
study of pain. However, it can be argued that this partiality is the result of a lack of 
clear understanding of the far-reaching potential of the somatopsychic pathway for the 
study of body symbolism and the psychology of disease. Consequently, a much larger 
ground has been left unattended by psychoanalyst, namely that of the unconscious 
significance of bodily affliction, pain, and suffering which involves the greater field of 
caring for the ill as opposed to the more circumscribed area of caring for the mentally il!. 
In fact, the study of the somatopsychic pathways can deepen the phenomenology of 
illness and suffering by shedding light on the unconscious construction of the body in 
pain, and by making sense of the terrifying images of suffering that today are largely 
deemed as catastrophizing and misappraisa!. In fact, such understanding is needed if we 
are to have a psychoanalysis of disease and disease symbolism that can generate much 
needed insight into the public attitude toward health and into the professional ethos of the 
our social institutions. Hence, it is from a somatopsychic outlook that the psychoanalysis 
of pain is to be read and rewritten. 
By the same token, the foregoing review of the psychoanalytic literature from a 
somatopsychic point of view, reveals the following. First, based on Freud' s original 
approach to illness experience, pain cannot be reduced to a biological event or to a 
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generic, third-person definition which eliminates all account of the sufferer' s experience 
and inner world as shaped by personal biography. Second, the experience of pain, 
regardless of its origin, means being exposed to harm through the injuries of the body as 
the ego's primary protective shield, or thraugh loss of the object, in relation to which the 
ego is primordially defined. Third, as pain involves confrontation with a hUltful element, 
it signifies threat both to the basic integrity of the ego and to the object which resonates 
deep in the inner world of the patient and beyond the limits of consciousness. Forth, as 
pain resonates into unconscious, its sensation puts into motion unconscious material that 
thereafter engender the affective perception of pain. Fifth, fram early infancy, pain along 
with pleasure, plays a key role in mediating the ego-body and ego-object relation which 
defines the development of adult ego and adult capacities. Sixth, for its fundamental raIe 
in the shaping of the individual' s inner world, pain has to be seen as "a thing 
intermediate" (Freud, 1923: 22) between, biological and psychic, adult and infantile, 
external and internai, present and pas t, conscious and unconscious, private and public, 
redemptive and torturous, and scientific and literary. Lastly, in the words of Anna Freud 
(1952:75-76), "The manner in which the child invests bodily events with libidinal and 
aggressive cathexis and significance creates a phenomenon which has baffled many 
observers ... According to the child's interpretation of the event, young children react to 
pain not only with anxiety but with other affects appropriate the content of the 
unconscious fantasies, i. e., on the one hand with anger, rage, and revenge feelings, on the 
other hand with masochistic subrnission, guilt, or depression." 
Yet, Anna Freud's evocative postulation suffers fram an obvious lack of 
metapsychological consistency. Her notions of aggressive and libidinal cathexis clearly 
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support an economic model of psychic energy, whereas she emphasizes the key raIe of 
unconscious fantasy which is doser to a model of unconscious based on psychic reality. 
Second, although she highlights unconscious fantasies, she does not make any mention of 
its actual operations in shaping the child' s reality. Third, she speaks of anxiety in 
contrast to the feelings of anger, rage, and revenge on one hand, and submission, guilt, or 
depression on the other, without reflecting on any deeper link between anxiety and the 
bipolarity of rage and depression. Lastly, she names as pain-related affects (i.e., anger, 
rage, guilt, and depression) what seem to be in many ways the derivatives of aggressive 
impulse. Yet, she as well refers to libidinal cathexis without explaining its operation, or 
showing its contribution. Despite these inconsistencies, Anna Freud offers a succinct 
synopsis of pain-related affects experienced by the suffering child. The literature of 
chranic pain has reported the same polarity of emotions for many sufferers and in fact 
more intensely in the case of those who are not able to manage their painful condition 
(Roy, 2004). As a child analyst, her account weIl corresponds with what Bakan 
(1968:80) caIls "the early stage of ego development" where the ego experiences pain as 
"I-am-being-hurt-and-killed." However, the polarity of feelings noted by her and the 
primitive stage of ego development praposed by Bakan can both be better understood, 
and more directly linked to the unconscious construction of pain, if we consider the 
development of psychoanalytic theory of primitive development. 
Freud' s (1920) metapsychological postulation of death instinct (Todestrieb) as a 
destructive instinctual force was crucial not only for understand repetition compulsion 
beyond pleasure principle, but also for explaining the infantile anxiety of annihilation 
revealed in child analysis (Schwartz, 1999:216-20). In an effort to further this 
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postulation clinically, KJein (1928, 1929, and 1933) redefined the concept of anxiety, to 
include the destructive impulse, and to take account of the pre-oedipal or primitive stages 
of development. She used novel techniques such as play therapy to access the primitive 
significance of anxieties experienced by children. She demonstrated how such 
unmanageable feelings are engendered during the infantile period as part of primitive 
object relation, by death instinct. Emphasizing the early, preverbal development, 
KJeinian object-relation sought to understand the most primitive unconscious forms of 
mental activity, which KJein and her colleagues identified as unconscious phantasy. 
Susan Issacs (1952:82) defined the concept of phantasy as the mental representative of 
instinctual impulses, and described it as "the primary content of unconscious mental 
processes." Through her child-analysis, KJein uncovered that phantasies reflected not 
only concrete experience physical impulses and events, but also ail primitive object 
relations. In other words, the early mentallife has been described as containing concrete 
bodily events and impulses as the infant's somatic reality, as weil as the primitive 
interpretations and elaborations of such experiences which begin at the very basic loving 
or hating the object. 
ln this sense, phantasies are undifferentiated physical reactions, thoughts, 
feelings, and actions that are reflect the primitive ego's object relation and shape the core 
of psychic reality or the inner world of the infant. Bence, the infant experiences the pain 
of hunger as a deadly attack by a persecuting object. The fear induced by this object is 
enacted through the infant's relation with the breast. "An example of phantasies 
influencing the reaction to reality," Segal (1964: 14) states, "may be seen when a hungry, 
raging infant, on being offered the breast, instead of accepting it, turns away from it and 
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not feed". The infant's reaction is a clue to the phantasy of breast as something other 
than a feeding and comforting object, but one that is now seen as bad or repulsive, and its 
approach may be seen as an attack that has to be avoided. Anxieties of annihilation, fears 
of disintegration, and the primitive mechanisms of defence are aIl aspects of infantile 
phantasies. 
ft is from the phantasies of the primitive ego that Klein traces the emergence of 
the adult ego. Klein argues that the primitive anxiety of annihilation emerges at the time 
when "early ego lacks cohesion and a tendency towards integration alternates with a 
tendency towards disintegration, a falling to bits" (Klein, 1946:4). In her view, from the 
very infancy, the primitive ego feels threatened by a mix of real, painfuJ frustrations, and 
the innate destructive impulse or death instinct. She explains that "the fear of the 
destructive impulse seems to attach itself at once to an object-or rather it is experienced 
as the fear of an uncontrollable overpowering object" (4). In fact, she recognizes this 
distinct internaI source of threat, as the single most important, intrapsychic source of 
danger. Unlike classical psychoanalysis that views anxiety as the result of oedipal 
repression of the libidinal impulse, Klein sees anxiety as being essentially the function of 
the death instinct. It is this pre-Oedipal anxiety that is the most primitive form of anxiety 
experienced by the ego. In short, Kleinian object-relation revised Freud theory of 
development using the important findings of child analysis the revealed above ail the role 
of the death instinct and the importance of unconscious phantasy. 
Klein's analysis of primitive, pre-oedipal phantasy reveals that the ego assumes 
two positions in relating to the object. These positions involve their own inherent 
phantasies, anxieties, and defences. She explains the first position as the paranoid­
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schizoid position that begins at the time when the ego is not fully differentiated from the 
object and lacks stable integration. Segal (1979) summarizes Klein's view and 
elaborates: 
"Because the early ego is very weak and unintegrated, under the impact of 
anxiety it tends to fragment and to disintegrate. The terror of 
disintegration and total annihilation is the deepest fear stirred by the 
operation of the death instinct within. 
From Beginning of life there is a struggle between the life and 
death instinct. Splitting, projection, and introjection are the first 
mechanisms of defence. At the behest of life instinct the ego splits off and 
projects the death instinct outward. At the same time the life instinct is 
partly projected in order to create an ideal object. In that way out of chaos 
a printitive organization emerges. The ego splits into a libidinal and a 
destructive part and relates to a sintilarly split object." (116-17) 
This projection of death instinct into the bad object externalizes the destruction and 
allows the ego to ward off the threat of disintegration, whereas the projection of libido 
creates the good object. Out of such projection, emerges the persecutory objects, which 
are merely part-objects and not whole and integrated objects. As such, they are split 
from their good part-objects, to be kept in a denigrated state as opposed to the idealized 
status of their counterparts. The introduction of this split between good and bad, which 
encompasses both the ego and the object, constitutes the paranoid-schizoid position. In 
this black and white world, fortifying the ego means introjecting the good as an idealized 
object to increase the ego' s sense of intactness against the attacks from the bad 
persecutory objects, and build an inner world of goodness. The core anxiety of this 
position is the fear of the bad objects as the persecutors that can destroy both the good 
part of the ego and the ideal object. This fear gives rise to omnipotent denial, wherein 
oral-sadistic phantasies of destroying the persecutors come into effect. The function of 
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these phantasies is to redirect the oral aggression of the ego towards the persecutory 
object, and deny the psychic reality or the psychic content. 
In what Klein calls the depressive position, the infant integrates the good and bad 
part objects into a whole that is no longer split. The whole object, therefore, appears as 
the simultaneous source of frustration and gratification. This paradoxical quality of the 
whole object gives rise to the ambivalent feelings of the ego, and makes the object appear 
as being simultaneously good and bad, hated and loved, or feared and desired. The 
integration of good and bad into a whole object causes the ego extreme anxiety regarding 
the earlier aggressions and their injurious effects. Such state of concern for the object 
makes the ego depressively anxious for 3 principal reasons: 1) for losing the damaged 
object altogether; 2) for depending now on a damaged object; and 3) for losing the 
introjected good object that makes up the inner world. The depressive anxiety sets in 
motion a number of important mechanisms of defences to ward off the primitive guilt and 
deny any dependency on the object. First, the ego can develop contempt for the damaged 
object to disown guilt and deny loss (i.e., 1 hate you, why should 1 care for you). Second, 
the ego can avoid the guilt by obsessively engaging in compulsions to control the object 
and to deny dependency (i.e., 1 don't depend on you, but 1 am in control of you). Third, 
the ego can avoid anxiety by resorting to a sense of triumph over the object and feel 
having no need to care for the fate of the damaged object (i.e. 1 got what 1 wanted, why 
should 1 now care). Segal explains these manic defences as being essentially based on 
three elements: contempt, control, and triumph. 
For Klein, the most primitive experience of anxiety can be traced to death instinct 
and aggression in the infantile, pre-oedipal stages of development. The ego, in the 
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paranoid-schizoid position, projects the destructing force of the death instinct into the bad 
object, and deals with it in the form of concrete persecutory objects. In the depressive 
position, the ego completes the process of separation from the object, reintegrates the 
parts into the whole, and feels anxious about the fate of the object as the receptacle of the 
ego's destructive impulse. In Klein's view, the ego may revisit same primitive anxieties 
later in life, if it is thrown into crisis by pain, illness, and other forms of distress. Klein 
(1952) explains: 
''The emotional and mental processes during the first year of life (and 
recurring throughout the first five or six years) could be defined in terms 
of success or failure in the struggle between aggression and libido; and the 
working through of the depressive position implies that in this struggle 
(which is renewed at every mental and physical crisis) the ego is able to 
develop adequate methods of dealing with and modifying persecutory and 
depressive anxieties-ultimately of diminishing and keeping at bay 
aggression directed against loved object." (93) 
Klein' s insight simply states that the adult ego ultimately copes with any danger situation 
of life by drawing upon the material that is developed through resolving paranoid­
schizoid and depressive anxieties. Understanding this insight means to grasp how 
ordinary threats can reawaken our infantile anxieties over the death and destruction of the 
self, or of the love object. In effect, Klein's theory of primitive anxiety can shows us, 
how under the sway of death instinct, the primitive ego splits noxious or frustrating 
stimulations into an alien non-self and projects unto them the aggressive impulse, which 
turns pain into an annihilating and persecutory object. As a result of infantile splitting 
and projection, any painful stimulation is experienced as fear of annihilation (death), 
coming from the persecutory attacks of bad objects. The ego can then launch attacks 
against such dreadful and dreaded objects without any qualms or concern. 
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Klein's theory of primitive mental state as the underside of adult functioning can 
explain May' s uncanny insight, "that people utilize disease in the same way older 
generations used evil-as an object on which to project their hated experiences in order 
to avoid having to take responsibility for them." (1977:86) The experience or the 
prospect of pain and illness often means exposure to a throbbing and incapacitated body 
that exposes our fundamental vulnerability and anxiety with regard to bodily malfunction 
and threat. Intersubjectively, this feeling of vulnerability is often understood as a 
cognitive lack of information about the disease. In this sense, the demonization of the 
illness may reflect the diminished ability of the public to understand and to contain deep 
states of anxiety in an emotionally meaningful way. To aggressively and destructively 
disown experiences, before which we can not rely on personal or collective resources for 
integration bears the definite marks the primitive process explained by Klein. May tells 
us that contemporary attitude demonizes illness by what he calls the projection of hated 
experiences of the self to disown them. This is no doubt an uncanny observation that 
avers the need for a better understanding of the primitive significance of pain. 
As frequently observed and reported, chronic pain patients refer to their pain as an 
"alien presence" (Zaner, 1981), "a monster" (Good, 1992), or an "ominous it" (White & 
Sweet, 1955; Cassell, 1976) that is split from "1." In her phenomenological study of pain, 
Scarry (1985:53) states, "In physical pain, then, suicide and murder converge, for one 
feels acted upon, annihilated, by inside and outside alike." Although it is certainly not 
Scarry's intention to argue for any primitive understanding of pain, her observation 
inadvertently reads as a telling description of the feelings of being internally and 
externally haunted, by suicidaI and homicidal forces. Bearing a striking resemblance to 
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Klein's persecutory anxiety, Scarry's description shows how the persecutory non-self 
threatens the patient from the inside (suicide) and the outside (murder). From Kleinian 
point of view, an elaboration of infantile anxieties can explain the phenomenological 
findings of Scarry and substantiate them as meaningful according to the infantile 
development of the ego. 
Klein's view of primitive development can shed light on the contentious relation 
between language and pain. It is observed that for the adult ego, verbalizing pain is 
fraught with serious limitations (Good, 1992). In most part, when intense agony strikes, 
cries and groans replace proper words and phrases. Bakan (1968:64) ,points out that 
talking about pain is generally problematic, as one often has to borrow words from other 
senses, such as: dull or burning from tactile sense, blinding from vision, dizzying from 
equilibrium, bitter from tas te, stabbing or throbbing from kinetic. On the other hand, 
Scarry points out the inherent incapacity of language for expressing pain. She cites 
Virginia Woolf (1930) who issues a darnning indictment against English language for its 
shortcoming with respect to pain. 
"English which can express the thoughts of Hamlet and the tragedy of 
Lear has no words for the shiver or the headache ...The merest school 
girl when falls in love has Shakespeare and Keats to speak her mind for 
her, but let a sufferer try to describe a pain in his head to a doctor and 
language at once runs dry." (194) 
Scarry attributes this paucity of words to a particular quality of pain that negates 
language. She points out, "Physical pain does not simply resists language but actively 
destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to astate anterior to language, to the 
sound and cries human being makes before language is learned" (4). In fact, any attempt 
to verbalize pain is interjected by non-lexical sounds reminiscent of preverbal distress 
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vocalizations of infancy. Pain cries that earlier expressed the need for nursing, reveal in 
adulthood a reversion to a time before learning language. Hence, if earlier such cries 
meant an absence of language, today they speak of the destruction of language and the 
adult system of articulation. 
Scarry reminds us that language posits subjective states as objects for reflection 
and dialogue. In her view, it is in fact this objectifying function that significantly fails, 
when pain takes over. From Kleinian point of view, the primitive experience of pain is 
indeed outside the purview of language. Not having fully developed a sense of 
separation, the infantile ego struggles with fusion and disintegration, as the ego and 
object are both split. Primitive object relation is blurred by projection and introjection 
that dim the boundary between the internaI and external. The primitive mental activity is 
dominated by somatic phantasies, wherein innate preconceptions meet realization of the 
object to create conception or thinking (Bion, 1961). Without adequate integration and 
separation, the experience of object remains extremely concrete and the ego cannot 
properly develop or use verbal symbols (Segal, 1957). As a result, primitive pain 
experience remains beyond the reach of language. This preverbal history remains a 
fundamental quality of pain that can as much frustrate the literati as it besets pain 
patients. 
Another primitive quality of pain inheres in its impact on the sense of objectivity, 
or the reality principle. Chronic pain blurs the boundary between the internaI and the 
external. To elucidate this quality, Scarry (1985:5) points out that all states of 
consciousness involve objects as their "referential content". She explains that anger, 
happiness, sadness, hatred, hunger, and love aU refer to objects. In each case, what the 
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speaker means is loving someone, being hungry far something, ar being sad about a 
situation. Scarry points out that intense pain is "experienced spatially as either the 
contraction of the universe down to the immediate vicinity of the skin or as the body 
swelling to fill the entire universe" (35). In effect, pain as "concrete aversive experience" 
(Leder, 1990:73-75) can occur without a referential content or an object. In addition to 
being objectless, once in pain, the external world only becomes significant insofar as it is 
deemed germane to the predicament of the body, and not in its own right. Leder refers to 
this "swelling of the body" as the "spatiotemparal constriction" in arder to highlight how 
patient's experience of time and space constricts, as pain expands. He shows how such 
expansion confounds the ego's experience of reality. The over-expansion of the body and 
the constriction of the external world leads to "an almost obscene conflation of private 
and public" (Scarry, 1985:53). Such shifting boundary is reminiscent of infancy, when 
the infantile ego cannot maintain a sense of separation, and concrete somatic events 
dominate the mental activity of the infant. 
1.5. Conclusion: The Choice of Theoretical Frame 
By and large, Kleinian theory of infantile mental states sheds light on many unique and 
adverse qualities of pain and suffering, qualities that have consistently been reported by 
introspective studies of pain, but have repeatedly perplexed empirical research. From 
historical point of view, the psychoanalytic study of pain and physical symptoms has 
hitherto revolved around the notion of conversion. Seeing unusual somatic events as 
causally explainable in terms of intrapsychic dynamics, classical psychoanalysis 
investigated pain as the symbolic manifestation of repressed memories, or as hysterical 
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conversions (Freud & Breuer, 1895). Later on, psychosomatic illness was introduced as 
the somatic derivative of stress caused by psychic conflicts (Alexander), or as the 
expression of primitive personality structure caused by trauma and ego-pathology (Marty, 
De M'Uzan, and David). In effect, classical psychoanalysis and psychosomatic theories 
have established the horizon of the debate, wherein body symbolism is expounded and 
traced from the intrapsychic cause to its somatic derivative. This study is, however, 
designed to depart from this tradition and to initiate a movement in the reverse direction, 
from soma to psyche. In this vein, it explores persistent pain as an anxiety-inducing 
experience, from which ,primitive, unconscious symbolism can arise. This study asks 
whether intractable pain with a known cause and pathophysiology can rekindle the 
primitive anxieties of annihilation and destruction and bring to present the infantile 
helplessness, fear, rage, and guilt buried deep within the unconscious. 
To this end, a qualitative study, encompassing the discourses of chronic pain 
patients, IS designed to investigate whether suffering enfolds anxieties of death and 
destruction that mark the primitive significance of pain. If suffering chronic pam 
contains and symbolizes aspects of primitive object relations, the return of paranoid­
schizoid anxieties of being annihilated by an entity alien to the self cannot be easily 
trivialized as such return may reflect the primitive history of pain. To explore the latent 
content of the interview material, the analysis follows what Klein (1955: 128-129) has 
charted as the effective method of interpretation: 
"It is an essential part of the interpretive work that it should keep in step 
with fluctuations between love and hatred, between happiness and 
satisfaction on the one hand and persecutory anxiety and depression on the 
other." 
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Focusing on anxiety fluctuations is not only central to the interpretation of transference, 
but is the key for leading the analyst to the primitive content of experience. ln this 
investigation, the interpretive process has to keep pace with the fluctuations between 
paranoid-schizoid and depressive anxieties, as pain experience and suffering resurfaces in 
the narrations and free-associations of the participants. 
However, whether patients experience such anxieties as part of their pain is one part of 
the overall question, whereas the other part is whether clinicians' normative views and 
discursive practices are reflective and cognizant of this complexity. Today's 
dominant discourses of health as much promulgate an expert view of pain as shape the 
lay representations of suffering (Handy, 1987; Fox, 1994: 152-159). ln the context of 
rehabilitation, health psychologists hold a unique position in explaining pain to 
millions of sufferers. ln fact, the prevailing model of pain management largely relies 
on the discourse of health psychologists for defining pain, suffering, and anxiety. ln 
the process, the sufferer' s experience is constantly construed and elaborated, based on 
what is clinically considered as valid complaint (Mishler, 1984). 
Using a phenomenological and psychoanalytic framework, the present study 
explores not only the experience of the sufferers , but also the discourse of the health 
psychologists. Hence, the second part of this study encompasses the discourses of 
experienced health psychologist who reflect on pain and suffering from a point of view 
that is at once clinical, disciplinary and yet persona!. The analysis concentrates on how 
discursive practices construct human suffering in clinical context, and what range of 
signification is normalized as the focus of today' s rehabilitative effort. The study 
demonstrates, what befalls preternatural experience of suffering when emphasis is placed 
on adult cognitive processing, realistic Ideations, and adaptive norms of functionality. As 
a result, the ultimate aim of this study goes beyond investigating the anxieties of pain 
sufferers, and involves today' s practice of health psychology in rehabilitation. 
To this end, the present study maintains a twofold structure that includes two 
interrelated explorations. As a psychoanalytic study, it seeks insight into the content of 
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pain-related anxieties in order to investigate their primitive significance. However, as a 
phenomenological study, it examines the professional discourses of pain and anxiety in 
order to reflect critically on today' s normative understanding of suffering. In the first 
investigation, it asks to what extent, suffering chronic pain contains and symbolizes 
primitive object relations, and ultimately renews paranoid-schizoid anxieties of being 
annihilated by an entity alien to the self. In the second, it asks how health psychology as 
the prevalent model of pain management speaks of anxiety and construes the chronic pain 
experience. These two questions conjointly frame the problematic of this study, and open 
the discussion for a wider reflection on the anxiety of death and its place in our approach 
to human suffering. 
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CHAPTER2 
The Epistemological and Methodological Frame for 
Depth Psychology of Pain 
Une expérience scientifique est (... ) une 
expérience qui contredit l'expérience 
commune. 
Gaston Bachelard, La formation de ['esprit 
scientifique (1938) 
Not infrequently, phenomenology and psychoanalysis have been rebuked for their 
noncornpliance with conventions of scientific research. Theil' reliance on qualitative 
methodologies and case studies has been interpreted as lack of empirical vigour. 
Whereas Psychoanalysis has for sornetirne been disparaged for not being falsifiable 
(Popper, 1959), phenomenology has been criticized for lacking the distance of a third­
person perspective (Dennet, 2003). In both cases, the critique is essentially the same. It 
questions the evidential ground, on which these two paradigms stand, and warns against 
the fickle reliability and validity of their constructs and inferences. As a result of what 
critics caU the lack of adequate correspondence with empirical evidence, phenomenology 
and psychoanalysis are often described as mystifying and tautological, leading only to 
obfuscation of the cognitive and behavioural processes. 
In particular, a dispute has been raging for sorne time over the epistemological 
status of the psychoanalytic theory and research. At the core of this heated discussion, a 
number of protagonists have been painstakingly debating over the present and the future 
of psychoanalysis. Today, we can hardly come across any psychoanalytic text that has 
not been affected by this deeply nuanced debate. In spite of the growing diversity of 
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issues, the cross-continental and cross-Atlantic forays of discussions have revolved 
around at least three key epistemological issues: 1) as a body of knowledge whether 
psychoanalysis should submit to the standard of science or entirely assume a hermeneutic 
spirit, (i.e., Grünbaum, Habermas, Ricoeur); 2) as a clinical discipline whether 
psychoanalysis should use methodologies of empirical science to validate its concepts 
and findings (i.e., Stern, Fonagy, Wallerstein), or remain resolutely an inquiry of latent 
meanings (i.e., Green), and 3) as an interpretive approach whether psychoanalysis should 
be open to possibilities of narratization (i.e., Spence, Schafer), or focus on specificity of 
psychic reality (i.e., Caper, Steiner). Like ail epistemological and methodological 
debates, the underlying concern remains the problem of truth and the methodology of its 
discovery. 
This study concerns itself with epistemological issues only to the extent necessary 
for addressing the ontological questions raised with regard to pain and suffering. "It 
cannot be sufficiently emphasized," as states Dicenso (l990:xvi), "that critical attention 
to ontological questions is inseparable from reformulation of the problem of truth." By 
the sarne token, what is offered in this chapter is a "reformulation of the problem of 
truth" that is inspired by the "critical attention to ontological questions" raised earlier 
with regard to pain and suffering. The questions, posed in this study, indeed concern the 
biopsychosocial model as part of the "ruling scientific paradigm" of research (Kuhn, 
1962), together with the notions of empirical methodology and truth. Such critical 
questions cali for an equally critical methodology. Such a methodology must open the 
path for a critical inquiry, while satisfying at least three epistemological questions: 1) 
what kind of truth statement this research is meant to establish; 2) why it becomes 
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necessary to deviate from the norms of scientific research to establish such truth, and 3) 
through what methodology such truth statement can be reached and verified. 
The answers to these three questions, in effect, comprise this chapter which 
begins by examining the scientific rationality and ends by presenting the logic and 
methodology of the present study. In other words, the methodology of this research is 
based on an epistemological framework that rises from the critique of the neopositivist 
project of scientific discovery and empirical research. Even though this chapter takes us 
away from reflection on pain, it does not take us away from the psychoanalytic study of 
pain. For, such study inevitably requires a sound methodology that can explain the logic 
of its truth claims. Without a psychoanalytic critique of established methodology of 
empirical science, a proper analytic methodology would be unattainable. 
2.1. The kinds of Truth Statements and the Subject-Object Distinction 
It is commonly claimed that science is the empirical investigation of ail natural 
phenomena and as such its findings are based on positive reality and impartial to the 
observer's disposition, viewpoint, fancy (conscious fantasy), and phantasy (unconscious 
fantasy). We are persuaded that scientific method can explain life with rigorous accuracy 
and objectivity. We, therefore, openly solicit scientific research for predicting future 
events, or for finding reliable interventions. In today's information and technology 
driven society, fostering the instrumental rationality of prediction and control has 
become, more than ever, the exclusive province of science. Consequently, going against 
the advice of scientific community is seen as offending the natural harmony and risking 
disease, injury, disaster, pestilence, and famine. The ambivalent blend of apprehension 
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and reverence that were historically reserved for divine oracles and scriptures are now 
accorded to scientific literature. 
Scientists claim that this level of trustworthiness requires a reliable methodology 
of knowing that is not corrupted by the observer's subjectivity. Valid knowledge, 
according to them, must be objectively verifiable on an empirical basis that guards 
objectivity against the intrusions of fancy, phantasy, prejudice, preconception, beliefs, 
and values. Hence, to know an object means successfully muting the presence of the 
knowing subject by the means of the methodologies of experimentation, observation, 
measurement, analysis, and inference. Through strict observance of methodology, 
scientists try to recast themselves into a disinterested observer and operationalize their 
objects as an entity or a thing, observable and measurable from distance. This recasting 
of the knowing subject is meant to eliminate ail social and psychological traces of the 
subjectivity from the process of knowing, while the operationalization of the object is 
meant to remove any reference to aspects, not directly observable or reducible to 
measurement. For social and human studies, the practice of science is particularly meant 
to generate subjectless knowledge or knowledge purged from the subjectivity of the 
observer and the observed. 
In fact, scientists insist that the strict compliance with experimental procedures 
can adequately circumvent confounding effects of extraneous variables. They propose 
that our safe way to objective knowledge is no other than methodological positivism that 
ensures the integrity of the data for hypothesis testing. In their view, scientific 
methodology can effectively isolate facts from their social, cultural, and psychological 
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context, by controlling what is extraneous to factual evidence needed for inferential 
reasoning. Once scientific findings are objectively gathered, tested, and reviewed, the 
influence of psyche, society, and culture becomes immaterial and unimportant. In effect, 
we are reassured that scientific methodology can render our world explainable, 
predictable and controll able by distilling the process of knowing from aIl extraneous 
influences of the human world. 
However, this obliteration of subjectivity is predicated on the presumption of an 
ontological distinction between subject and object, a distinction that sees factual reality as 
the obverse of the non-factual knowledge. For this reason, knowing is presumed to take 
place in a world fashioned by the objects of knowledge that are independent from the 
knowing subject, and distinct from human perception, belief, discourse, fancy, and 
phantasy. ln this manner, the world out there is said to exist positively as a pre-subjective 
given, based on which we can assess the adequacy of descriptive and inferential 
propositions. Such a world stands at a distance from those who attend, experience, 
reconstruct it through their lives, feelings, and imaginings. Hence, this world can be 
described and explained objectively by a disinterested observer as what it is. rather than 
as what it better he or not be, or as what it can possibly be. 
Despite scientists' daim of natural neutrality of the objective world, it is in fact 
through the pursuit of human aspirations, hopes, and imaginings that we have historically 
shaped the world around us into a complex and meaningful system of objects 
(Baudriallard, 1968) and social institutions (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). ln this world 
of human constructions, social scientists view the meanings of lived experiences 
(Erlebnis) as nothing more than personal opinions (doxastic), which must be challenged 
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by impersonal scientific knowledge (epistemic). It is therefore scientists' hope to redeem 
objective truth statements by occluding subjective meaning statements about being and 
life. In this manner, scientists strive to capture the pre-ideational stratum of experience as 
the factual evidence for ail inferential reasoning and truth claims. While science is 
proclaimed to offer the empirical methodology of knowing, it would be valid to ask: 1) 
whether the presumption of a factual world as distinct from human experience can be 
trusted, and 2) whether validity and reliability of knowledge can be reduced to a matter of 
methodological procedure set to eliminate human subjectivity. 
When methodology becomes the preponderant criterion of valid knowledge, any 
critique of scientific rationality that illuminates the psychic and social pre-conditions of 
truth and understanding loses its raison d'être. For science, methodology and its 
procedures hold an impoltant place, as they have circumvented the need for such critique. 
When methodological procedures can successfully remove ail a priori assumptions, the 
question of "what are the preconditions of knowledge," cornes to mean very little. As 
soon as we believe that experimental procedures suffice to safeguard knowledge against 
subjective and contextual effluence, any critique becomes at best redundant. When 
procedures can make knowledge objective and observers disinterested, it would be 
nothing more than trifling to ask: "what it socially and psychologically means to do 
science." ln that event, as long as control procedures are in place, the critique of 
subjectless knowledge would be of little relevance to the validation and valuation of 
knowledge. This emphasis on procedure and methodology, in effect, assumes a unique 
epistemological ground beyond any psychological and social critique, whereupon science 
can stand poised to remedy the ills of the world and the follies of the human speculation. 
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Such know1edge is said to have precluded the pre-conditions of its production by the 
virtue of its well-controlled methodology. Eventually, as the empirical status of 
knowledge becomes a matter of methodology, empiricism as the test of knowledge 
through experimentation loses its openness to self-reflection and its suppleness to human 
experience and cornes to allow meaning only to the extent permitted within the limits of 
procedures and methodology. What lies outside these procedures has to be reduced 
through operationalization, or has to be denied empirical or ontological status altogether. 
ln other words, what cannot be procedurally valid must be non-veridical on the whole. ln 
effect, this emphasis on methodology has led to formalism or an obsession with forms 
and procedures, and has overshadowed more serious concerns over the substantive 
aspects of knowledge production. 
Recognizing the importance of going beyond methodological procedures, social 
constructionism as a theory, and as a weil established research practice has problematized 
the subject-object distinction as a basic epistemological tenet of the neopositivist 
methodology. It argues that what we take for granted as reality is a social construction 
occasioned by symbolic interaction of human subjects. For social constructionists, the 
human world as the world of speaking subjects is built through "practices which form the 
objects of which they speak." (Foucault, 1972:49) These practices, for their involvement 
of speaking, are identified as discursive or "a system of statements constructing an 
object." (Parker, 1992:5) Through discursive practices, propel' objects of experience are 
given identity and boundary. ln this process, interested views and personal perspectives 
shape not only the human experience, but also the very substance of social and human 
reality. Consequently, science is said to do more than just finding the reality out there. 
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Science as the discursive activity of the community of researchers constructs a sense of 
what is real and how this reality can be properly operationalized, observed, explained, 
categorized, predicted, controlled, and harvested. By thus doing, science creates an 
intelligible order that is responsive and serviceable to human desire. 
The emphasis on the world-making function of language among social 
constructionists is reminiscent of Heidegger's (1962) and Wittgenstein's (1953) critique 
of the naturalist notions of the "objective" world. Wittgenstein argues that language is a 
system of perfectly meaningful statements according to its everyday use. For 
Wittgenstein, in its everyday use language brings life to a community of speakers and 
makes it sensible. He argues, "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life" 
(sec.19, p.8). His philosophy makes language coextensive with life. Although he 
believes in a world outside language, he argues that such a world is revealed in our 
understanding through language. Hence, nature cornes to us as natural sciences or as the 
product of the evolution of mathematics as a formaI language. On the other hand, for 
Heidegger, language is a historical and mutating practice. He still acknowledges the 
world as being out there (Dasein), yet this world can be only disclosed through language 
which shapes what is revealed. Hence, even though what exists appears out there 
independent from language, it lS language that allows the interpretation and 
representation of what is out there. In Heidegger's view, representation is always 
interpretation, and as such the world is disclosed to us as a matter of interpretation. In 
fact, Heidegger (1950/1971:191) describes human being as being born in language, hence 
we speak the language to which we are born and in that sense, "we leave the speaking to 
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language." What here can be very important is the difference the separates Wittgenstein 
from Heidegger, as Reé (1995:212) explains: 
But there is a conspicuous difference between Wittgenstein and Heidegger 
in their understanding of language. For Wittgenstein, language is, properly 
speaking, beyond criticism, because it is its own criterion: "aIl the 
propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect 
logical order," as he puts it in the Tractatus, and philosophical error arises 
only when that order is misunderstood or disobeyed (TL? 5.5563; see also 
4.003, 6.53). For Heidegger, on the other hand, "everyday language is a 
forgotten and therefore used-up poem" (L 208), and the task of thinking is 
to listen out for the poetry we have lost. 
This critique of everyday discourse separate more than only two philosophers; it in fact 
has created two divergent epistemological attitudes from relatively similar premises. 
Heidegger anxiously senses beneath the warn-out language of quotidian, a lost poetic 
possibility that is concealed from view, a possibility that if captured, restores the "lost 
poetl'y" and vitality to thought, language, and action. It is to this point that we shall 
shortly return to qualify the notion of truth statement. Yet, it is evident from what has 
been said that Heidegger and Wittgenstein formulate a serious challenge to subject-object 
distinction based on the formative and constructive function of language. 
When reality is mediated by discourse, objectivity becomes an intersubjective 
construction, and representation becomes interpretation. Then, search for truth requires 
keen understanding of interpretation. "In relation to the problem of truth," as states 
Dicenso (1990: 145) "the interpretive nature of human experience takes on increased 
significance as one moves from simple perceptual givens to more complex social and 
existentially relevant judgements." Yet, is it the "interpretive nature of human 
experience" that discursively constructs reality through language? Or, is there something 
fundamentally more human than language that is intersubjectively brought to bear on 
108 
reality? Wittgenstein's notion of language as a system of utteranees, and Reidegger's 
notion of language as a historical entity both answer affirmatively to the former question. 
However, Heidegger's remark about "the lost poetry of life" leaves the second question 
open. Renee, one still can ask: does language interpretively discloses the world, or does 
language brings something uniquely human to the world and discloses "what appears" in 
the light of what is most human? 
In essence, the aforementioned question asks what makes the human nature so 
interpretive and human action so constructive. To answer to this question, Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) offer one of the most important and influential accounts of the social 
construction of reality as part of a uniquely human need for externalization and 
objectivation through language: 
Ruman being is impossible in a closed sphere of quieseent interiority. 
Human being must ongoingly externalize itself in activity. This 
anthropological neeessity is grounded in man's biological equipment. The 
inherent instability of the human organism makes it imperative that man 
himself provide a stable environment for his conduct. Man himself must 
specialize and direct his drives. (55) 
In this sense, the anthropological need for a stable environment leads to "humanly 
produeed, constructed objectivity" (61). This construction cornes about through 
objectivation as the "process by which the externalized products of human activity attain 
the character of objectivity." The authors identify language as one such objectifier. 
However, both externalization and objectivation are explained "as moments in a 
continuing dialectical proeess" that culminates to internalization "by which the 
objectivated social world is introjected into consciousness in the course of socialization." 
(61) As a result, through socialization, human being finally introjects into consciousness 
what was onee externalized into the social reality and experieneed as objective reality 
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external to consciousness. For Berger and Luckman, the interpretive nature of human 
being involves constant the externalization of human needs and internalization of reality. 
In their view, the assumption of a sacrosanct distinction between consciousness and the 
world precludes this ongoing process of externalizing and internalizing. 
Although the authors effectively challenge the subject-object distinction, they 
leave behind a series of serious blanks and unanswered questions. WouId biological 
drive simply engender action and objectivation as a reflex without any mental corollaries 
or psychological representative of biological drive (Trieb)? In what manner the processes 
of externalization, objectification and internalization are comparable to what 
psychoanalysis calI projection, projective identification, introjection? Would 
externalization and internalization involve states of desire, feelings, anxiety, and 
aggression? What is really being externalized, a biological drive to attain a stable 
environment or a desire to reduce the self or the other (alter) to self-sameness (identity)? 
In short, are these processes biological, verbally accessible and essentially rational, or do 
they involve meaningful overlaps with primitive object-relations, preverbal phantasies, 
and possibly irrational? 
The aforementioned questions are obviously meant to reveal a different kind of 
construction of reality, one in which a deeper psychic undercurrent of unconscious 
phantasies are mediating intersubjectivity. In fact, the world constructed by operations 
of unconscious phantasy becomes more than a discursively or biologically mediated 
experience, as it acquires latent meaning as an object of primitive love and hate. Within 
Kleinian object relation, the term phantasy has been defined as "the mental expression of 
instincts." (Segal,1964 :12). Unconscious phantasy is said to be the most archaic form of 
------ -------
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mental activity that predates language. Analytic work with children demonstrates that 
biological instincts have in fact psychological corollaries as phantasies that contain 
objects of love and hate, as weIl as the primitive anxieties and defences. In this sense, 
phantasies are "not merely an escape from reality, but a constant and unavoidable 
accompaniment of real experiences, constantly interacting with them." (14) As 
accompaniments of reality, they remain active throughout life. Phantasies both mediate 
reality and change as a result of experience. In this manner, the concept reflects the 
psychological complexity and lifelong ramifications of the early development, and 
challenges ail assumptions of tabula rasa, somato-sensory concreteness, and biological 
minimalism. 
Although Berger and Luckman reveal a dialectical process beneath the naïve 
realism of subject-object distinction, they ultimately create a naïve realism of their own 
by biologizing the notion of subjectivity or interiority and in-wardness as a biological 
drive with no symbolic content of its own. Hence, the question of what content is being 
exactly externalized is still left in ambiguity. However, judging by today's status of 
psychoanalysis in sociological theories (O'Niel, 2001), sociologists are least prepared to 
answer such questions. In fact, social theory offers very little systematic account of how 
unconscious phantasy may suffuse both intersubjectivity and discourse, and subtend the 
social construction of reality. As a result, the significance of primitive phantasies, as 
weil as the function of projection, projective identification, and introjection, as ways of 
shaping the intersubjective space, are neither systematically explored nor adequately 
expounded (Steuerman, 2000). 
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Much of what has been uncovered about how primitive phantasies mediate the 
consensual experience of reality and social dynamics originates from psychoanalytic 
work in the areas of group therapy (Bion, 1961b ; Hinshelwood, 1987), and 
organizational and institutional behaviour (Jacques, 1953, Menzies Lyth, 1960). These 
studies reveal the operation of primitive object-relations in generating the emotive and 
conative undergrid of rational thought and language (Bion 1961, Segal, 1957), to which 
our intersubjectivity and discursive practices are welded. In other words, phantasies hold 
the primitive source of our emotional and intellectual life, as concrete ways of feeling and 
thinking originally generated by the interaction between the internai world of the infant 
and the external reality. Throughout life, meanings generated by primitive object 
relations remain ready for "deployment" into our relations with others, in here and now 
(Meltzer, 1981: 178). As Jacques (1953 :21) states: 
"lndividuals may put their internaI conflict into persons in the external 
world, may unconsciously follow the course of the conflict by means of 
projective identification, and may re-internalize the course and outcome of 
the externally perceived conflict by means of introjective identification." 
Through projection, projective indentification, and introjective identification, group 
relations become shared and reciprocal ways of being and experiencing reality. As 
opposed to Berger and Luckman, Jacques views externalization and internalization as 
inserting aspects of psychic reality into the relational complex that underlies Iife. By 
engendering dynamics of relating, feeling, talking, and acting within the group, 
phantasies confer meaning to reality. Such meanings are constitutive of our sense of 
identity and our experience of reality. 
Evoking similar experiences in others, phantasy engenders what Hinshelwood 
(1995) calls "relocation of identity." This relocation takes place, when different parts of 
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an individual's self are projected into the members of a group and enacted as 
interpersonal dynamics among the members who hold the projected parts and evoked 
sentiments as their own. For an individual, phantasies lead to what Spillius (2001) calls 
"a complex system that involves the individual's own unique way of being, of relating to 
the world, of maintaining his balance." (367) However, Within a group, Hinshelwood 
argues that relocation of identity can lead to unique group dynamics and social reality 
wherein there would be an interpersonal dispersal of ways of feelings, perceiving, 
thinking, and interacting. Through primitive mechanism of defence, the intersubjective 
experience of reality is shaped. 
If we accept that reality can be mediated by unconsclOUS phanasy, the 
epistemological relation between subject and object in the act of knowing must radically 
be overhauled. Such overhaul begins from reconsidering cognition and cognitive 
processes. As an infantile way of thinking and feeling, phantasy is recognized to be "the 
primary content of ail mental processes" and "the basis for aIl unconscious and conscious 
thought process." (Isaac, 1948:85). As Mitchel (1986:23) points out: 
In Klein's concept, phantasy emanates from within and imagines what is 
without, it offers an unconscious commentary on instinctual life and links 
feelings to objects and creates a new amalgam: the world of imagination. 
Through its ability to phantasize, the baby tests out, primitively 'thinks' 
about, its experiences inside and outside. 
As opposed to cognition that derives from without, to form representations within, 
phantasy "emanates from within and imagines what is without." This creates an ironic 
situation. For, thinking and cognition are said to evolve from primitive phantasies (Bion, 
1961), to which they remain unconsciously tied, even for adult ego. In this sense, 
cognitive representations of actual objects have their roots in the ethereal region of love 
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and hate that emanates from prinùtive object-relations. If cognition is therefore meant to 
create a sense of what is real, by the virtue of its primitive history, it enfolds in its depth 
the desire for what better be (loved) or not be (hated). As opposed to cognitive 
processing that is held to the standard of what is real, phantasy reflects how objects are 
sought based on prinùtive love and hate. As a result, unconscious phantasies are at work, 
when cognitive acts (cogitations) result in cognitive objects (cogitata) that serve as the 
schema or template for external reality. Through projection, projective identification, and 
introjection phantasies take on the external reality in the name of an internaI world and 
construct our complex web of experience (Spillius, 2001). 
A world mediated by unconscious phantasy has far-reaching ramifications for 
human understanding and the commonly upheld distinction between subject and object. 
As aforementioned, Heidegger establishes his critique of subject-object distinction by 
contending that representation (Vorstellung) is interpretation (Deutung). He, therefore, 
sees interpretation inherently linked to language as a historical entity that shapes 
meaningful representation. In contrast, Kleinian object-relation offers the notion of 
phantasy, and views the preverbal object relation as the source of intrapsychic elaboration 
that underlies discourse and constructs the experience of reality. As a result, it gives a 
new meaning to why representation is inescapably interpretation: 
"Through introjection and projection a complex phantasy world of self and 
internaJ objects is slowly built up, sorne of it conscious but reaching into 
the unconscious depths ...This internaI wOrld is imaginary by the standards 
of the material reality, but possesses what Freud calls 'psychic' reality­
that is the individual concerned it feels real at sorne level, conscious or 
unconscious, and it is also real in the sense that it affects its behaviour." 
(Spillius, 2001: 365) 
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In representation, the materiality of the world is interwoven into phantasies of primitive 
love and hate. Although such phantasies "are never articulated in words, though words 
may be the means unconsciously used to communicate them by evoking them in an 
external person." (366) Hence, what mediates reality exceeds language, for phantasy is 
more fundamental to the development of the subject and intersubjectivity. 
In this manner, Kleinain notion of objectivity as mediated by phantasy can exceed 
Heidegger critique of subject-object distinction. Heidegger believes in a world that exists 
out there independent from language (ontologically independence of object from subject). 
Yet, this world can only be disclosed through language (epistemological dependence of 
object on subject). As opposed to Heidegger, the feminist critique of epistemology on the 
other extreme refutes ontologically independence and argues against the independent 
materiality of the world (see Butler, 1993). In this debate, psychoanalysis offers a 
measured alternative that maintains an ontologically independent world but expands 
beyond the realm of presence to redefine materiality. From Freud's description of 'fort' 
'da' (Freud 1920:8-11) to Klein's notion of phantasy, psychoanalytic theory has 
concerned itself with more than how presence is disclosed to the thinking subject or how 
thinking can evolve from interacting with objects. In contrast, psychoanalytic theory 
reaches beyond the presence of the object, and focuses on how absence of the object is 
fathomed and made full of presence through phantasy. According to object relation 
theory, it is by overcoming the painful and dreadful phantasies of absence that the 
capacity to think (Bion, 1961) and to symbolize ultimately develops (Segal, 1954). 
As a result, subjectivity is said to have a "negative origin" in emotional 
overcoming of the absence of the object, the absence that is experienced by the infant, 
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through anxieties of disintegration, annihilation and destruction (Keylor, 2003: 216-226). 
Steuerman (: 18) uses Klein' s anxiety positions to explain the intersubjective 
ramifications of the struggle of the subject with absence: 
For KJeinians, there are two basic configurations of the mental world, and 
these two basic positions are exemplary of two ways of dealing with 
inetrsubjective reality. In the paranoid-schizoid position, the world is split 
into: the good and the bad objects, the bad ones being exclude, denied, 
destroyed or projected outside. Anxiety, which is generally intense, is of a 
persecutory type, due to the attacks on the object. In the depressive 
position, there is an attempt to apprehend the object more as a whole, good 
and bad. This position seeks to integrate parts of oneself which had been 
split off and denied. The depressive position, which in spite of its name is 
actually the position where we are freer from our more destructive aspects, 
in the recognition of the others that form our world, of how dependent l 
am, for my own happiness, on the endurance and existence of others. The 
paranoid position is the destructive denial of the existence of the world of 
the intersubjective relations, and the manic attempt to restore the fiction of 
an isolated and omnipotent subject (myself, all good), who sees the other 
as a different sort of being (bad and completely distinct from my regal 
self). 
Although psychoanalysis recognizes the world to be independent from the psyche, it 
attributes its disclosure to interpreting the anxieties evoked by the experience of its 
absence than to construing its presence. Based on the negativity of thought, the presence 
of the object-by itself unthinkable-becomes thinkable when its absence is experience. 
While we are here reviewing the various critiques of the subject-object distinction, this 
negativity of thought has far reaching implications for what constitutes truth claim from 
psychoanalytic point of view. 
Nonetheless, to sununarize this part of the discussion, it is evident from what has 
been said that the truth claim of psychoanalytic or phenomenological findings can not be 
assessed by a methodology that presumes a subject-object distinction as its point of 
departure. Based on philosophical arguments of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, such 
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presumption has already been effectively challenged and fruitfully overcome by social 
constructionist theory and research as an accepted alternative to the data-oriented study of 
social facts. However, psychoanalysis qua Kleinian object relation effectively provides a 
distinct view of the ontological and epistemological relation between subject and object, 
that treats objectivity and subjectivity, absence and presence, phantasy and reality, 
rationality and irrationality, and verbal and preverbal as moments of experience that are 
inseparably inte11wined and meaningfully involved in a dialectical process. As dialectical 
binaries, these are not so much contrary or mutually exclusive categories as they are 
contradictions immanent in human experience (For, an elaboration of this theme see the 
discussion of being and non-being in Sartre, 1938). Such a diaJectical process is said to 
underlie the construction of reality wherein subject-object distinction involves a fluid 
relationship between psychic reality and external reality. 
As a result, the proper epistemic object of psychoanalysis lS the dialectical 
process of transference-countertransference, and by extension, ail intersubjective 
situations wherein objective reality fades into primitive phantasy, and in tum, primitive 
phantasy reifies into reality. Undoubtedly, such perspective would be at odds with 
neopositivist criteria that insists on the distinction of ideas from facts, and upholds 
validity as the correspondence of ideas to facts. Yet, applying the neopositivist criteria of 
objectivity to phenomenology and psychoanalysis is no different from asking marine 
biologists to start their research on underwater life forms from the premise that insists: 
only the creatures on the surface of the land can be considered as objective forms of life. 
By the same token, psychoanalysis and phenomenology begin from the shoreline where 
the perceptible solidity of the real precipitously disappears into the mysterious oceanic 
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depth of subjectivity and intersubjectivity, a depth that inspires commUnIon with 
profundity in the search for meaning as insight. 
2.2. The Uncanny Truth and the Deviation from Scientific Truth 
Assuming a distinction between subject and object, neopositivist approach insists on 
verification of truth against reality in empirical settings. To countervail the 
correspondence theory of truth, it would be necessary to define the kind of truth that 
psychoanalysis and existential phenomenology intend to establish, and to show why it 
deviates from scientific truth. One aspect of this truth can be said to be its self-reflective 
quality that questions the preconditions of knowing, or asks what makes knowing 
possible. 
This question was originally formulated by Kant's critique (178112003) and 
thereafter developed into a number of diverse theories of knowledge. Through his first 
critique, Kant argued that knowing is a transcendental process rising from a-priori 
categories of mind, rather than from experience with the real. In his view, "though ail 
our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that ail arise out of 
experience." (1) In his view, the transcendental ego (Das Ich-Denke) brings to a given 
experience the pre-given conditions of knowing. Thus, the knowing mind owes its 
accomplishment not to the presentation of reality in the mirror of consciousness, but to its 
innate categories for thinking and making sense of experience. For being beyond 
experience, these categories were said to be transcendental. 
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After Kant, knowing as the main operation of the mind (Geist) was rediscovered 
to be intersubjective rather than transcendental. Subject was explained historically based 
on an on-going process of conflict and self-becoming. Hegel proposed a dialectical 
dynamics of mutual transformation between what "begins from experience" and what is 
"not rising from experience." He redefined "what begins from experience" not as crude 
reality. For him, it is history that affords us aU "that begins from experience," as we are 
born into a society with a pre-existing order of intelligible things. In this manner, what is 
reality at any moment (Ding-jür-sich) was someday an unreality, a mere possibility of 
mind (Ding-an-sich) that is now turned into a particular actuality (Ding-an-und-jür-sich). 
In his view, it is through self-particularisation that mind projects itself outward only to 
reclaim itself back and to make yet anew another process of self-particularization. 
In Hegel' s dialectic, there exists an interaction between the two polarities or 
between that "which begins," and that "which is not rising" from experience. Hegel 
(1807/1971) reformulates subject-object binary into the subject-object totality wherein 
subject and object are necessary and indivisible terms of a single process. In this totality, 
human beings reshape nature and create history. More importantly, in this totality, "what 
is not rising from experience" is perpetually self-actualized, only to get self-negated. 
Gadamer (1976: 119) explains the objective of Hegel' s epistemology in the most succinct 
and useful terms: 
It showed that consciousness and object are in fact only two sides that 
belong together and that any bifurcation into pure subject and pure 
objectivity is a dogmatism. The series of dramatic developments that 
constitutes Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit rests directly on an 
awareness of the fact that every consciousness that knows an object alters 
itself and hence alsa necessarily alters its abject once again. 
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In this manner, Hegel (1812/1969) describes the self or the thinking agency (Das Ich­
Denke) as changing, much like the reality that it changes. Hence, the categories of 
thought as preconditions of knowing are by no means fixed and ahistorical. Rather, they 
are in process of becorning, as they come to be and cease to be constantly. This is known 
as Hegel' s ontologization of categories of thought and logic. 
In his later work, Hegel made an important distinction between rnind (Geist) as 
rational and collective agency, and psyche (Seele) as a personal agency of feelings. 
Hegel (1817/1971) recognized something not quite rational at the core of subject-object 
.	 totality, regarding which he remained ambivalent throughout his later writings (Mills, 
2002; Berthhold-bond, 1995). He referred to it as pit (Schacht), or abyss (Abgrund) and 
described it as unfathomable (Ung ründlich) and nocturnal (Nachtlichen) , and as part of 
the feeling soul (Fühlende Seele) and life of feeling (GefÜhlsleben). In this nocturnal 
abyss, "a world of infinitely numerous images and presentations is preserved without 
being in consciousness." (EG 453) Moreover, he recognized phantasy as part of 
imagination or as poetic imagination, to which he referred as "symbolizing, allegorizing, 
and the poetic power of imagination." Hegel sees phantasy as the place where sign, 
symbol, and language begin (For a thorough elaboration of this theme see Derrida, 1972). 
After Hegel, an understanding of intersubjective rnind, as posed along a 
historically constructed reality, emerged on the epistemological scene. Hegel's 
philosophy of rnind changed the attitude to truth and made his successors to focus on two 
new questions: 1) what would constitute the intersubjective character of knowing and 
rnind, and 2) how such intersubjective and historical constitution would change through 
practice of critical reason and action (praxis). In effect, Hegel's redefinition of rnind 
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opened before us a new perspective, wherein knowing and reason could be understood as 
part of historical and social process of being and becoming. From this perspective, truth 
is no longer the inert feature of an idea, "but instead takes shape and appears in the midst 
of human affairs." (Disenco, 1990:26) This realization has changed the notion of truth to 
an event that rises from social and historical conditions, and it has a prospective character 
that can undo and change such conditions by revealing the hidden alternatives of being 
and action. Hence, knowing as critical practice was said to rise from human affairs, and 
to lead back to them in a struggle to reveal and uncover the critical beyond. 
From this history, a different notion of truth has emerged, one that is not based on 
correspondence (i.e., positivist and realist) or coherence (i.e. idealist and rationalist), one 
that in fact rises from subject-object relation rather than distinction. However, when 
relation replaces distinction, truth becomes not only a matter of "what is the object," but 
also a matter of "what is the relation in which object is experienced." Tt is this latter 
question that creates the notion of truth as uncovering which implies undoing 
concealment. The uncovering caBs into question the relation in which the object is 
experienced to uncover the preconditions of knowing that create a self-soothing 
experience or a knowledge that comfortably affirms our habits of mind. Form the 
viewpoint of truth as uncovering, it is only by seeing how knowing creates soothing self­
sameness that new possibilities of understanding (Verstehen) can emerge. In this 
manner, truth as uncovering requires the subject to understand (Verstehen) and to explain 
(Erklaren) the objects, while trying to uncover the process from the habits of thinking 
and the preconditions of knowing that are implicit in the relation with the object. 
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The term, understanding, refers to the primary process of grasping the intrinsic 
meaning intended and shared by those who have lived an experience or authored a text 
(Dilthey, 1988: Verstehen). On the other hand, The term, explaining, is a secondary 
process that relies on the first to elucidate the extrinsic meaning of an experience in terms 
of causal relationships, or as a text in relation to other events or texts (Dilthey 1988: 
Erklaren). To understand in self-reflective manner is to become at the same time aware 
of the pre-conditions of subject-object relationship. Through such awareness, knowing 
can reach beyond the normative language and methodological frameworks, to articulate a 
new understanding. In effect, the resulting knowledge breaks the soothing habits of 
thought in order to create new possibilities for subject to relate to object. Such 
overhauling of habits and relations can result in critically valid outlook of understanding, 
explaining, practicing, and changing. 
To change the subject-object relation becomes possible, when knowing becomes 
critically self-reflective. In this manner, a critical exploration of self-soothing habits of 
subject's relation to object becomes as crucial as the detailed observation of facts, itself. 
For, facts are disclosed to mind through a relation wherein the subject is as much the 
maker as is the observer of truth. Through revealing how subject relates to object, one 
can uncover what has been left nameless (out of common discourse) or misnamed 
(distortions of common discourse) in the normative subject-object relation. 
When it cornes to questioning the preconditions and habits of today' s established 
way of relating to empirical objects, the task is not unlike the story told by Borges (1970) 
about the imperial cartographers who undertake to draw a detailed map of the empire. In 
a surreal tum, their relentless obsession with ail things objective results in a map as big as 
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the empire itself that not only unfolds over the entire dominion, but also displays the 
mapmakers in the act of drawing. In a sardonic twist, they end up neither removing 
themselves from their map, nor uncovering the imperial dominion from beneath the 
expanse of their gigantic atlas. The surrealism of the story is in many ways more than 
real, in the sense that no matter how objective, our replicas of reality not only ultimately 
carry their makers, but also cast a lasting shadow over what was once their original 
object. However, this irony must not make us conclude that truth is arbitrary and that 
there is nothing at stake. On the contrary, the critical approach to truth agonizes over 
what is at stake. It demonstrates how the discourses and practices that stipulate our 
accepted methodological habits circumscribe subject-object relation to create a self 
soothing construction of reality as self-sameness. Hence, the unconcealed truth invites 
the reader to consider a new subject-object relation that starts from the critique of the 
established one and asks the reader to assess its validity in terms of both its critical and its 
observational values. 
As an effective method and philosophy of unconcealment, existential 
phenomenology recognizes that what exists appears out there independent from human 
agency and language, yet all that appears can only be disclosed through language. 
Without language as interpretation, there would be no disclosure and no representation. 
Heidegger reminds us that being human means being born in language. In this sense, as 
"we leave the speaking to language," so we leave the interpretation to it. For Heidegger, 
disclosure and interpretation in unreflective manner makes subject-object relation nothing 
but a self-soothing practice, to which he refers as inauthenticity or resignation to the 
unreflective tranquility of the public (Das Man). Inauthenticity is, in effect, an escape 
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from finitude as Being-toward-death (Sein-zum-Tode). Heidegger argues that the 
awareness of the temporality of being makes us anxious about our finitude. It is this 
mood (Stimmung) of anxiety that attunes us to what is unreflectively taken for granted in 
our being-in-the-world. Thus, Heidegger calls anxiety the ground-mood that discloses 
indefiniteness (Unbestimmtheit) of death and makes us reflective about temporality as the 
ground of being. In this sense, those aware of temporality feel anguished and can no 
longer accept the way of the public (Das Man), and realize how normative views 
condemn us to the monotony of an unreflective life. Heidegger temporality has largely 
been left obscure, yet it is clearly the experience of time as living history that involves 
non-being. 
Living resolutely in the face of death makes one feel ill-at-ease and uncanny 
(unheimlich: unhomely) with the commonly shared, all-to-familiar sense of being. As 
anxiety tunes the person to the possibilities of Dasein, "the meanings and truths making 
up the fabric of the world become alien to the individual" (Hoffman, 1993:203). The 
individual in existential angst longer feels at home (Heimlich: canny) with the publicly 
avowed truths, as anxiety of non-being makes "the fabric of the world" appear in tatters. 
In this sense, through the concept of angst, existential phenomenology asks for an 
emotional re-orientation to the phenomenal world that as Heidegger believes would 
inevitably lead to a new disclosure, language, and interpretation of Being. As a result, 
Heidegger challenges habits of thinking with the habits of feeling before asking us to 
reflect on our habits of interpretation and language. 
Heidegger' s re-orientation to temporality of being is no doubt uncanny, as it 
upsets the subject's abode of taken-for-granted meanmgs. And, it lS indeed from 
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uncanny that psychoanalysis like phenomenology begins its reflection on truth, as the 
unconcealment of the eerie and the un-homely. IronicaUy, Freud (1919) characterizes his 
study of uncanny as an "aesthetic investigation." Published at the end of the Great War, 
and only one year before his major work on death instinct (Freud 1920, Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle), The Uncanny offers Freud's application of psychoanalytic theory to 
Gothic art. In effect, by the reason of his designation as an aesthetic study, his theory of 
uncanny has not been received as a serious work in epistemology and hermeneutics, even 
though it has been cited extensively in art and literary criticism. However, for Freud, 
aesthetics is less concerned with the theory of beauty than with the quality and expression 
of everyday feelings. 
In his investigation, Freud recognizes the marginal interest shown at the time by 
aesthetics in the phenomenon of uncanny as "the realm of frightening, of what evokes 
fear and dread." (123) Questioning the habits of feeling, he contrasts the abundant 
interest shown in "feelings of a positive kind" with the rather meagre inquisitiveness 
about "repulsion and distress." For Freud, this disparity betrays the repression of the 
unwanted and the risqué. He, therefore caUs into question the habits of thinking that 
views the evocation of dread as a reaction to uncertainty. What at the time was caUed 
the theOl"y of "intellectual uncertainty" (139) can be compared to today's cognitive theory 
of dread that attributes fear reaction to an encounter with strange uncertainty as defined 
by total lack of clarifying knowledge. Freud argues against the theory of inteUectual 
uncertainty of stimuli, as he points out a variety of everyday examples wherein a 
disposition toward the embellishment of fright can be observed. He sees the rich and 
widely projected images of dread and fear as a proof of a much deeper involvement of the 
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psyehie dynamies that link together Gothie art, the ordinary ghost stories, nightmarish 
dreams, pre-modern belief systems, and woeful fantasies. For Freud, uneanny entails the 
return of "superannuated ideas" hidden at the heart of the mundane realism of the modern 
life. In his view, these images serve as the mythie prototype for a banished past. 
To explain the psyehie dynamies of this return, Freud builds a parallel between 
the reeurrenee of the historieally surmounted traditions that were thought to be long­
gone, and the return of the psyehieally repressed thoughts that were felt to be forgotten or 
outgrown. In Freud's view, sueh return involves the subterranean region of 
eonseiousness wherein unwanted and hated relies of the past namelessly live on, beneath 
the eherished images of the present, waiting to return. In this sense, uneanny is the 
emotional quality assoeiated with the return of what has been split off from the self and 
banished from understanding. Tt is aeutely felt as paIt of the experience of gothie art and 
or brought about through analytie interpretation as uneoneealment. In this sense, the 
repressed images of past remain latent but vibrant, waiting to resurfaee and to evoke 
dread. In ail manners, sueh return is indeed uneanny as it springs from within or from the 
eomfort of the home and not from any foreign territory that lie without. Prefaeing 
Freud's text, Haughton deservedly emphasizes this sense of uneanny: 
Tt is assoeiated with the moments when an author, fietional eharaeter or 
reader experiences the return of the primitive in an apparently modern and 
seeular eontext. For Freud as uneanny theorist, however, this is also a 
survival from the abandoned psyehic eulture of our own ehildhood, 
bearing the Gothie signature of our own earliest terrors and desires ... For 
Freud, though, those nightmarish myths and primitive beliefs themselves 
are only estranged ehildhood fantasies writ large. 'The Uneanny' reminds 
us not only that there is no place like home, but that, in another sense, 
there is no other place. For Freud, our most haunting experienee of 
otherness tells us that the alien begins at home, wherever that may be. 
(Freud 1919, the Uneanny: xlix) 
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As what is uncanny makes us feel no longer at home with ourselves, it make us feel at 
home nowhere. In this way, "the uncanny becomes an experience whereby that which 
had or has been familiar becomes suddenly and inexplicably alien and strange." (124) 
Through return of the repressed in everyday life the familiar as taken-for-granted 
becomes suddenly alien. This is indeed the same effect that analytic interpretation 
evokes, when by revealing the latent content to consciousness, it dispels the aura of 
familiarity and self-evidentiality of rationalizations. 
Freud shares with Heidegger the appreciation for uncanny as the feeling that re­
orients the subject to the possibilities of new meaning in the world of experience. Yet, in 
Freud's estimate, uncanny does not necessarily lead to authenticity. In this sense, even 
though it means the return of the banished, it does not mean its resolution or integration. 
In fact, it is the quality of the integration of what has returned that decides the fate of the 
process. However regardless of this important difference, for both authors, this eeriness 
at home portends to a possibility of understanding beyond the self-soothing illusions of 
the present. Freud sees this possibility in the banished past within, while Heidegger finds 
it to in the disquieting resurfacing of non-being. In Heidegger' s word, "everyday 
language is a forgotten and therefore used-up poem" (208) that can be restored by 
salvaging its lost poetry. For psychoanalysis on the other hand, everyday life is a world 
standing on a repressed double (Doppelgiinger, Freud, 1919:) that has been denied aIl 
stance in discourse and conscious mind. Hence, it is not the lost poetry, but the banished 
phantasies that the psychoanalytic interpretation seeks to unconceal. 
If knowledge is perspectival, psychoanalysis argues that it is not primarily from 
the subject' s position in language, social structure, cultural habitus, or political discourse 
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that perspective is articulated. But, it is from the transposition or insertion of the 
subject' s unconscious phantasies into the lived experience of the object as the other that 
the perspective of knowing and relating takes shape. It is this transposition that makes aH 
other instances of social and discursive positioning uncanny, as it colours them with the 
concrete hue of the emotional experiences of infancy that is split from the self and made 
into "the alien at home." To reveal this unconscious transposition means to unconceal 
how this "alien at home" operates in the intellectual habits of the mind as the enduring 
primitive meaning of relating to the object as the other. Hence, "the alien at home" is 
that of which we are unconscious, as we assume an object in the act of relating, speaking, 
and knowing. 
However, it would be a valid question to ask: what may warrant such 
unconcealment as proposd by psychoanalysis? Going back to the correspondence theory 
of truth, the map as the replica of the reality appears as the ultimate act of representation, 
in which no trace of its maker must be ever detected. However, unconcealment seeks to 
show that the cartographers' frame of primitive phantasies and perspectival discourses 
have been part of the map all along, in spite of all daims to the contrary. In effect, the 
truth as uncovering is meant to reveal how through successive maps, elaborate realities 
are constructed to hide the trace of the mapmaker. Such endeavour must not be construed 
as an attempt to debunk science as a mere fraud. Rather, it must be understood as an 
effort in showing that scientific methodology cannot obviate the need for self-reflective 
critique of subject-object relation. Hence, no matter how strict the data-gathering 
methodology, self-reflective critique must still ask how this knowledge occasions an 
intelligible order that selectively takes stock of human experience and denies painful 
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aspects of being, or in Heidegger's term to go beyond the warn-out poem and to discover 
the lost poetry of the banished parts of the self. 
However, such self-reflective questions are not posed for the sake of arriving at an 
ultimate truth that is untainted by distortions of human fancy and phantasy. To the 
contrary, regardless of how we create an intelligible order, knowledge is never 
disengaged from its subjective context and from the social and psychic reality. Yet, 
critique does not become futile, when knowledge remains hopelessly tainted and oblique. 
For, the function of critique is to make scientific knowledge and neo-positivist 
methodology less emotionally seductive, or less capable of breeding the kind of 
intellectual and moral complacency that can lead to unchecked and self-deluding 
complicity with omnipotent phantasies of being in control of the object or in fusion with 
it. In effect, when any knowledge, even psychoanalytic knowledge, presents itself or its 
methodology as being beyond self-reflective critique of subject-object relation, seduction 
becomes the inevitable outcome. If rationality is to be true to its end, it must remain self­
reflective in order to reveal irrationality as its internaI double (Doppelgiinger) and not as 
its external obverse. In this manner, the question becomes to what extent any purported 
impartiality and objectivity enfolds its double, without being able to account for it. By 
the same token, the self-reflective critique of knowledge is an ongoing investigation of 
how prevailing regimes of knowledge partake in the practice of seduction, by projecting 
and reifying their double into an antagonist and divert their anxieties to a unwanted and 
debased alter as opposed to the self. 
As a result, every attempt in knowing must be examined as potentially mystifying 
the subject-object relation and human condition by creating an intelligible order of things 
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that can engender seduction and hegemony. By definition, hegemony refers to forms of 
action and discourse, whereby self-soothing and forgetfu1 practices are justified as 
sensible and realistic methods, accepted on pragmatic and natural basis, and enforced 
through routine and everyday practices. Hegemonic discourses occasion collective forms 
of persuasion that reconcile people to the disciplinary regimes of knowledge and power 
(Castoriadis, 1986) that validate knowledge within a controlled perimeter. Through 
common-sense distinction of subject-object, hegemonic practices mischaracterize reality 
as being "out there" or as "the given," rather than as being "consll1lcted" through psychic, 
social and historical processes. When reality is seen as being the natural state of affairs, 
achieving one-on-one correspondence with the so-called naturalness becomes the ideal of 
"real" knowing and by extension the principle of "real" being. Consequently, being 
natural and living natural are naively exalted over the attitude that tries to qualify the 
construction of this naturalness. 
As aforementioned, at the heart of this attitude to knowing and being lies in the 
assumption of a fixed subject-object distinction and opposition that is taken as a matter of 
unshakable epistemological ground for neopositivism. This sacrosanct assumption 
shapes the disinterested methods of observation, wherein valid knowledge is appraised as 
bath prespectiveless and subjectless. It is the same assumption that allows neopositivism 
to disregard the opacity of subject-object relation, and to promote indifference to any 
critique of what is persumed as real, given, natural, practical, rational and normal. On the 
other hand, the self-reflective critique of knowledge seeks to unconceal how the 
prevailing regimes of knowledge partake in the practice and reproduction of seduction, as 
they project and reify their uncanny irrationality as an external other in order not to 
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assume responsibility for it. Freud's concept of uncanny as the return of alien at home is 
of great value in such self-reflective effort, as it allows us to redefine the fundamental 
terms of subject -object relation. 
2.3. Methodology of Unconcealment and Verifying Truth in Subject-Object Relation 
ln quantitative research, objects of inquiry are operationalized into measurable quantities 
detached from the subjectivity of the observer as experimenter. In this methodology 
theory is important insofar as it generates testable hypotheses that can lead to the 
discovery (Heidegger, 1962: Entdecktheit) of generalizable statements. Such 
generalization is predicated on the inferential statistics and its particular application of 
probability logic. By definition, probability logic infers an event or a relation as 
statistically significant, when its presence can be shawn to be more prevalent than chance 
occurrence (Carnap 1953; Hempel, 1952, 1964). Thus, statistical significance is defined 
against blind chance. Statistical techniques based on probability estimates infer events 
and patterns of relation between two or more variables according to regularities detected 
between or amongst them. The golden IUle of statistical inference maintains that the best 
predictor of the future behaviour is the past behaviour. Hence, regularities observed, 
measured, and recorded from a sizable sample of representative members of a population 
are used to infer and to predict the behaviour of the whole population. ln this manner, the 
kind of tlUth established is probable tlUth which states it is generally (significantly 
probable) true that given event "A," event "B" is the outcome. However, the same 
proposition cannot be claimed to be necessarily true. In this approach, tlUth claims about 
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events, A and B, are taken to be realistic descriptions of the relation and properties of 
these events. 
Similar to many qualitative investigations, the present study uses a hermeneutic 
approach. As a result, requirements of empirical science and inferential statistics do not 
guide the methodology, analysis, and reasoning of this study. As aforementioned, the 
hermeneutic approach is established on the subject-object relation, rather than distinction. 
Hence, it views truth as the product of the relation that the subject establishes with the 
object, and cornes back to itself through the object, in a self-reflective manner. In 
hermeneutic analysis, the subject begins from questioning the accepted mode of knowing 
in order to occasion a new way of relating to the object and ultimately to itself. 
To this end, as Gadamer states (l990a: 153) "over against the whole of our 
civilization that is founded on modern science, we must repeatedly ask if something has 
not been omitted ... " In fact, the omitted is "what is to be met in ail human orientation to 
the world as atopon (the strange), that which does not 'fit' into the customary order of 
our experience." (Gadamer, 1976:25) Through act of interpretation, what remains 
otherwise hidden not from but in our experience and consciousness, is given disclosure 
and brought to unconcealment in order to transform "the customary order of our 
experience." In this manner, interpretation is a self-reflective act that seeks to understand 
primarily what is hidden to experience from within as a way of establishing a new 
subject-object relation and a new self-reflective attitude (Davis, 1978;). Without 
reflection on preconditions of knowledge or "given preunderstanding," one cannot say 
what has been left no place in language and discourse. "Reflection on a given 
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preunderstanding," Gadamar (1976: 38) states, "brings before me something that 
otherwise happens behind my back." Hermeneutic is, therefore, "the art of interpretation 
through transformation." (Ferraris, 1996) In other ward, it is the art of understanding the 
object through transfarming subject-object relation that ultimately leads back to the 
subject' s self-understanding. 
As opposed to statistically inferred probable truth, hermeneutic approach 
establishes possible truth. In effect, hermeneutic practice asks, what would be possibly 
true, if we reach beyond "the customary arder of our experience" and understand the 
uncanny that has no place (atopon) in discourse. In this sense, when it cornes ta 
precedent, truth as possibility relies on a different kind of evidence. Probable truth takes 
into account the regularities of "what has been happening" in order to generalize to "what 
would generally come next, or happen." In contrast, possible truth allows for the 
abandoned irregularities, dismissed oddities and neglected ruptures to be considered as 
precedent and as evidence of uncanny truth. Possible truth is about disrnissed and denied 
meaning of the uncanny and as such its daims are established on interpretation of 
dreams, play content, daydreams, slips of tongue, hysterical symptoms, marginal 
practices, emergent oddities, sordid idiosyncrasies that are often discounted, omitted, 
denied, ignored, or simply forgotten in the secreted junkyard of everyday consciousness. 
Possible truth begins where the uncanny is passed over and is not seen as a meaningful 
portent. In contrast ta probable truth begins with the ratio of the a desired event on all 
equally possible cases, possible truth questions how we define events of equal possibility 
to show that they are not independent from human interests and phantasy that farm the 
preunderstanding of possibility. In short, possible truth can be distinguished from 
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probable truth on at least three grounds: 1) its focus is what is feH as uncanny; 2) its 
evidence is what is discarded as having no meaningful potent; 3) its content is what has 
not been afforded a place in discourse; 4) its method is what has been denied in 
neopositivist subject-object distinction. 
What has been so far explained as possibility or possible truth refers only to 
critical application of the term which is distinct from the normative notion of possibility 
as explained either in mathematics, or in pragmatics. The critical possibility is the result 
of questioning the established frame of feeling, thinking, and talking. In contrast, the 
normative view of possibility is largely established on a quantitative calculus. The 
science of possibility is a mathematical theory that describes possibility as a method of 
dealing with data uncertainty (Zadeh, 1978). What is known as possibility theory is 
generally viewed as an alternative to probability theory in dealing with specifie kinds of 
uncertainty, for which possibility theory has proven to be a more efficient method. Based 
on this definition, the difference between possibility and probability has been reduced to 
formaI methods of computation for dealing with uncertainty. To estimate possibility, a 
calculus (MaxIMin and MaxfTimes) different from the probability calculus (PlusfTimes) 
is used. 
A rather cornmonplace example may better elucidate the difference between 
probability and possibility from mathematical point of view. One can demonstrate the 
distinction between the two by the means of an event with a low probability but good 
possibility. For instance, winning a lottery such as 6-49 for a buyer named "M" is a 
highly improbable event. The odds are 1 to the factorials of 49 for every combination 
selected by M. One can therefore say that it would be highly improbable for M to win. 
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But, does it mean that it is impossible for M to win? Can M be convinced that since it is 
improbable for him to win, it would truly be impossible for him to win and he should not 
buy tickets? That is of course an untenable argument. For, as long as 1 chance over the 
factorials of 49 exists, it would be possible for M to win, even though it is highly 
improbable. In fact, if M bought a ticket and won, it would be no surprise from 
possibility point of view. But, it would be a surprise from probability point of view. If 
possibility of an event is reduced to null that event is said to be false. For example, it is 
impossible for the sun to revolve around the earth. 
It has been said that for events involving human judgement, the possibility theory 
can serve as a better model of decision making than the probability theory (Zadeh, 1978). 
This can particularly be the case when an event is viewed as extremely positive or 
negative. For instance, what M would do if the jackpot prize reaches 10 million dollar 
for the week's draw. Would M decline to buy tickets on account of low probability, or 
would M buy one in the light of the good possibility? How possible is that possibility, 
anyway? In that case, what decides the goodness of the possibility: the high likelihood of 
having at least one winner for the draw, or the subjective appeal of the prize? Same point 
can be made regarding buying a life insurance policy. If M is imagined to be a young, fit, 
active, working, and healthy person with dependents, what are the probabilities of M's 
dying a sudden and premature death? Would M still buy a policy based on possible event 
of sudden death, or would M decline based on low probability of a sudden death among 
his cohort? What makes the possibility of a certain event appear as good or strong? Are 
human beings more inclined to act based on possibility that are deemed good or bad, or 
are we creatures of probability? These are not easy questions to answer, but they show a 
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realm of unceltainty beyond probability, wherein the fate of uncertainty would not be 
decided on the basis of probability. Here, the possibility of a much desired event seems 
aIl the more plausible than the low probability of its happening. In fact, despite their 
repeated loss, most buyers keep purchasing lottery for the reason of its alluring possibility 
and prove probability to be a bad predictor of their future behaviour. 
What mathematical theory of possibility and inferential statistic fail to consider is 
the relation between probability and possibility in the world shaped and reshaped by 
human desire, action and understanding. For an event to be possible, it only requires to 
have a chance happening of more than zero. Whereas for an event to be probable it needs 
to have a minimum chance happening of 19 times out of 20 (p =0.05). Yet, people and 
individuals commit themselves to actions, events, and discourses based on what they 
believe their possibilities are or can he. Tt is, in fact, from what people hold as possible 
that probabilities of action and truth are fashioned. In this vein, regularities and 
likelihoods established on observed frequency and sample size miss to recognize that the 
purpose of inference is not always to find the most likely truth. Rather, inference can 
lead us to the previously unknown and unrecognized possibilities that can transform our 
understanding and create new horizons for insight, meaning, and human action. 
Although possibility according to mathematical theOl'y can facilitate certain 
aspects of decision making, it transfigures possibility from a critical notion to a 
computational function. Computationally speaking, possibility is a way of dealing with 
uncertain data to create reliable certainty. In contrast, critical possibility is a way of 
confronting the celtainties of knowing and being by dismantling our habits of 
understanding, and by undoing the customary order of experience. In effect, critical 
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possibility runs in the opposite direction of computational possibility, in order to 
unconceal new understanding. Mathematical possibility helps decision making to go 
from uncertainty to relative certainty by the means of computing as the ultimate method 
of pattern making. Hence, the difference between certainty and uncertainty would be 
reduced to what can be made part of a pattern (a set in this case) and what cannot. 
However, such understanding if applied to the realm of meaning, can generate a 
deceptive effect, as the radical difference of unknown and uncertain can be denied in 
favour of known patterns and their stability. Gadamer (1976: Il) candidly notes this 
effect by stating how hermeneutic possibility steps beyond the statistics and methodology 
of science: 
It is an extreme example, but it shows us that science always stands under 
definite conditions of methodological abstraction and that the successes of 
modern sciences rests on the fact that other possibilities for questioning 
are concealed by abstraction. This fact cornes out clearly in the case of 
statistics, for the anticipatory character of the questions statistics answer 
makes it particularly suitable for propaganda purposes. Indeed, effective 
propaganda must always try to influence initially the judgement of the 
person addressed and to restrict his possibilities of judgement. Thus, what 
is established by mathematics seems to be a language of facts, but which 
questions these facts answer and which facts would begin to speak if other 
questions were asked are hermeneutical questions. Only a hermeneutical 
inquiry would legitimate the meaning of these facts and thus the 
consequences that follow from them. 
Restricting the possibilities of critical rationality can be the inevitable outcome, when 
statistical and computational methods are used for assessment of knowledge. By going 
from uncertainty to certainty, the calculus of possibility theory reduces the critical ability 
of thought to the mere play of patterns of certainty with no appreciation for the uncanny. 
However, mathematics is not the only branch of thought that has been grappling 
with possibility. Within logic, possibility has for sorne time been the focus of discussion. 
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Through the analysis of the ordinary statements of possibility, Hacking (1975) 
differentiates two kinds of possibility which he caUs: possibility for and possibility that. 
For instance, on can state: 
1) It is possible for Jane to do the exam, 
2) It is possible that Jane will do the exam. 
In the first example, the statement indicates Jane's ability to do the exam. It says the 
event is possible, for the reason that Jane can make it happen. Hence, Hacking caUs this 
possibility de re. In the second, the possibility is based on what the speaker knows of the 
situation surrounding Jane and the exam. It says.that based on what appears it is possible 
that the event will happen. According ta Hacking, this latter statement is an epistemic or 
de dicto possibility. 
However, Hacking's differentiation between these two kinds might prove to be 
not so solid, when possibility cornes to signify what is permissible for the Jane to do. For 
instance, "it is now possible for you to talk" is a statement that tells to Jane what has 
become possible for her ta do at a given time. This possibility has little to do with Jane's 
actual ability for talking. However, it indicates a precept that lifts an injunction on 
talking for Jane. In that case, the statement is a de dicta possibility without being 
necessarily epistemic. For, it states a command of authority telling her what she can do. 
Yet, that is not aIl. Since, such statement of authority may carry a de re meaning as weIl. 
Its de re effect depends on how far Jane may believe that this statement is stipulating 
when her real possibility begins and ends. In other words, if Jane accepts this de dicto 
statement of possibility that say: it is now possible for Jane to speak, it becomes then 
possible for her ta speak (de re). In this example, what would possibly happen depend on 
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how far de dicto possibility can persuasively command Jane into accepting de re 
possibility. If it fails, Jane might decide to protest and not to speak. Then under 
conditions of protest or transgression de dicta possibility collapses and becomes 
untenable. 
It goes without saying that permissibility is not restricted to imperatives of power 
or to dictates of authority. As understanding and explaining are both predicated on 
language, what is truly permissible and possible is what is afforded a place in discourse. 
In this sense, what exceeds the resources of discourse surpasses articulation, and remains 
nameless and absent as far as the explicit content is concerned. Reflecting on this limit of 
expressible, Ricoeur (1981) points out: 
A quotation from Humbolt willlead us to the threshold of this new field of 
investigation: 'Language as discourse (Rede) lies on the boundary 
between the expressible and the inexpressible. Its aim and its goal is to 
push back still further this boundary.' Interpretation, in its proper sense, 
similarly lies on this frontier. (176) 
When the boundary of the expressible grows unyielding and impermeable, knowing and 
thinking can become unreceptive to the ineffable unknown. Interpretation can then open 
understanding not to what lies beyond language, but to what is inexpressibly hidden at 
the heart of language and reason. It is through interpretation at the frontier of expressible 
that possibilities of meaning and truth are unraveled and the meaning of the uncanny is 
unconcealed. 
In his more recent publication, Hacking's (2006) explication of two forms of 
possibilities, although useful, is utterly incomplete. His argument effectively 
demonstrates two ways of talking about possibility without exploring the relation 
between the two in the pragmatics of speech act. As a result, it does not adequately 
139 
illuminate the various ways in which these two forms of possibility may inter-penetrate 
one another in ordinary discourse and practice. In particular, Hacking shows little 
interest in discussing how through permissibility, de dicta and de re lose their distinction 
and assume a dialectical relation. In many ways, Hacking's distinction between de dicta 
and de re resonates the distinction between subject and object in neopositivist 
epistemology. And much the same, it effectively leads to creating a mode of thinking 
wherein a dynamic relation between the knower and the known is discounted in favour of 
a de-ontologized distinction. In contrast, critical possibility begins from a dialectical 
relation between the knower and the known, in order to show how de re is interpreted by 
the conventions of de dicta, and how de dicta is transformed by the expansion of de re. 
Thus, critical hermeneutics suspects such assumptions of distinction, and examines their 
validity in terms of their ontological vicissitude (Schicksale) in order to show that the 
very idea of possibility challenges both conunon language and prevalent understanding. 
If possible truth-as meant in critical hermeneutics-radically departs from 
probable truth, what possibilities can be regarded as true and what must be deemed false? 
From epistemological viewpoint, the response to this question allows the hermeneutic 
practice in psychoanalysis to avoid open-ended acceptance or indiscriminate suspicion of 
ail. For analysis, bringing into language what had never belonged to discourse and what 
was heathenized and denied from consciousness and understanding, cannot become an 
arbitrary act of random reconstruction. However, if ail that have been argued so far about 
subject-object relation, unconscious phantasy, critical possibility, and interpretive 
reconstruction hold true, what can possibly be taken as fact or proof in psychoanalytic 
investigation? Would not our expianations become nothing more than hypostatized 
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theories with no point beyond them? Would not our interpretations become any thing 
other than soothing stories of metaphoric value for persuasion? These questions are 
concerned with the problem of facts, proofs, and relativism of explanations. 
In ordinary parlance,fact is what can serve as evidence for or against a statement, 
while proof is the reasoning that presents facts as such evidence and reveals their 
evidential value. In the case of simple assertions based on overt perception, facts and 
proofs become indistinguishable. For instance, if 1 say: John is not in this gathering, one 
can point him out in the crowd and simply refute my statement. In this case, the proof is 
therefore ostensible rather than reasoned. However, for complex explanatory models 
dealing with complex phenomena, facts and proofs are two distinct but interrelated 
aspects of reasoning. In its common sense meaning,facts are self-evident knowledge that 
by the means of proofs as reasoned arguments, come to support or challenge a statement 
that is not self-evident, by itself. Without proofs, facts are of little value, and without 
facts, proofs are unsubstantiated. On the other hand, facts become only self-evident or 
patently obvious according to the perspective, context, and pre-understanding of the 
observer. Facts are normally observed and interpreted in accordance with the observer's 
perspective and theoretical orientation. In this sense, facts are not simply observed, as 
the research question, choice of constructs, operationalization, design and inferential 
reasoning deterrnine what can be considered as facts or fiction. For instance, 
mathematics translates facts (observations) into units of computation, while discourse 
studies translate facts (spoken material) into units of speech act. Hence, we refer to facts 
by designations, such as: physical, empirical, hermeneutic, logical, historical, 
sociological, and more. But, are there such things as psychoanalytic facts and proofs? 
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How can they be found and how can they be examined and verified? To answer these 
questions, it wou Id be necessary to review what psychoanalytic interpretation is and what 
it tries to unconceal as truth. Furthermore, it would be essential to show what facts are 
observed through analysis; what reasoning is applied; what proofs are built; and what 
inferences are made. 
The question of what constitutes psychoanalytic facts and proofs has been 
discussed from two major viewpoints: 1) the psychoanalytic theory, or 2) the analytic 
situation. Green (2000) must be credited as the chief representative of the former 
approach. He argues that Freud's notion of deferred action (Après-coup, 
Nachtriiglichkeit) defines the nature of psychoanalytic evidence, so that only mnemonic 
traces of the events that assume meaning at a later point in time-as they are brought to 
present context--can be considered meaningful evidence. ln this manner, deferred action 
reflects the temporality and causality of the psychic phenomenon from past to present. 
Hence, observation in "here and now" (i.e., infant observation) cannot in-itself constitute 
a meaningful psychoanalytic fact without having been retraced through unconscious 
distortions and symbolism from recent context to an earlier one. In this manner, past 
events assume significance and become analyzable facts only later in life. If deferred 
action is the necesary requisite of psychoanalytic fact, direct observations and 
interpretation in the here and now are of little valid use. 
Although Green's argument with regard to deferred action as the defining feature 
of psychoanalytic fact represents an important line of reasoning, it tends to be for the 
most part one-sided. Green misses an important point by emphasizing on what is 
interpreted through deferred action. He confuses the ontological and the epistemological 
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status of the fact and holds the former confined to the latter. In this manner, phantasy 
becomes delimited to the evidence of phantasy that is uncovered later in life, and 
psychoanalytic fact to the strict terms of evidentiality as belated symbolism and causality 
through deferred action. The deferred action as belated meanings born entirely in 
present from mnemonic traces of the past is radicaIly different from deferred action as 
belated remaking of primitive psychic reality in a way befitting the external reality of 
here and now. Although Freud' s (1895, 1917) reference to this term describes how 
unconscious phantasy can assume belated meaning, it is no where definite that such 
meaning is the only one that is ever assumed or that is the only one with which 
psychoanalysis is to be strictly concerned. 
Whether from theoretical or form technical point of view, the function of psychic 
reality cannot be reduced to strictly belated meanings, regardless of the role of phantasy 
in early development of symbolization and mental processes during infancy. Green's 
argument is in many ways the extension of the one made by Anna Freud and her 
supporters during the "Controversial Discussions" of 1940's (see King and Steiner, 1991; 
Steiner 2003) against Klein's discovery of unconscious phantasy and infantile 
development. In Klein's view, phantasy is coextensive with aIl conscious mental and 
external events, and mediates every experience of external reality from infancy to 
adulthood. Meltzer (1981: 178) explains this relation between the internaI and external as 
that of two parallei worlds: 
[Klein] made a discovery that created a revolutionary addition to the 
model of the mind, namely that we do not live in one world, but in two­
that we live in an internaI that is as real a place to live as the outside 
world ... Psychic reality could be treated in a concrete way. 
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The idea of two paraUel worlds that are in meaningful interaction from infancy goes 
beyond Freud's idea of rnnemonic traces that are strictly rendered meaningful through 
differed action. In infant observation, the observer interprets a complex experience that 
includes only by observing the infants, but also "the feelings evoked in the observer as 
weIl." (Frosh, 2001 :628-9) In this manner, infant observation has revealed behind the 
mundane interactions of the infant an inner world of archaic phantasies from which one 
can see the emergence of selfhood. 
As opposed to Green's emphasis on analytic theory, there are others who explain 
the uniqueness of analytic facts based on the analytic situation. Ricoeur (1977) must be 
recognized for introducing psychoanalytic facts from the viewpoint of analytic situation. 
In his view, proof takes shape in the context of analysis that reveals the evidence as facts. 
In his editorial preface to Ricoeur, Thompson provides an unambiguous outline of his 
position and argument that is most useful: 
Ricoeur's current approach to this question reveals a shift away from his 
earlier work, where the emphasis was on the structure of psychoanalytic 
theory. His starting point now is the analytic situation, which determines 
what counts as a 'fact' in psychoanalysis. The relation between fact and 
theory is, in addition, much more complicated than that aUeged by the 
traditional empiricist account. These preliminary considerations prepare the 
way for Ricoeur's suggestion that the type of truth claim raised by 
psychoanalysis is very different from the notion of truth presupposed by the 
observational sciences. For the truth claim of psychoanalysis is ioseparable 
from the self-recognition achieved through the process of narration. 
Nevertheless, the explanatory dimension of psychoanalysis provides means 
of proof which are not contained in the narrative structure itself. Ir is in the 
complex articulation of psychoanalytic theory, interpretative procedures, the 
therapeutic treatment, and the narrative structure of analytic experience that 
the means of proof, and hence the criteria of a good psychoanalytic 
explanation, ultimately consists. (Ricoeur, 1981 :24) 
He, therefore, focuses on features of the analytic situation that guides the fact-finding and 
arrives at what he caUs the narrative structure of analytic process. For Ricoeur, analytic 
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situation serves the purpose of bringing desire to discourse through narratization that 
restores the true historicity of human experience. Hence, analysis becomes "constructing 
or reconstructing a coherent story or account from tattered remains of our experience." 
(271) Ricoeur's emphasis on reconstruction of life histories as narratives that can be 
understood and followed has served as a foundation for the views of Schafer (1992) and 
Spence (1982) who see narratization as central to both therapeutic and epistemological 
spirit of psychoanalysis. 
However, the emphasis on cohesion, construction, and reconstruction can be a 
greater problem for psychoanalysis than the empiricist critique. The idea of cohesion 
highlights the syntagmatic aspect of narration (i.e., splitting explained in terms of 
"degrammatized symbol") and takes the emphasis away from integration as intrapsychic 
dynamics (260). The integrative process does not necessarily result in narrative cohesion, 
as "integration achieved is never complete and defences against depressive conflict bring 
about regression to paranoid-schizoid phenomena, so that the individual at aIl times may 
oscillate between the two." (Segal, 1964:ix) From Kleinian viewpoint, cohesion can be 
only a by-product of integration and its value is relative to the quality of mourning and 
the capacity for reparation. In contrast, Ricoeur's argument promotes cohesion as a 
necessary requisite of narrativity for stories that can be followed. The insistence on 
construction of such stories can in fact introduce a level of indeterminacy in theory and 
practice that would transform analytic facts and explanations into inescapable circularity 
and indefinite plasticity. Secondly, Ricoeur's notion of "bringing desire to discourse" 
fails to reflect the radical difference between the preverbal nature of the primitive object 
relation and language. The radical difference of what is inexpressible is not best served 
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by the word, desire (Begierde). For his emphasis of language and narration, Recoeur's 
notion of fact is first and foremost a hermeneutic event and only secondly an analytic 
one. 
Unlike hermeneutics that is the exegetical discipline of texts, psychoanalysis is a 
clinical discipline concerned with the inner experiences and psychic dynamics of 
suffering (Unlust). Historically, it began not from the interpretation of texts, but from 
attending to patients whose suffering was beyond understanding, explanation, or 
treatment. "No text as such," states Steiner (1995: 442), "has in its own etymology also 
the meaning of sufferance which the word patient carries with it." As a discipline 
dedicated to sufferance (Unlust), it has emerged from clinical case studies to show how 
suffering can be interpreted (Deutung), understood (Verstehen), explained (Erkliiren) , 
and treated (Behandlung) , a11 as parts of a single process of analysis. Its effOit has 
generated insight (Einsicht) into psyche, or into the inner depth of the subject, with its 
archaic origins, phantasmatic content, and mystifying operations. Its theory has been 
used to explain the dialectic of absence and presence, inner and outer, past and present, 
canny and uncanny, real and phantasized, and rational and irrational. Beyond analytic 
situation, the findings of psychoanalysis have illuminated the anguish that permeates 
human life in a manner that encompasses the self and the other. 
As a result, the hermeneutic aspect of psychoanalysis is not the art of avoiding the 
misunderstanding of a text, as its surface reading of definition indicates (For a depth 
reading comparable to analysis see, Gadamer, 1975: 179). But, it is the art of working 
through the painful distortions of being that arise from the split off parts of the self and 
objects, parts that have been tangled with infantile desire and hatred, and parts that have 
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been scotomized beyond conscious understanding. In effect, psychoanalysis, foIlowing 
the vision formulated by Freud, has unveiled a different kind of misunderstanding, one 
that is part of our normalized thinking. Reflecting on Freud' s extraordinary vision and 
unconventional diction, LaPlanche (1997:653) states: 
The sharpness of his vision is testified to by terms like "internaI foreign 
body" or "reminiscence." They define the unconscious as an alien inside 
me and even put inside me by an alien. At his most prophetic, Freud does 
not hesitate over formulations which go back to the idea of possession. 
He, therefore, continues his remark: 
Fram the moment the unconscious is brought back fram its alienness to 
what one could calI, along with theologians, an intimor intima meo 
['something more inward than my inwardness']-we can only observe a 
return to centering: there is something in me which l've split off from, 
denied, but which 1 must re-assimilate. Certainly, the ego is not the master 
of its own house, but it is, after aIl, nonetheless at home there. (659) 
In this sense, whereas critical hermeneutics speaks of the pre-reflectïve being-in-the 
world, the pre-understanding of experience and the role of language as the pre-given, 
psychoanalytic hermeneutics focuses on "alienness within." More importantly, for 
critical hermeneutic, angst originates fram non-being as human finitude, whereas for 
psychanalysis primitive anxiety is the function of death instincts as the destructive 
impulse that operates within the psyche from birth to death. 
Kleinian object relation traces this "alienness within" to the preverbal phantasies 
that form the core and the dynamics of psychic reality. In his original definition, Freud 
(1917:368) states, " ... phantasies possesss psychical as contrasted with material reality ... ; 
in the world of the neuroses it is psychical which is of decisive kind." Later development 
in psychoanalysis showed the role of psychic reality to be more aIl-encompassing than 
that initially explained by Freud with regard to neurosis. Psychic reality is shown to 
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underlie mature functioning and cognition. In particular, it is shown that primitive 
mechanisms of defence bring psychic reality to bear on our knowledge and perception of 
material reality, and on our interaction with the world. With the discovery of the 
significance of psychic reality, the hermeneutic as "the art of avoiding the 
misunderstanding of the other" has to changed meaning to: avoiding to misapprehend the 
other within for the sake of relating to the other without. In other ward, psychoanalytic 
hermeneutic makes sense of transfer and countertransfer in order to understand the 
unkown within. For psychoanalysis, it is the unchecked distortion of feelings, actions, 
and thoughts in relating to others that is at stake. 
Being acutely cognizant of this ineffable "unknown" at the heart of language and 
reason makes psychoanalysis qua Kleinian object relation distrustful of the de­
ontologized positive binaries, such as: reason vs. unreason, subject vs. object, known vs. 
unknown. Thus, a different notion of thinking can be proposed, one that is "conversant 
with what is unknown" at heaIt of accepted reason. Steuerman explains this notion of 
thinking as: 
The idea of becoming 'conversant with what is unknown' is so distant 
from the traditional ideal of knowledge as mastery of the object presented, 
that Strachey translated 'unknown' by 'what (the patient) has now become 
acquainted with' ... 
For Klein, Bion and the contemporary Kleinians, thinking cannot be 
dissociated from our very concrete emotional experiences of the world. It 
is a capacity for making links which can be traced back to the very early, 
preverbal, 'non-reasonable' experiences with the mother as a vulnerable 
baby. Thought does not come 'after', as a mature achievement of reason. 
Thought and reason bear also the unthought and unreasonable, and it is 
only by becoming 'conversant' with the pain and suffering as weil as with 
the love and pleasure that we experience with the 'other' that we can pay 
tribute to our mature rational capacities as a human. This is not a solitary 
but an intersubjective achievement. (97) 
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Psychoanalysis brings forth the possibility for integrating the split off aspects of primitive 
object relation, wherein thinking and emotionally relating to the object have essentially 
remained intertwined. ln this sense, interpretation steps beyond what is discursively 
manifest meaning to reach what lies beyond in the heathen region of the psyche where 
split off parts of the self and object are fomenting the primitive phantasies and the 
individuals unconscious inner world (Segal,). In Ricoeur's view, through interpretation 
as recollection of the inexpressible, the critical hermeneutic of suspicion becomes a 
hermeneutic of reminiscence (35). From Kleinian object relation point of view, through 
interpretation as "re-collection," the critical hermeneutic of suspicion can become a 
hermeneutic of integration, mourning, reparation, empathy, and gratitude. 
As Steuerman reminds us, the novelty of Freud's notion of "unknown," even for 
Strachey, was hard to grasp. This difficulty reflects the uUer alienness of the concept to 
the kind of thinking that sees knowledge as a means to an end (instrumental rationality) 
and initiates inquiries from a subject-object distinction (positivism). Freud 
interchangeable uses of words such as unrecognized (Unerkannt) and unknown 
(Unbekannt) are quite deliberate and begins from one of his first major anal ytic 
publications, The Interpretation of Dream (Freud, 1895). ln this work, he presents his 
theory of interpretation together with his views on symbolic distortion and unconscious. 
In this text, Freud describes the unknown in more than ordinary terms to emphasize its 
obstinate quality beyond expressible. He, therefore, states: 
There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream 
which has to be left obscure; this is because we become aware during the 
work of interpretation that at that point there is a tangle rein Knduel] of 
dream-thoughts which cannot be unravelled and which moreover adds 
nothing [keine weiteren Beitriige] to our knowledge of the content of the 
dream. This is the dream's navel, the spot where it reaches down into the 
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unknown [den Unerkannten aufsitzt]. The dream-thoughts to which we 
are led by interpretation cannot from the nature of things have any definite 
endings [ohne Abschluss]; they are bound to branch out in every direction 
into the intricate network [in die netzartige Verstickung] of our world of 
thought. It is as sorne point where this mesh work [Geflecht] is 
particularly close that the dream-wish grows up, like mushroom out of its 
mycelium. [German phrases added from Freud's original] (564) 
In this passage, Strachey has been quite candid with the word unknown. ln the light of 
later discoveries, Freud's early description is prescient and discerning. His choice of 
literary allusions and figurative expressions reflects his deep understanding of the radical 
otherness of the unknown and its refractory nature to literaI meaning and propositional 
statements. Lying beneath the dream-content as dream-thoughts, the unknown keeps 
branching and bifurcating into a meshwork of meaning beyond interpretation and into 
"our world of thought." This underside of our thoughts, dreams, symptoms constitutes 
the hidden side of the rationality. 
Freud is quite to the point that the act of interpretive unravelling is never perfect, 
since what is revealed always leaves behind other irresolvable entanglements. Analysis, 
if successful, would no doubt become transformative. But, in spite of its transformative 
effect, it cannot have claim to any emancipation (pace Habermas). As Steuerman points 
out: 
There will never be a thorough 'chirnney sweeping' as the first patients in 
analysis hoped for. We cannot clear out the unconscious for, without it, 
conscious thought cannot exist. We can hope to achieve, however, a 
changed understanding of ourselves, one that acknowledges the role of the 
other subjects and non-rational elements in what we used to think as solely 
'ours'. (15) 
Psychoanalysis simply seeks the relentless undoing of the painful distortions of life in 
order to expand human capacity for thinking and feeling. The resulting transformation, if 
successful, provides a better self-reflective ground for contentment and justice. But, 
150 
emancipation is beyond the scope and the horizon of analysis, as it involves matters of 
historical and social reality and not psychic reality alone. In this manner, the need to 
renew the critique of rationality and to undo sufferance remains stable, since every act of 
integration is only an optimal and not a terminal accomplishment. As new forms of 
being, feeling, and thinking become themselves unreflective conventional practices, they 
eventually shift into a new common sense or a new normalized science of objectivity 
cleansed of the subject. 
This critical endeavour can only be meaningful, if analytic interpretation and the 
ensuing process of psychic integration are neither seen as a realistic recollection, nor 
pursued as unbridled narratization. Realistic recolJection turns psychic reality into 
nothing more than a repressed replica of real of the past, whereas unbridled narratization 
assumes a plastic psychic reality that can be rewritten orrlinpotently in the present. As 
argued before, analysis qua Kleinian object relation is a reconstruction, whereby aspects 
of occurring interaction are traced to psychic reality. These aspects of reality are re­
examined in terms of infantile phantasies that are shown to have certain constant qualities 
and recognizable operations on the individual's mental world. Refering to Klein's 
anxiety positions, Steuerman states, "there are of two basic configurations of the mental 
world, and these two basic positions are exemplary of dealing with intersubjective 
reality." (18) Analytic interpretation makes recourse to "these two basic configurations 
of the mental" to retrace and reconstruct how intersubjectivity is mediated by psychic 
reality. The specificity of these two positions provides a frame for psychoanalytic 
observation and identification of facts. The content of anxieties rising in the 
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intersubjective world or in here and now serves as the clue for analytic interpretation to 
retrace elements of the two basic positions of primitive object relation. 
In the process of observation and interpretation, facts are aspects of reality that 
arise from the subject-object relation (transference and countertransference) and invoke 
the eeriness and anxiety of the unknown. Hence, it is the feelings of the uncanny in the 
relation between the observer and the observed that reveals what can at any moment 
assume the status of fact and call for proo! The analytic proof is a process of walking 
back and forth between the psychic and the material reality reflecting on the nature of 
anxieties and feelings experienced by the analysand and invoked in the analyst. In this 
process, the uncanny as fact is traced to the psychic reality of the infantile phantasy to 
interpret the latent content or the unknown (Unerkannt), and is retraced back to the 
material or actual reality through insight to unconceal the primitive significance of the 
events in here and now. Ultimately, psychoanalytic interpretation is intended to reveal 
how ego's experiences of actual events are mediated by primitive phantasy. Through 
such reconstruction, the primitive feeling-I (lch-Fühle) is restored to the adult thinking-I 
(lch-Denke). In this manner, the reason rediscovers its living roots in the infantile 
phantasies of love and hate, and thereupon "what is re-collected" and "the one who re­
collects" are both transformed to create new capacities for thinking and feeling. 
As a result, psychoanalytic findings can be validated according to the 
transformative effect in analytic setting, or in a discursive situation that leads to a new 
capacity for understanding and working through sufferance. When psychoanalytic 
theory is applied to intersubjectivity as texts, discourse or socio-cultural phenomenon, its 
effect can be said to be revealing the uncanny unknown and to open new possibilities for 
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thinking and feeling, possibilties that are denied within our habit of thinking. For, they 
question our thought and raise questionable feelings about us. For instance, Freud's 
study of human discontent under civilization opened a new way for looking at the relation 
between individual and society. He argued how modern civilization despite having 
evolved from much yearned love of the family and community, inevitably leads to 
growing feelings of guilt and self-punishment. His analysis of the unconscious underside 
of civilization was valuable, since it opened a new chapter for future inquiries in the 
direction of the uncanny emotional underworld of culture. Although future studies 
questioned Freud's argument, no one can deny that his application of psychoanalytic 
theory to the problem of civilization potentiated a new capacity for thinking and feeling 
with regard to civilization and culture (a new sensitivity among researchers), and 
consequently changed the way we speak about ourselves as members of a civil society. 
This must be considered as the validity of his argument, as it changed the subject-object 
relation-in this case, self and society-by making it open to examination of unconscious 
feelings that underlie culture and modern life. Despite the subsequent development of 
disagreements and differences, the direction and the tenure of discussion introduced by 
Freud have continued in the works of many contemporary thinkers. In other words, the 
value of Freud's insight in creating a possibility for reflective studies on culture and 
civilization surpasses the actual degree of correspondence between his every argument 
and the reality. As a result, the validity of his work can be assessed in terms of its critical 
impact on defining subject-object relation within a community of researchers or within 
the greater arena of public self-reflection, as well as in terms of introducing a new area of 
inquiry hitherto non-existent. 
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By and large, reported psychoanalytic findings are ultimately possible truths and 
not probable truths. For, they do not tell us what can be probably true from regularities 
of the past. Rather, they surprise us with what can be a definite possibility of truth 
behind the uncanny irregularities of the present if interpreted in terms of archaic past. 
The analytic emphasis on the temporality of aIl occurring experiences stands in contrast 
to the neopositivist and realist assumption that "an object can be effectively represented 
(and as Heidegger has shown in his critique of technology, represented means mastered) 
in here and now of the atemporal presence." (Steuerman, :92) In this manner, the kind of 
possible truth that psychoanalysis offers is a critical one, as its existence has been denied 
out of consciousness and discourse and made unknown (Unbekannt) and unrecognizable 
(Unerkannt). By recognizing this unrecognizable truth, psychoanalysis expands human 
experience, feeling, thought, and deed to include an understanding of what was once 
denied. To this end, analytic findings reveal how the re-integration of the unknown can 
become a true possibility for a given situation. In this sense, they open possibilities of 
transformation or of transformative action for working trough sufferance. 
When it cornes to how primitive unconscious phantasy mediates our experience, a 
similar need for critical possibilities of understanding and action can be felt. It would not 
be an overstatement to say that the real focus of psychoanalysis lies in psychic reality. 
Although psychic reality is dismissed by our habits of thinking, when it cornes to 
sufferance, it has shown to be not dismissable. For, psychic reality holds the eerie 
unknown, to which discourse and rationality remain vulnerable without a possibility of 
integration. Psychoanalysis offers a way to reflect on the "unconscious forms of relating 
and participating in an intersubjective world." (Steuerman, :xv) It is through this 
154 
reflection that causal explanations are formed ta retrace our relating and participating to 
the unconscious phantasies. As a result, the causal explanations of psychoanalysis 
unconceal and explicate the uncanny ways in which what was lived in primitive past 
cornes to determine or set limit to what is lived or can be lived in present. Steuerman 
expands this point by stating: 
But unless we recognize that thinking and reason, as measures of our 
humanity, are not abstract developmental processes, but concrete 
emotional experiences developed from very early interactions, we may not 
fully comprehend the level of unconscious fantasies that shape our mature 
abstract reasoning and argumentative processes ... The fundamental 
contribution of psychoanalysis to such a project is the recognition that our 
capacity for thinking and tolerating separateness and difference has to 
acknowledge an unconscious world which can attack the most basic links 
that make understanding possible. It also shows that the unconscious, 
unknown world encompasses more than can be known by 'abstract', 
purely cognitive processes. (36) 
This notion of unknown at the heart of the self and at the core of reason shapes the 
psychoanalytic critique of normative rationality, and defines the psychoanalytic approach 
to human suffering. In this sense, psychoanalysis is the systematic study and treatment of 
the abiding cunningness of unreason that underlies the world of intersubjectivity. 
The application of psychoanalysis to qualitative or interpretive research can reveal 
how rational thinking systematically avoids genuine understanding as it continually faces 
the unknown within. In effect, when applied to observation in human context, 
psychoanalysis can make the observer refigure its position vis-à-vis the object by pointing 
out the docility and complacency of the normative preconceptions of thought in 
confronting the eerie unknown. As Waddel (1988:313-14) argues, such self-reflective 
method does not rely on objectivity as subjectless knowledge: 
It is a method with no daim to impartiality or objectivity. Rather the 
reverse, it is one rooted in subjectivity of particular kind-with the 
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capacity to look inward and outward simultaneously; one that struggles to 
prevent observation being clouded and distorted through preconception. 
Waddel's emphasis on psychoanalysis making no daim to subjectless impartiality cannot 
be taken lightly. Being rooted in a critical subjectivity, psychoanalysis makes the 
observer acutely aware of the uncanny relation between internaI and external, rational 
and irrational, and subject and object. It is through this awareness that new possibilities 
of relating and participating in the intersubjective world emerge. 
2.4. Conclusion: The General Choice of Method and Design 
In what has so far been elucidaed, an epistemological approach for conducting 
psychoanalytic, qualitative research has been worked out in order to reduce the reliance 
of the present study on research epistemologies that are antinomie to the critical and self­
reflective spirit of psychoanalysis. To this end, concepts such as possible truth, fact, 
proof, interpretation, understanding, and explanation were redefined based on 
psychoanalytic critique of modes of thinking epitomized by common sense and 
neopositivism that rely on subject-object distinction, and on correspondence-coherence 
theories of knowledge. It has been shown that the historical and disciplinary roots of this 
critique expand beyond the history and the scope of psychoanalysis. Today, whether in 
philosophy or in sociology and anthropology, rethinking discrete facts in terms of 
meaningful worlds of constructions has generated a different kind of knowledge based on 
subject-object relation, wherein objectivity is intersubjective. Yet, contemporary 
psychoanalysis has made a unique and controversial contribution to the understanding of 
intersubjectivity. It has proposing that the objectivity is irredeemably intersubjective, and 
yet the intersubjectivity is helplessly mediated by unconscious and primitive object 
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relations. Hence, for rationaJity to fulfill its promise of illumination, we have to rethink 
thought and reason as bearing unthought and unreasonable. The rationality, that fails to 
be conversant with the unknown within, may advance toward the unknown without, with 
narcissistic and omnipotent phantasies. Long before Freud and psychoanalysis, Vico 
(1744/1984: 129-30) grasped this insight, even though misidentified the true location of 
the unknown, and he admonished: 
Man in his ignorance makes himself the rule of the universe (... ) So that, 
as rational metaphysics teaches that man becomes ail things by 
understanding them (homo intelligendo fit omnia), this imaginative 
metaphysics shows that man becomes ail things by not understanding 
them (homo non intelligendo fit omnia); and perhaps the latter proposition 
is truer than the former for when man understands, he extends his mind 
and takes in the things, but when he does not understand he makes the 
things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself into 
them. 
Contemporary psychoanalysis reminds us of this unknown as ensconced within reason 
and traces its origin to psychic reality, where primitive phantasies operate as an 
"imaginative metaphysics" beneath our yearning for knowledge and control. 
Although psychoanalysis has made a substantial contribution to the critique of 
reason, its contribution to epistemology has been less solid and fraught with ambivalence 
and indecisiveness. It is definitely beyond the scope of this work and the ability of this 
author to remedy this shortfall. However, it is a matter of necessity for this work to 
establish its methodology on a foundation congruent with its mode of reasoning. To 
apply methodologies appropriate for empirical research to a psychoanalytic study is no 
less unrealistic, incomprehensible and mystifying than to choose for an empirical study 
the methodologies proper for psychoanalysis. Such manner of espousing contradictory 
and paradoxical ideas may only breed arguments and findings that have the semblance of 
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doing things right without ever doing the right thing. In more scholarly terms, such 
disregard for historical debate can only mean ignoring the importance of fundamental 
quandaries, in reaction to which every epoch has created distinct paradigms in order to 
ensure their dialogical treatment. Hence, for this scribe, hammering out a fitting 
methodology is not a matter of intellectual entrenchment, but a matter of logical 
consistency and dialogical continuity with the history of the quandaries and paradigms, to 
which l utterly owe my inspiration and reasoning. 
As aforementioned, the methodology of this study relies on a psychoanalytic and 
phenomenological approach that is not compatible with the empirical logic of hypothesis 
testing. By and large, mathematical probability used for such tests a110ws us to infer a 
hypothesized event as statistically significant, when its presence can be shown to be more 
prevalent than chance occurrence. Thus, statistical significance is defined against blind 
chance. The result of statistical analyses is positivistic knowledge that treats a11 objects 
of inquiry as measurable quantities detached from the subjectivity of the observer. The 
resulting knowledge purportedly leads to the discovery (Entdecktheit) of discrete facts 
(Heidegger, 1962: 118). In contrast, the hermeneutics discloses (Erschlossenheit) an 
event or a relation as existentially significant, when through interpretation (Deutung) it 
explicates (Auslegung) and "work out" (Ausarbeitung) an understanding (Verstehen) of 
the uncanny (Unheimlich) and the unknown (Unerkannt) that lies within the subject­
object relation. The ultimate goal of the hermeneutic knowledge is to make the unknown 
and the uncanny expressible and intelligible against the conditions of its indeterminacy, 
inexpressibility and namelessness, in order to "work out" (Ausarbeitung) angst and 
sufferance. 
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As psychoanalysis and phenomenology have taught us, every representation is 
interpretation. Thus, "what can be interpreted and revealed in discourse" ultimately 
determines the horizon of "what we can consciously know or relate to." In this sense, our 
horizon of meaning and understanding is never without the absence of the un-interpreted. 
It is however the horizon of our feeling that alerts us to the enduring evocations of that 
which has remained un-interpreted and occluded from discourse. "Working out" means 
to uncover and give meaning to the presence of the un-interpreted (the unknown), in 
order to address the angst of the un-interpretable absence (nothingness). To this end, 
interpretation has to unconceal the meaning of the uncanny. For, without interpreting 
(Deutung) what is eerie, there would be no meaning (Bedeutung) for suffering. For 
interpretation to become unconcealment, it has to begin from the process of "critical 
dismantling" (Abbau) of the taken-for-granted habits of thinking in order "to break 
through the conceptual surface" and to retrieve (wieder-holen) the "living roots" of 
meaning (Caputo, 1993:272). Rence, the significance or the adequacy of hermeneutic 
truth claims must properly be evaluated against the meaningful working out of human 
suffering for greater capacity of thinking and feeling, and not against the blind chance. 
By the same token, the objective of this study is to disclose (Erschlossenheit) the 
nameless and the uncanny qualities of chronic pain experience in the discourse of the 
sufferers, and to reveal the condition of their namelessness in the discourse of health 
psychologists. These are two interrelated, but independent interpretive objectives. The 
analysis of the discourse of the sufferers focuses on the evocative references to anxiety 
and pain to reveal the eerie side of their experience; the side that has to be brought back 
to discourse without being ruled out as catastrophizing in advance. Rowever, the 
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analysis of the discourse of health psychologists bears a double significance. For me as 
the author of the study, the discourse of health psychology reflects not only the dominant 
paradigm for clinical management of pain, but also the paradigm in which 1 was initially 
trained as a clinician for dealing with chronic illness and suffering from a 
biopsychosocial perspective. In this manner, reflecting on the discourse of the 
participants is in many ways a self-reflective practice that questions what has shaped the 
very ethos-the habit of thinking and feeling-of my own clinical introduction to pain. 
Hence, the findings of this study are as much about the clinical context in which suffering 
is named for clinicians and patients, as it is about my own introduction to clinical 
management of pain that continues to be the so-called air of our practice. 
As the study includes both chronic pain sufferers and health psychologists, it is a 
two-sided query which can be carried out by a two-fold design. In other word, as two 
distinct but interrelated questions are being investigated, two studies are designed and 
carried out, with two different participant groups. To match the distinct characters of 
each question, the methodological rubric is expanded to gather two different discursive 
materials: 1) projective stories, and 2) semi-structured interview responses. On the other 
hand, to maintain the interconnection between the two studies, their shared conceptual 
frames and interpretive goals are made explicit and their findings are condensed into a 
conclusion that offers insight into how the existing clinical discourse of suffering takes 
stock of the lived experience of chronic pain. In a sense, they conjointly define and 
address the problematic of this study and complement one another to create a unitary 
insight. The findings and insight of this study can be deemed possibly true, if they can 
afford existentially significant interpretations of suffering. That is when the resulting 
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explication (Auslegung) can work out (Ausarbeitung) an understanding (Verstehen) of the 
nameless uncanny (Unheimlich) and the inexpressible unknown (Unbekannt) that has 
been occluded as unrecognizable (Unerkannt) from discourse, but has eerily remained 
vivid in experience of pain. 
In this study, little attempt has been made to arrive at narratized forms through 
consolidation and solidification of elements of experience and discourse. The discourse 
analysis used in this study remains acutely sensitive to the distiction made in literature 
between inchoately lived experience (Erlebnis) and reflectively articulated experience 
(Eifahrung). Although this difference has been defined from diverse angles, it is 
Benjamin's (1968: 155-200) original formulation of these terms that underlies the analysis 
of the present study. He speaks of these two forms of experience as distinct moments of 
a dialectical process in the development everyday psychology of modern subject. In 
short, he defines "inchoately lived experience" as a sequence of disjointed impressions 
with little organization, but with highly felt sensations and feelings that can equally carry 
the poignancy and dullness, the sorrow and joy, and the peace and frenzy of the lived 
event. Inchoately lived experiences are expressed with all the disjointed, extreme and 
contradictory qualities of a felt event. On the other hand, "reflectively articulated 
experience" is the restructured feelings and thoughts of an event that are figured and 
organized out of the initially confused impressions. Such experiences are integrated into 
and recollected as part the person' s accumulated experiential history. Although they 
carry less of those originally felt contradictory qualities, they can be articulated and 
shared with others in a coherent manner, or become the object of further self-reflection. 
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In this sense, in lived expenence it is the event that overtakes the person, while In 
articulated experience it is the person that overtakes the event. 
The distinction between Erfahrung and Erlebnis has been the topic of serious 
reflection in phenomenology. Heidegger (1970) is for the most part responsible for its 
extensive treatment and its complex historical analysis. In contrast, psychoanalytic 
literature has not given this matter due reflection. In one of the rare examples, Thompson 
(2004:21) states: 
The first is the German Erfahrung, which contains the word Fahr, 
meaning "journey." Hence, Erfahrung suggests the notion of temporal 
duration, such as, for example, when one accumulates experience over 
time, including the accruing of wisdom that cornes with old age. The 
other German term for experience is Erlebnis , which derives from the 
word Leben, meaning "life." Hence, the use of the word Erlebnis 
connotes a vital immediacy in contrast to the more historical perspective 
of Erfahrung. When, invoking Erlebnis, the speaker is emphasizing a 
primitive unity that precedes intellectual reflection. 
Thompson points out that in his earliest references to the experience of pain (Unlust), 
Freud (1912) relies on the notion of Erlebnis rather than that of Erfahrung. He marvels 
at the phenomenological emphasis in Freud' s writing, and states, "there are aspects of 
Freud's conception of experience that are surprisingly consistent with Heidegger's and 
compatible with the ontological dimension of human experience." (21) However, 
Freud' s Erlebnis relates to the pain experience engendered by the "underworld" of the 
psyche or that which is strange within us. Ironically, Heidegger is not able to refer to 
experience of what seems as foreign by using Erlebnis (Berman, 1992). Hence, his 
famous phrase "the experience of foreign" reads as die Erfahrung des Fremden, which 
casts strange or alien not as an immediate aspect of the self but as an externality to it. In 
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this sense, Heidegger has turned away from Freud's phenomenological notion of the 
repressed unknown within, to project and externalize an alien without. 
Due to the historical importance of differentiation between Erfahrung and 
Erlebnis, this analysis is careful not to impose cohesion and linearity on the gathered 
discursive material, allowing for the li ved experience of the participant to emerge. In this 
manner, it is the fragmented, incomplete, and impressionistic side or underside of the 
discursive material that is given priority. The analysis deliberately avoids consolidating 
utterances and solidifying interpretation into the sequenced format of progression and 
denouement. To the contrary, the reader is provided large sequences of material and is 
given the opportunity to experience the actual feelings and evocations of the process. 
The aim is obviously to allow the reader experience the brittle apparitions of the uncanny 
that glimmers across the utterances in the course of the interviews and swiftly disappears 
almost as soon as it is intuited. For each set of materials, two different analyses are 
provided: 1) the analysis of each individual interview and 2) the analysis of each item 
across the interviews. Both analyses concentrate on the speech act to show how the 
participants by talking about what they are asked, they speak of "what they feellike" and 
ironically "what they do not feel like saying" emerges without much effort. Depth 
interpretations are not made as the only meaning enfolded in the material, but as a 
possible meaning that can allow the reader discern the unknown in "what suffering pain is 
feH like" and in "how suffering pain is explained." It is through revealing the underside 
of the utterances that the analyses reveal how the participants feel and think about 
suffering and how they define their experience with pain as a personal reality or as a 
clinical entity. 
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The first study investigates the analytic question of the primitive significance of 
anxieties experienced by chronic pain sufferers. For this study, projective testing is used 
as a means of gathering stories that are rich with free associations. These stories provide 
the basic material for a psychoanalytic interpretation that focuses on the experience of 
anxiety and pain. The pm1icipants are three chronic pain patients who are suffering from 
Rheumatoid Arthritis. The data is gathered by recorded interviews that are transcribed as 
a set of narrations. The analysis is based on a grid that allows interpretation of staries 
according to theoretical categories of Kleinian object relation. This study asks whether 
the analysis of the discursive material can meaningfully uncover the primitive 
significance of anxieties associated with the sufferer' s experience of chronic pain. 
The second study is meant to explore how health psychology construes the 
anxieties associated with chronic pain. By the nature of its problematic, this investigation 
falls appropriately within the scope of critical psychology and phenomenological 
research. This study uses a semi-structured interview procedure as a means of gathering 
discursive material that can reflect the participant's professional views and practices. 
The participants are three experienced health psychologists who are in active practice of 
managing pain. The presentation of the material emphasizes the dialogical nature of the 
interviewing process to reflect the spontaneity of the exchange. The material is analyzed 
to show how interview themes are validated or invalidated by various speech acts that 
reflect the professional discourses of health psychology. This study asks whether the 
analysis of the material can meaningfully disclose how the primitive significance of pain­
related anxieties and suffering is concealed in the discourses of health psychology. 
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As aforementioned, the overall problematic of this research necessitates the use of 
a complex two-fold design, and the involvement of two different participant groups. The 
selection procedure for the participant groups was subject to the accessibility and 
availability of the individuals. Hence, it did not fully comply with the conventions of 
random sampling, as required in statistical analysis with an inferential logic for probable 
truth claims (Greenberg, 1951; Harville, 1975; Easterling, 1975; Efron, 1978). However, 
the discourses of a linùted number of participants can still reflect something about pain in 
general, if the analysis can adequately unconceal a possible truth claim at the heart of the 
participants' lived experience. In other word, whereas the quantitative approach ensures 
the representative quality of the sample by its random selection or sampling strategy to 
make probable truth claims, the qualitative approach relies on the richness of the 
participant's lived experience and discourse to uncover a possible truth claim. The 
adequacy of the interpretation is determined based on how methodically the manifest 
content of the material has been worked out to reveal the latent or hidden content without 
doing away with the inchoate lived experience of the pmticipant. As a result, only a 
small number of participants are interviewed in each study to allow for an exhaustive and 
in-depth analysis. A special emphasis has been placed on the repetitive reading and of 
the discursive material to allow the appreciation of its evocative and affective nuance, 
and to void excessive fragmentation, arbitrary sequencing and thematization. 
As there is no ultimate or truly conclusive act of unconcealment, what emerges 
in every instance of interpretation is what can be disclosed through a given subject-object 
relation. In fact, as every interpretive act is limited, it is destined to become eventually a 
new form of concealment that is in need of future interpretations. Hence, the question of 
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generalizability of an interpretation cannot be simply decided by asking how often 
subsequent attempts can literally uncover the same understanding that was once 
unconcealed. To the contrary, it is reasonable to expect that later attempts show an 
interpretive continuity toward the same direction as the one indicated by the earlier 
interpretations. For this research, the primitive symbolism of the body in pain constitutes 
the direction, to which this interpretive study is pointing by investigating the primitive 
significance of suffering and anxiety. Yet, to elaborate meaningfully and self-reflectively 
on the relation between the hidden (latent) and the expressed (manifest) in discourse, this 
study asks not only what is hidden, but also how it is hidden in the greater context of 
clinical practice. 
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CHAPTER3 
Qualitative Study of Suffering in the Discourse of 
Chronic Pain Patients 
3.1. Methodology 
The methodology of this qualitative investigation involves the analysis of stories 
collected by the means of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943). The 
TAT has been used as a research tool, where nuanced material was required for exploring 
implicit aspects of the participants' psychology and inner warld (Morgan and Murray, 
1935; Cramer, 1996). Feelings, conflicts, and phantasies that are not accessible through 
self-report or introspection, are made explicit by interpreting the TAT results (Abrams, 
1999). As a technique of qualitative data gathering, the TAT has a long history of 
application across diverse areas of research. By presenting ambiguous pictorial themes, 
the instrument elicits open-ended narratives from the participants whose staries are as 
much about the image in front of them as about their internai states and private feelings. 
Using Kleinian object relation theory, Brunet (1998) offers a compelling criticism 
of the common rnisapplication of projective tests as a direct keyhole to the unconscious 
primitive content. He questions the cornrnon misapprehension of assuming direct 
correspondence between narrative elements and unconscious phantasy as latent content. 
He reminds clinicians that in the proper analytic sense, the unconscious content does not 
get revealed in a straightforward manner. In fact, it becomes manifest through symbolic 
distOliions that are characteristic of manifest content. Such distortions have to be 
recognized, from the very first step, by any process of interpretation. Presuming a direct 
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correspondence between latent and manifest content can indeed contribute to further 
distortion of psychic material. As a result, if open-ended narrations reflect any latent 
content, such content is complicated by distortions of prinùtive symbolism. In Brunet' s 
view, working through such distortions allows the interpretation to reveal the latent 
content in an idiographic manner that reflects the participant's individuality and unique 
experience. Brunet offers a model that emphasizes three main criteria: 
1- Adnùnistrating the tests in a way that affords greater freedom to the 
participant without much restriction, redirection or interruption; 
2- Analyzing the chain of association within a response-sequence to a picture, as 
well as between response-sequences to pictures 
3- Framing the analysis with an explicit theory of psychic reality, unconscious 
and personality that can delineate anxiety, conflict, object relation, and 
defence mechanisms, as weIl as the ego' S ability for tolerating anxiety, and the 
relation between the superego and the ego. 
As a time-honoured means of accessing latent content, free-association is considered an 
integral part of analytic technique. Using a method of administration and analysis that is 
strongly oriented to the participant's chain of association strengthens the analytic quality 
of the process. In fact, what Brunet suggests makes narration similar to Klein's play 
technique, as it offers the participant unrestrained opportunity to play with elements of 
story telling-themes, plot, characters, setting, and imagery-in order to develop a rich 
chain of association. 
However, in its original sense, the TAT is largely dependent on classical 
psychoanalysis and ego-psychology. As an assessment instrument, it is used to reveal 
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latent material of Oedipal nature to evaluate the basic personality structure and ego 
functioning. ln contrast, KJeinian object-relation emphasizes the pre-Oedipal phantasies, 
and offers an understand the personality from an infantile viewpoint as opposed to the 
Oedipal one. From KJeinian object-relation perspective, it is not the dangerous feelings 
or inhibited desires that are projected, but split aspects of the self and the object­
containing infantile destructive or libidinal impulse-that are projected to create 
persecutory (aIl bad) or idealized (aIl good) part-objects. Hence, projection for KJein is 
far more complex, priITÙtive, and phantasmatic, since together with splitting it form the 
first anxiety position. As a solution to this basic theoretical discrepancy between the 
original TAT interpretation and the Kleinian approach, Casoni and Brunet (1989) have 
suggested a new framework for the purpose of the personality evaluation by the use TAT. 
The author's framework is comprised of an interpretive grid based on KJein's 
metapsychology that emphasizes infantile object relation and anxiety positions. The grid 
contains three basic theoretical categories: 1) anxiety, 2) interpersonal relations, and 3) 
defensive strategies. Casoni and Brunet sub-divide the categories to reflect a hierarchy of 
concepts: 
1­ Anxiety: 
a) Schizoid-Paranoid Anxiety 
b) Depressive Anxiety 
2­ lnterpersonal Relation: 
a) Paranoid-Schizoid Type 
i. Split Part Object 
ii. law of Talion 
iii. Envy 
b) Depressive: 
iv. Whole Object 
v. Ambivalence 
vi. Concern for the übject 
3­ Defensive Strategy: 
a) Schizoid-Paranoid Type: 
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1. Deniai 
11. Splitting
 
Ill. Projective Identification
 
iv. Introjective Identification
 
b) Depressive Type:
 
i. Reparation 
11.	 Manic Defences
 
- Contempt
 
- Control
 
- Triumph
 
The authors test the grid with a sample size of adolescents, and demonstrate the reliability 
of the categories. Based on this grid, Casoni and Brunet offer two scoring procedures. 
The first one is strictly binary established on the presence or absence of a category, 
whereas the second one requires the scorer to judge any present category as playing a 
determinant role, before actual scoring. Obviously, as the authors point out the second 
procedure allows for more interpretive flexibility and makes the process more 
theoretically meaningful. 
Although the grid proposed by Casoni and Brunet shows significant consistency 
in personality evaluation, the purpose of the present study is lirnited to investigating the 
primitive significance of anxiety associated with pain. Bence, a much more focused 
interpretive strategy is needed to trace and interpret such anxieties without extensive 
elaborations of the psychic reality. On the other hand, the absolute distinction between 
anxieties related to pain and characterial anxieties is only of limited import for this study, 
since pain-related anxieties are explored as lived experiences of a person with a character 
and infantile history. In any given situation of distress, the experienced anxiety bears the 
distinct marks of the person' s infantile past, as weil as the particular hue of the actual 
experience of agony. In other words, if what is regarded as anxiety associated with pain 
involves much deeper and infantile dreads, it is the pUl-pose of this analysis to make such 
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dread explicit. As a result, the participants are asked for further elaborations, where they 
use the pictures to speak about pain or about their feelings. Such elaborations not only 
enrich the material, but also render pain and suffering the focal part of the free­
association. 
The stories as open-ended, imaginative narrations contain self-reflective material 
which the analysis uses for the purpose of exploring the shifts in the participants' 
perception and experience. Exploring such shifts can yield phenomenological clues to 
anxieties experienced by the participant at the latent level (Klein, 1955). To this end, the 
categories of the aforementioned interpretive grid are used as a guide for the analysis of 
the stories, and not as a scoring grid. A sma11 sample is chosen to ensure a higher degree 
of depth in the anal ysis. To gather a wider range of associations, the TAT protocol is 
adrninistered in the manner outlined by Brunet (1998). 
3.1.1. Participants 
One male and two female participants, who suffer from chronic aI1hritis pain, take part in 
this study. Rheumatoid arthritis is a disease with a very we11 established pathogenesis 
that can be objectively diagnosed. The three patients were chosen blindly from a pool of 
rheumatology outpatient practice. They were undergoing treatment and clinical 
management of pain for at least 5 years, as they continued to live with their farnilies. 
These participants come from intensive involvement with health psychology for pain 
management as a major aspect of their experience. Hence, they a11 completed at least one 
year of pain management training. 
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This study asks how possible it is for pain patients to experience primitive forms 
of anxiety as part of their suffering. As the research question is not predicated on 
probable truth, the satiation point for the participant group has been set at three to allow 
the in-depth analysis required for uncovering the possible truth. In this manner, greater 
depth in analysis is prioritized in order to meet the interpretive and critical goals of this 
study. 
3.1.2. Instrument 
The Thematic Apperception Test is used as the sole instrument of data gathering. The 
subset recommended for general administration for males and females, as well as for 
young boys and girls was used for this study. This subset includes the most generally 
used items of the test, and it is used across gender and age in every administration. These 
items are identified with numbers without any letters. The Card numbers below identify 
the pictures in the set, while their order reflects that of the actual administration. 
1. Card 1: young boy with violin, 
2. Card 2: a young woman with books in her hand standing in front of a farm 
landscape, 
3. Card 4: a woman holding onto a mans shoulder, 
4. Card 5: a woman opening the door bending into a room from a dark corridor, 
5. Card 10: a woman and man embracing, 
6. Card Il: an ambiguous picture of a rood on top of a rocky cliff, 
7. Card 14: a man opening a window to light from a totally dark space, 
8. Card 15: a man standing in the middle of a graveyard, 
9. Card 19: a house in snow with chimney, 
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10. Card 20: a man standing beneath a street lamp, 
Il. Card 16: a blank cardo 
3.1.3. Procedures 
Participants who initially agreed to the process, were given an interview at their homes 
for administration of the TAT. The participants were asked to take part in a study that 
investigates the relation between pain and emotions. They were given a consent form 
(Appendix 1) prior to the interview, which provided them with written information 
regarding the objective and the use of this study. Each interview was completed within a 
35 to 40-minute period. The interviews emphasized an open and unrestrained approach. 
Elaborations were asked if pain or pain related material is expressed by the participant. 
3.1.4. Data and Analysis 
The data consists of transcribed interview recordings. For the purpose of reflecting finer 
verbal elements, Jefferson' s (1978) dramaturgical notation system was, in part, adopted 
for this study. 
= Sudden beginning or ending 
/ Repetitions 
x: Extension of the preceding sound 
xx Stressing the underlined utterance 
XX Loudly uttered 
(.) Short pause 
(... ) Long pause of at least 2 seconds 
(2) Pauses of specified length 
Skipped part 
[] Added explanations 
The model known as sequential organization was used for presenting the material. This 
model emphasizes the sequence of "adjacency pairs" that are defined as discourses 
exchanged in a given tum between the interviewer and the participant (Schegloff, 1977). 
To capture the interplay between the two interlocutors, every research must set these 
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pairs according to the nature of the interview and the intended analysis. Hence, each 
adjacency pair may include more than one actual conversational turn and involve a set of 
questions and answers. Since this study emphasizes the participants' thematic stories, the 
adjacency pair is defined as the entire presentation of a Card (a pictorial theme), and aU 
the solicited elaborations. The non-lexical expressions such as "Oh" or "Hm," as well as 
pauses and repetitions have been retained to preserve the conversational quality of the 
speech act. 
Each transcript undergoes two initial readings for analysis. The first reading 
identifies all speech acts, which reflect the themes of paranoid-schizoid anxiety or the 
annihilation of the self. The second reading explores the acts, which reflect the theme of 
depressive anxiety or annihilation of the object. The first two readings are intended to 
reveal anxieties for each narrative. The aim is to show how the participants allude to 
pain, as they fluctuate between anxiety positions. To make this fluctuation explicit, the 
result section presents the first and second readings together. In this vein, it becomes 
possible to observe the interplay between the two anxiety positions over pain related 
issues, as the participants presents the stories. The first two readings are within-picture 
interpretation that treats each picture, individually. Finally, the third reading is intended 
to explore the between-picture fluctuation of anxiety, for the three interviews. To this 
end, the third reading retraces each participant's anxiety fluctuation across the cards to 
reveal the actual sequence over the entire process. All the readings are established on the 
interpretive grid introduced by Casoni and Brunet. However, as the aim of this study is 
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not personality assessment, the grid is employed in limited sense, mainly for identifying 
anxiety positions. 
With regard to the question of validity, Giorgi (1975) defines the criterion for 
qualitative research as "whether a reader, adopting the same view point as articulated by 
the researcher can also see what the researcher saw." To satisfy the criterion of validity, 
the reader must be allowed to fully identify the point of view of the researcher. One way 
of facilitating a transparent reading of the researcher's stance is to present the analysis 
from the first-person point of view. Such perspectival clarity is adopted in this research; 
hence the analysis is written from a first-person point of view. In addition, the 
Discussion section presents the interviewer's self-reflective material that was collected as 
part of the journal of research. This practice will allow for an added transparency with 
regard to the author's stance and reactions during the interview and through the process 
of analysis. 
3.2. Analysis and Results 
3.2.1. First Interview-First and Second Readings
 
The first participant is a female patient in her late 40's. Ms. A has been living with her
 
husband, for more than 20 years. They have two children. Her son lives on his own,
 
while her younger daughter is still living at home and works part-time to finish college.
 
Ms. A is a practicing, religious person. Her home reflects her faith; it is adorn with
 
commonly known religious icons. Ms. A has college education. Before being disabled
 
by her chronic pain, she was working for a community organization. Before we begin,
 
she reminisces of her work and life before arthritis with mixed feelings of joy and sorrow.
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As she describes her pain and her ordeal, her mood becomes sombre and her emotions 
visibly change. She finds herself useless to her family and friends, and sees her body as 
incapacitated by uncontrollable pain. l started with the first cardo 
I: l am going to show you sorne pictures, one at a time. You can 
make up a story as dramatic as possible about the picture. Tell what has 
led up to the event in the picture and explain what is happening, what the 
characters may feel, and finally what is going to happen. Speak your 
thoughts as they come to you. You can make the story as elaborate as you 
want. Now, l will show you the first one and you can begin. 
P: Okay. The person is looking at a violin that is calling him, and he 
is very discouraged, very sad. l don't know what about! He doesn't quite 
know what to think of it, what to do with it because he's feeling sad. The 
violin is just sitting there in front of him and he looks as if he knows what 
to do. But he can't do anything with ... [crying]. 
I: He cannot do anything? 
P: He gets pretty discouraged. It is awful for him. It is like under his 
sad stare the violin is melting. 
The depressive feeling is immediately revealed in the boy which is identified as being 
"very discouraged and very sad" in front of the violin. The violin as the object was seen 
as "calling him." She referred to the figure in the picture not as a boy or a child, but as 
"the person," which makes the figure more adult-like and less distant from her own age. 
The ego and the object were presented as the child and the violin. Despite knowing what 
to do, the ego is helpless in front of the object. The ego feels being beseeched by the 
object, however, is too overwhelmed to respond. Under the "sad stare" of the helpless 
ego, the object (violin) "is melting." The ego feels guilty for failing the object, and the 
object is melting as a result. The depressive anxiety is prominent. 
I: What can you make up about picture number 2? 
P: A man is working his field and, on the farm, and he is (.), and it 
looks like a lady is watching him and the girl is standing beside, or in front 
of them, looks like she's ready to go to school and they're all just kind of 
standing there and the man is holding his hand out and l see a horse in the 
background too. l'm not quite sure what they're going to do maybe they're 
off sitting and waiting for nice weather or something like that, you can't 
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tell from this picture what is going on. The lady is just kind of standing 
there looking as if nothing can be done, or else just waiting for something 
to happen. The girl too, is looking and waiting for something. There are 
several buildings in the background and trees and they're ail sort of 
looking the same direction except the girl is looking away. 
Her narration began from the figures in the background (a man working in the field and a 
lady watching him), and moved to the one in the forefront (the girl). Feelings of 
helplessness are again repeated. "Not knowing what to do" is reiterated. The figures in 
the picture are described not as interacting with one another, but as disconnected. She 
cannot find a story that can connect the elements. The loss of ability to maintain 
gratifying object-relation is quite evident, as her discourse reflects disjointedness of 
elements. She did not e1aborate on the girl in the forefront. The girl (which may 
represent herself or her daughter) is described as wanting to go to school. Yet, a sense of 
waiting for something to happen, sorne unknown doom, has replaced hope, and reflects 
the ego's deeper anxiety. She noted that the girl does not look in the same direction as 
the other characters in the background. A sense of conflict becomes more obvious at this 
point. The anxiety is changing, although it is not yet crystallized. Yet, there are signs of 
"waiting for sorne thing to happen" that signifies a threat of paranoid nature. 
1: Picture number 3, what do you rnake up? 
P: A husband and wife, possibly, friends maybe. Looks like he's 
going away [crying aloud] 
1: You cry, is this reminding you of something? 
P: Yes, rerrtinds me of my relationships. 
1: Your relationships? 
P: My chronic pain involves my husband too. 
1: Ummhmm and how is he reacting to you? 
P: He's quite angry at tirnes. 
1: Angry with you? 
P: l don't think with me but just with the situation that he is into. 
1: How about you, how do you feel about your relationship? 
P: Weil l feellike, like l spent a lot of time just looking after me and 
so it feels as if l can't give a whole lot in rny relationships. 
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1: How bad is your pain? 
P: It's very bad sorne days. It seems to be ail that l can think of sorne 
days. 
In this exchange, she quickly switches to her own life. The depressive anxiety becornes 
clearly manifest, as her fear of losing the object is expressed. Pain diminishes her 
capacity to care for the object. She feels rather guilty for focusing on herself and not 
being able to tend to her relationship. As the ego feels withdrawing from and losing 
ground with the object, the object appears as damaged and hurt. She, however, manages 
to deflect this anger from herself to the situation. The anxiety is depressive and her 
reference is to her own life. 
1: What you can make up for Card number 4? 
P: This lady is opening the door into a new room, or into a room with 
flowers and lamp and books, looks like she's having trouble walking into 
the room. She's kind of stooped over, maybe afraid to go into the room? 
Almost looks as if she's trying to look what's in there first before she goes 
in ... to see if it's a place she'd like to be. She is scared of something 
1: Is she afraid of going in? 
P: It looks like it, yeah. l can say she is pretty scared, l can't say of 
what though. What ever it is, it must be quite scary. She is going from a 
safe place into where she can expect harm. 
She starts revealing signs of paranoid-schizoid anxiety. Splitting and projective-
identification has divided the scene into safe and unsafe places. The character is moving 
with apprehension into the unsafe zone. She talks about the scary harm that looms on the 
other side. Projection of the aggressive impulse makes the other side dangerous and 
threatening. The figure in the picture is intent on going in, but is stopped motionless, 
stooping over to examine the threat. The splitting ailows the figure to stand at the 
threshold, with her back to safety to peer at the other side. Splitting marks the paranoid­
schizoid position. It provides the ego with a sense of safety at the onslaught of terrifying 
threat. 
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I: What can you make up for Card 5? 
P: Two people showing each other that they care about each other (.) 
that they love each other. Both of them, l think look like they are 
comfortable (.) happy to be there. The woman is scared from something 
and is seeking the embrace the man. It makes her feel safe. But, she is not 
sure at the same time may be what scared her can snatch her away. l don't 
know. May be she can't trust the man who is holding her. May be she is 
in pain. She must have pain. 
1: What about pain? 
P: Pain takes her away from everything ( ... ). It is, it makes fear 
things. 
Hel' narration reflects what she describes as fear of being snatched away, which 
constitutes a paranoid-schizoid anxiety. The threat of being taken is persecutory. The 
ego feels that the good object, no longer offers a comforting shield (i.e., "may be she 
can't trust the man who is holding her"). Hel' final reference clearly indicates how she 
experiences pain as a concrete force that can take her over, and snatch her away. The 
pain is described as taking on a persecutory character. 
1: What can you make up for Card 6? 
P: This looks like a lot of confusion (.) a lot of rocks on the road or (.) 
yeah it looks like rocks on the road. Ifs a little hard to see what's (.) 
exactly what there is there. (.. ) Maybe a bird, maybe an insect of sorne 
kind. It can be road, a dangerous one. Doesn't look like anybody could 
get through this road, if that is a road (.) doesn't look like anybody will be 
able to get through there at aIl.. ...Looks confused, confusion. 
1: Confusion? 
P: Umhumm: (10) [looks scared] 
She perceives the picture as confused. She sees something that can be a bird or an insect, 
but she identifies a dangerously untraceable path on the edge of the precipice. The 
splitting between a bird and an insect, and the dangerous road ahead are elements that 
symbolize her paranoid-schizoid anxiety. She feels anxious to the point of confusion, as 
shown by repeated pauses and by her fidgeting. Finally, she falls into a lO-second-long 
179 
pause that mutes her narration. Silence replaces the linking of ideas and words. l waited 
before introducing the next cardo 
1: How about Card 7? 
P: Ifs very confused (2) would be (2) take a lot of effort to get 
through. There's a lot of scary darkness there with a little bit of light as the 
person is looking out a window, it looks like(.) a bit of a window with 
darkness aIl around. Looks like the person is looking for the light and has 
tried to open a window. He is desperate for the light [scared]. 
1: Seems you are becoming emotional. What are you feeling? 
P: [crying] Sometimes that's how l feel, there is not a lot of hope (3) 
there is a lot of darkness. 
1: Where is this darkness? 
P: Around me! 
1: Where does this darkness come from? 
P: From the pain and not being able to see my way through it except 
sometimes there is a little bit of light, maybe a new pill or something that 
the doctor can give me that helps me a little bit. Uhh (.) maybe, ifs just 
feeling a little bit better sorne days (.) gives a little bit of light...a little bit 
ofhope. 
She describes a man surrounded by menacing darkness with nothing more than a small 
window of light, and a sense of desperateness. Then, she turns her attention to her own 
situation and recognizes the darkness that she is in, because of her pain. Like the man in 
the picture, she is caught in a "scary darkness" that signifies her own paranoid-schizoid 
anxiety. The ego can take refuge from this scary darkness to the power of "a little" pill 
that is less than ideal. The good object is failing and paranoid fears of pain as scary 
darkness are consuming. Her voice resonates tension. 
1: What can you make up for Card 8? 
P: Now! This looks like a graveyard (2) with somebody standing over 
it. It could be a sign of total loss of control. l suppose it could also be a 
sign of taking control of a life. 
1: Taking control in front of what? 
P: In front of the pain, l think. 
1: Is this man in pain? 
P: Doesn't look to be in terrible pain, maybe sorne. He has his back 
hunched, he's (2) yeah he might feel a little pain. But he's sort of looking 
at gravestones there, possibly thinking of life and death. 
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1: Life and death? 
P: Well sometimes 1 (.) sometimes l'm happy to be able to do the 
things 1 cano Sometimes 1 wonder what l'm worth. Whether my life is 
worth anything or not. [crying] 
1: So you find yourself questioning life? 
P: Yes 1 do. 1 want to have a positive look on life because that's the 
kind of person l've always been. And 1 want to fight that pain, to fight 
that, that is overtaking me. 
Her initial reflection on "loss of control" in a graveyard, later on, reveals to be about pain 
as a force that can overtake and destroy her life. Hel' paranoid-schizoid anxiety is still 
strong. She wonders about the fundamental duality of life and death, and reflects on her 
life after pain. As she reflects on her loss, she feels the pain snatching her life away. The 
force "that is overtaking" reveals her paranoid-schizoid anxiety of annihilation. 
1: What about Card 9? 
P: That looks like a house in the middle of a snowstorm (.) with light 
in the window. There is sorne black in there l'm not sure what that looks 
like but (.) what that is. Darkness, part of darkness, 1 guess. 
1: What does this darkness remind you of? 
P: This darkness reminds me of sorne of the pain that 1 have, the 
darkness that 1 experience with my pain. And (2)/and yet there is also the 
lightness in the whole thing, that 1 sometimes think 1 feel that way.. .1 feel 
dark but then the next time 1 feellike things aren't so bad. And even when 
the storm is there 1 still feel hopeful sometimes. That life is good. 
She struggles with integrating the darkness and light, and maintain an integrated 
wholeness. Pain is the darkness, at least in part, and there is the light and the hope that 
she tries to integrate. However, she cannot bear the integration and the depressive 
anxiety. She resorts to reassuring herself that life is good. There are attempts toward 
reparation and restoration. 
1: What about Card 10? 
P: This looks like a person standing out in the evening. When things 
are dark all around and canOt see very well in the night. But there is the 
light of the lamppost still shining there. That's how a person feels a little 
bit of light coming over them. CanOt see too well, 'cause it still is dark in 
the distance. The person is just standing there, part of his face can show 
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and part of it is dark. Looks like he is just hunched over in a way (2) a 
little bit there, hands in his pockets. 
1: What do you think he feels in that darkness? 
P: He couId just be enjoying the darkness, enjoying being outside and 
(.) having a walk. He could feel unhappy...he could feel sad, rejected. 
1: Rejected? 
P: Rejected. Yeah that could be how he wou Id feel. 
Hel' attitude to darkness shows a marked change. She no longer sees it as purely scary 
and menacing. She is hopeful that the darkness can be illuminated no matter how faintly 
and even enjoyed. There is an attempt to reintegrate darkness with light, however she 
quickly reverts, and reveals her vulnerability, as that of being rejected and abandoned in 
darkness. ln effect, although the initial reintegration helps assuage paranoid-schizoid 
anxiety, the depressive anxiety regarding a damaged object seems to be emerging. 
1: See what you can see on this blank cardo Imagine sorne picture 
there and describe it in detail. Now look at it and imagine something. 
P: Oh boy. It's a whole new way to look at things (.) a blank page. 
1: You seem getting emotional now. 
P: Yeah, 1 guess it leave you thinking that there are different ways of 
looking at things. 1 could see it as a whole new way of living. 
1: Do you want to give a story for it? 
P: 1 couId see myself as being free of pain, being able to do all the 
things 1 used to do, like shopping, going for walks, doing my work at work 
and at home, being able to socialize with people (.) just being able to do 
the things that 1 would like to do (.) a whole new page of life. 
At this moment, the ego desperately looks for an abundance of light In the sea of 
darkness. Things are suddenly described as bright with no sign of gloom anywhere. The 
denial has managed to supplant the all-pervasive darkness. DeniaI seems holding sway to 
dispel dread. The white page has provided a blank or an erased slate to be recomposed 
omnipotently. 
3.2.2. Second lnterview-First and Second Readings 
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The second participant is a female patient in her late 60's. For more than 25 years, Ms. B 
has been living with her husband, with whom she has two children. She has two sons 
from an earlier marriage. At the present, aIl her children are living away fram home. 
Ms. A's husband suffers from a chronic health condition of his own. Despite her arthritis 
pain, Ms. B still manages to work part-time. As she and her husband are both ill, her 
home shows signs of a distressed life. It seems she does not receive enough help to 
manage the situation at home, with her husband. Ms. B has high-school education. l 
started with the first card, after few background questions. 
I: What do you make of Picture Number 1: 
P: He looks really sad. 
I: Who looks really sad? 
P: The little boy (... ) looks like he might have pain on the side of his 
head (...) on either side of his head. There is something wrang with his 
mouth, looks like he might have been hit, hit hard, or something aching in 
his mouth. His eyes are droopy, maybe from pain, or from being scared. 
Ms. B's description emphasized sad and unhappy feelings which she associated with 
pam. Hel' references to an aching mouth and to being hit or "hit hard" are both 
significant. She talks about "droopy" and "scared eyes." The ego obviously associates 
suffering fram pain with being battered, or being subjected to aggression. In effect, the 
anxiety is over pain as concrete aggression, and has a persecutory quality. 
I: Card Number 2 
P: Um:, (... ) Am l supposed to relate pain to this picture or just 
anything [tense voice]. 
She seemed suddenly confused, as to what she must be doing. It looked as though she 
wanted to make sure that she understood the process correctly, or that she has said the 
right thing. However, her body language revealed sorne ambivalence regarding the 
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process. Her voice sounded tense. The open-ended storytelling induced strong anxieties 
and made her feel vulnerable at the onset. 
1: You can tell me a story about this picture, using yom imagination, 
and make it as dramatic as possible, regarding what you see. 
P: WeB, there's a young girl with books, she must like to read. 
There's a lady that looks like she's pregnant. Ummm, there's a young man 
with a horse, maybe ploughing a field or doing something in the field (2). 
1: What do you think that girl feels? 
P: Ummmm, sad maybe. 
1: Why do you think she's sad? 
P: She's not srniling. She's either sad or deep in thought. That's 
worrying her. 1 don't see any pain there but something is rnissing in her 
life. she's deep in thought. Looks like he might be angry, the man behind 
her in the farm is angry with her. 
Her description begins from the forefront and moves to the background. Her narration 
offers very little story teBing to connect the figures and elements together. A pregnant 
woman and a young man are identified in the background. The background figures are 
split between a motherly character and an angry young man ploughing the earth. The 
man is angry with the studious girl in the foreground who is described as sad and worried 
over missing something, which alludes to depressive feelings over loss. As the story 
lacks a coherent plot so the ego feels unable to maintain whole-object relation, while the 
reference to something missing reflects anxiety for the object. The ego is struggling to 
integrate an active, angry side and a passive, motherly one. The anxiety is markedly 
depressive, but there is a great deal of instability and ambivalence in her narration. 
1: Card 3 
P: God! Angry again. 
1: Who is angry? 
P: The man (..,) looks like he's angry. The woman is trying to talk to 
him. Looks like he's trying to turn away or he's turned away from her. He 
looks angry. 
1: Does he look angry? 
P: Um-hmm, very much. 
1: How do you think the woman feels? 
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P: Concerned. She's concerned, looks like she's concerned about him, 
wondering why he isn't more considerate, wants him listen to her maybe. 
1: You think he is not listening to her? 
P: Ummm - he's wanting to pull away from her anyway. That's about 
ail l can see on that. 
The ego is dealing with an object that is seething with anger and threatens to leave. The 
rejection and abandonment seems inuninent. Unable to restore and repair the object, the 
ego is anxious over the well-being of the object, and about the pending loss. Being 
abandoned by an angry and damaged object alludes to the depressive anxiety. 
1: Picture 4 
P: There's a lady checking on something that's in the room, or (.) 
looking at something, doesn't look like she's gonna come in, she's either 
talking to someone, gonna talk to somebody, she's looking at something in 
the room, something painful. 
1: Is she seeing something in the room? 
P: Looks like it. 
1: What do you think she's seeing? 
P: She's not happy about what she's seeing. 
1: She's not happy? 
P: No. Not at ail 
1: How unhappy is she? 
P: She looks what rd say, disgusted. 
1: Disgusted? 
P: Maybe, or concerned a lot. Yeah, you could look like that if you 
were just concerned, she doesn't look startled, l don't think...no l wouldn't 
think she's startled. She's not happy, more like disgusted. 
The ego is standing at the threshold that splits the good from bad, and is peering at a 
nameless entity, both painful and disgusting. On the other side of the threshold, there is 
the bad object that causes pain, revulsion and unhappiness. Splitting shapes the core 
elements of the narration, and alludes to paranoid-schizoid anxiety. Pain is associated 
with the threats of the bad object. 
1: Picture Number 5 
P: They look like they're resting (...) peaceful. Sleeping? 
1: The two couples? 
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P: They're a couple (.) yeah. They look like they might love each 
other (... ) really care for each other. Yeah. 
1: What do you think the man feels? 
P: Umm, concerned maybe, he cares (.) and feels. He feels 
something, like he cares. l don't know whether it is sad or maybe sad, l 
don't know, maybe relaxed, loved, 1don't know. 
1: How do you think the woman feels? 
P: Looks like the same way. Really concerned. Caring for each other. 
1: What do you think she's concerned about, that woman? 
P: The man. They're concerned about each other, l think. Feelings 
for each other. 
She talks about the couple being relaxed and caring, in each other arms. But, the words, 
sad and concerned, were repeated as the undertone of the narration. The ego seems 
yearning for fusion with an all-caring object, as the man is described. There is total bliss 
with an idealized object, free from any anxiety. The concern for the object clearly marks 
the situation as depressive anxiety. 
1: Picture Number 6. 
P: What in the world is that? 1 don't know what that is. 1 either can't 
see or, is it a bug? No, must be on the side of a mountain somewhere, 
anyway rocks and cliff, a dangerous and steep cliff. 
1: What do you see on the cliff? 
P: 1 don't know what that is, looks like a bug, 1 don't know. And this 
looks like a snakehead coming out of the rock. 1 can see eyes, can't be a 
snake, maybe a dragon. No, it hasn't got a head for a dragon. 1 don't 
know, looks like a bug on this side here. The other side looks like sorne 
kind of monster. 
1: Monster? 
P: Yeah. 
1: What do you think this monster is about? 
P: 1 don't know, somebody's imagination l guess or maybe a creature 
from a long time ago, or something that is interested in whatever's on the 
rock, a bug or whatever. 
1: Umhmm. 
P: It does look vicious. 
1: Doesn't? 
P: No. It does. Whatever's there, they are two and looks like they're 
watching each other very carefuIly. 
1: Why do you think they watch each other? 
P: l don't know. It is just looks like that's what they're doing. Ummm 
they're kind of facing each other, l think. l can't tell what that bug or 
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whatever is there watching. 1 can't tell which end is looking. It could be 
watching somebody, could be that it, that his head is at the other end and 
that he's watchin' him that he's okay, could be that. 
1: Urnhumm 
P: 1 would like to know what you think that picture is [tense voice]. 
1: 1 can tell you after the session, now you can tell me what you see. 
P: Okay. 
1: Is that important for you to know what 1 think? 
P: Yes, this thing is just like my pain. The whole thing, it is rough 
like the rocks and vicious like those monsters. Sometimes is dark, hazy. 1 
don't know, but 1can feel it even now. 
She names a number of terrifying creatures, from monsters to snakeheads, and makes it 
clear that what she is describing is vicious. Her narration identifies two monsters that are 
carefully watching one another. She reveals a world occupied by bizarre creatures. 
Being terrified, she tries to recruit me and solicits my explanation and advice. As 
anxieties of paranoid-schizoid position come to the surface, her voice becomes tense. 
Then, suddenly, aIl the aforementioned horror becomes a portrait of her own pain as 
concrete monstrosity, hard and vicious. 
1: What do you think about this picture? Can you tell a story? 
Picture Number 7. 
P: WeIl, ifs a dark room and uhh, a man 1 would say is looking out 
the open window into daylight. He's umm, looks peaceful, is lookin' at 
kind of like maybe he's take off in thought. 
1: Why do you think it is so dark there? 
P: Maybe (...) maybe he's locked up (.... ) he can't get out (...) he's up 
real high and can't get out. 
1: You said maybe he's locked up? 
P: Yeah. If he was up high he'd be locked up and they don't give him 
any light. Yeah, this room has only, 1 don't know (.) only has one window 
maybe and there should be light in the room, though only if the window is 
open. 1 don't know (... ) So, it must have something to do with the way he 
feels maybe. 
1: What do you think he feels? 
P: Maybe he's in pain. 
1: Maybe he's in pain? How bad is he in pain? 
P: Really bad pain. He's locked up in darkness and scared. 
1: So how can this darkness be explained? 
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P: Weil, if it's because of pain he has no life at ail if it's like that, like 
as if it's dark, black, dreary, suffocating. Locked up and strangled in 
darkness. [her voice is tense] 
Her narration begins with the entrapment of the man in the picture. As pain is 
introduced, her account becomes more persona!. The ego feels entrapped in a dreary and 
suffocating darkness. The darkness of pain is "strangling," with little way out. The 
anxiety of annihilation is presented as images of pain associated with a death, as terrible 
as suffocation by strangling. These are concrete forms of aggressive attacks that are lived 
as part of pain experience. 
1: Picture Number 8, what can you make up? 
P: Oh man, l don't know. l don't know. Funny looking thing, ha, ha, 
whatever it is. [dismissive tone] l don't know. Hands look sore. Not 
happy whatever it is, it's not happy. 
I: Why is it not happy? 
P: He wants to die maybe. Everywhere, he's around a bunch of 
tombstones and dead stuff. Maybe he doesn't want to live anymore. 
I: Why? 
P: Cause he's in probably so much pain, that doesn't look very good. 
Looks like he's really, something is really wrong. The arms are together 
like there's no where to go. 
I: What feeling does this give you? 
P: Sad, lonely, really, really sad, upset.. .lonely. 
She starts by trying to make light of death (a funny looking thing). Then, she 
acknowledges soreness and unhappiness. Suddenly, her mention of suicide reveals the 
nature of her anxiety. The ego confronts much guilt. The 10ss is described as pervasive 
(tombstones are everywhere). Losses, caused by pain, are making the ego feel 
sUITounded by dead objects, for which the ego feels responsible. Life is "sad, lonely, 
really, really sad, upset" under the spell of pain. Pain experience has brought to present 
depressive anxieties. 
I: Picture Number 9 
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P: 1 don't know (... ) looks like a grey winter (... ) Um, 1 don't know 
(... ) seems a little house, maybe. 1 don 't know (... ) seems a little house 
covered by snow, lots of snow, maybe lots of snow and ice. Lights are on 
in the house maybe and ifs warm. Not sure if it's cozy. 1 don't know. It 
seems like a warm house in the rrùddle of ice, snow, and grey cold. 
1: Who do you think lives in this house? 
P: Eskimo (... )1 don't know. Looks like there's lots of ice and 
snow...must be Eskimo. Man, woman, happy 1 would think. It looks like 
somebody would be happy in there, maybe cozy. 
Under depressive anxiety, the ego feels surrounded by grey winter cold. There is a little 
house with light. Yet, she is not quite certain, if it is a warm and cozy place. The 
scepticism about warmth in the rrùddle of ice and snow implies the ego's concern about 
the internaI object. Psychic reality is grey, cold, and icy. The expression, "1 do not 
know," punctuates every sentence. The ego seems caught in irreparable loss and 
depressive anxiety. 
1: Picture Number 10 
P: Looks like it might be an elderly man sitting there. 1 don't know 
what he's sitting on.... hunched over, yeah, a hydro pole, telephone wire or 
power wires, raining, dark. 
1: How is he feeling? 
P: Sad. He's up high, 1 think. He's up high somewhere. He's alone, 
sad. 
1: Where is he up high? 
P: 1 don't know (...) it seems, looks like he might be on a high hill or 
something, or on top of something. 
1: Why do people get up high? 
P: 1 don't know. 1 don't know, maybe he's gonna jump somewhere or 
jump down. 
1: Do you have any idea where? 
P: No. 1 don't know. Maybe there's an edge (... ) there could be an 
edge that he could jump off. Or (... ) uhh 1 don't know. l'm not very good 
at this. 
Her depressive anxiety becomes evident as she talks about suicide. She never mentions 
it, directly. She alludes to it as "jumping off." There is a sense of helpless with utter 
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despair and sadness that is consuming the whole story. She finds herself not being able 
to go much further, and stops. 
1: In this part, l'm showing you a card, you can look at it and use yom 
imagination and make up whatever cornes to you. There is not much on 
this Card - Number Il 
P: There's nothing on that cardo Like, 1 don't know what to say (...) 
there's nothing on that card, it's blank (tense voice). 
1: What does it make you feel or think? 
P: 1 don't know (... ) couId draw something on there or write 
something on there or it's a clean piece of paper. 1 don't know what to say. 
It is empty, it is nothing (tense voice). 
1: WouId the emptiness make you think something particular? 
P: Empty....yeah. Probably an empty feeling when you have so much 
pain and you get to feel that way lots, like there's nothing, only emptiness 
like death. 1 don't know. 
1: Empty feeling when you have pain? 
P: Ummm! (2) yeah, 1 guess. 
1: What does that emptiness make one feel then? 
P: Weil either, 1 don't know (.) you fight for to try and get help in 
every corner and when you're still having pain then you don't know what's 
going to happen to YOU. But it's a scary feeling, quite scary actually like 
being taken, like being attacked. 
Initially, she sees emptiness and blank as a space to be filled and made up for. The 
tension in her voice gives away her anxiety. She, then, reveals the other meaning of 
emptiness as a death-like void, left by pain. In that emptiness, the ego feels as though 
being "attacked and taken." The anxiety of annihilation resurfaces, as the threat to the 
object disappears into the threat to the ego. 
3.2.3. Third Interview-First and Second Readings 
The third participant is a male patient in his late 40's. Mf. Chas been living with his 
wife and three kids, for about 15 years. Despite his arthritis pain, Mr. C does everything 
to maintain an active lifestyle. He still works part-time. Mr. Chas college education. 
He is a farmer with many skills, who needs his physical strength for his work. But, he 
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finds himself unable to do what he knows best, the farm work. 1 started with the first 
cardo 
1: Card Number One 
P: Well this guy looks like he is being forced to do something he 
doesn't want to do (.) like practice his violin. Umm, he looks like he'd 
rather be outside playing somewhere, perhaps that's what is going on, his 
parents have caught him outside or went and fetched him from outside 
playing with his friends and forced him to come in and practice his violin 
and he's not really happy about it, by the looks of things (.) looks like he's 
bored stiff to be honest with you. Umm 1 think he's wishing he was 
somewhere else. 
He describes the child in the picture a "guy" in front of something that he does not want, 
but is obliged to do. Being controlled by the object to the point of helplessness is what 
the narration implies. At the same time, there are feelings of contempt for the object and 
its demands ("he's wishing he was somewhere else"). There is a sense of punishment 
imposed on the child by the controlling parents. The ego feels punished and forced into 
being bored stiff by the punishing object. 
1: Card Number Two 
P: 1 don't know. That girl looks like she's on her way with the books 
in her hand, on the way to school, or to the library or something and she's 
looking at her family and how hard they have to work and struggle to 
make ends meet and she's putting in as much effort and work as she can to 
maybe make her life a little bit better. Maybe for her children. Umm, 
maybe for her family too. Uh, she's hoping for better things in the future, 
1 think 
1: How do you think she is feeling or thinking about the future? 
P: 1 think she's fearful of it, and optimistic. 
1: Can you tell me why she's fearful? 
P: That she might not accomplish what she wants to accomplish. 
1: What is she optimistic about? 
P: She may also accomplish it. 
Mr. C begins from the forefront and moves to the background figures. He relates a story 
that connects the elements together. However, his narration makes little reference to the 
figures in the background. The description of the girl's motive changes course from that 
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of being controlled by the demands of the object, to the one of dutY and honour toward 
others (the object). This change of course allows the ego to avoid aggression toward the 
object, and to evade the ensuing guilt. The ego is ambivalent about the object and 
struggles with possibility of integration and reparation (fearful and optimistic). 
1: Picture Number 3 
P: Umm, Jeez, 1 don't know. This guy looks like he's distracted by 
something. Umm, his wife or girlfriend who's maybe trying to stop him 
from doing something that he maybe shouldn't do, or maybe make him 
stay and he wants to go someplace else or do something she doesn't want 
him to do, or is risky to do. Really don't know. He looks intent on 
something out of the picture, it could be anything. Could be sorne place 
he wants to go. 
1: Can you tell me where he wants to go. 
P: He's got something he needs to do. He's got a job, to do or, it 
could be, it looks like they might be in a lounge or something, there's 
people in the background. Uh maybe someone has angered him and she's 
trying to stop him from, escalating the situation or (2) or maybe he's just 
gotta go somewhere and do something, something like a fight that scares 
her, or (.) anything like that 1 guess, 1 don't know, for sure. 
1: You talked about her, the woman, being scared and his being 
angry. How do you see these two things related? 
P: WeIl, she may be fearful he may get hUit and maybe his temper 
doesn't allow him to think about those things. 
The conflict in the picture confuses him, as he keeps repeating "1 don't know." What he 
describes as happening between the couple symbolizes two intrapsychic dynamics. First, 
the ego feels split between love (the woman) and hate (the man). The love struggles for 
safety, where aggression is a threat. Second, the bad object as the nameless "it" ("it 
could be anything") both angers and threatens the ego. ln describing the man, he first 
refers to having to do a job, but then calls it anger. He moves from neutralization to 
aggression. Splitting and the struggle for control under grave threat reveal the paranoid­
schizoid anxiety of the ego. 
1: Picture Number 4 
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P: Urrun. l'm not sure what this woman is up to. She looks like she is 
checking rooms for something; maybe she's checking on a child that's 
supposed to be doing sorne homework or something. Or she's just making 
sure that the curtains are drawn and the lights are out. Its' bedtime and 
she's on her way to bed or something. And (... ) she just, 1 think is looking 
around to ensure all's well before she retires for the evening. Just the 
opinion 1 get from that picture and her face. 
I: Does her face tell you something? 
P: She looks tired. (2) Urrun (2) not really worried, just tired. 
I: Not really worried? 
P: Not really. There might be a little bit of worry around her eyes but 
she's just making sure everything's' okay before she tums in. She's more 
tired 1 think, than anything. 
I: You think when she retires she goes to sleep, she will have a good 
sleep? a good day? She has finished her day? 
P: 1 think so. 1 think so (...) she's tired from either getting something 
accomplished or doing something constructive that day. Not much else 
makes you tired (...) that kind of tired. 
The woman is "checking on a child that is supposed to do home work" or "just makes 
sure that the curtains are drawn and the lights are out." The object seems to be both 
caring and controlling. However, the narration focuses on the all-caring object and 
describes an absence of fear, threat, and sadness. Suddenly, everything is described in 
much positive light with only a tinge of worry, which he does not specify. The ego is 
ambivalent toward the object. Depressive anxiety is evident. 
I: Picture Number 5 
P: Urrun. 1 think these two people have been together for quite sorne 
time and uh, they love each other very much. And he's telling her so, 1 
think (2) probably not something he does much. That's the feeling 1 get 
from that one. 
1: What do you think the man feels for this woman? 
P: 1 think he loves her very much. 
I: Why he does not say that often? 
P: He doesn't know why, he is not good in that sort of things and he 
feels sad. 
1: Is she accepting it? 
P: Yeso Yes she is. Like 1 say she wants to hear it, 1 think they've 
been together a long time. 
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He relates a man that feels not quite able to satisfy the demand of his beloved, when it 
means expressing his love for her. Mr. C, to reassure himself about the durability of the 
relationship, keeps reiterating that the couple have been together for a long time. There is 
a desire to deny what might be a damaged object and the possibility of loss. He talks 
about not being good at fulfilling the wishes of the object and feeling sad about it. This 
alludes to an undertone of depressive anxiety. 
l: Picture Number 6 
P: 1can't really see what that is. Umm, H looks like sorne kind of a 
trail across a gorge in the mountains or something. Looks like there is a 
line of people on the trail. 1can't really make out what is in the front 
there. Looks like somebody struggling with an animal or something, that's 
stubborn, doesn't want to go, like my pain. l'm not really sure. Maybe, 
uh, maybe reminds me of pictures 1 seen in the Yukon of the gold I1lsh 
where there were many people goin', searching for their fortune (.) and 
they were just lined up, one after the other. Goin' looking' for something. 
1: You think they are going to get to the gold, when something 
stubborn like your pain is standing in their way 
P: Most don't. Most work in vain and in pain, but the odd person 
does make it and that's what driving ail of them. They ail want to be that 
one person that does find their fortune. 
l: How about the gold? What do you think about that gold? 
P: Weil 1 think the trip has been made many, many times because 
somebody has built a bridge and made a road. Umm: 1 think this is 
something that is like a quest or a journey that many people have made (.) 
over many, many years. 
1: How safe is it? 
P: Doesn't look very safe. It's a rather perilous, painfui journey by the 
looks of it. The road is narrow, there is loose rock, there is ah 1 would say 
it's the road less traveled. 
1: What would you do if you were on a road or a path that is less 
traveled and you have to go through it? 
P: Weil, you plan ahead as far as you can and you watch your step. 
You make sure that every step you make is a safe one. 
l: What happens if a step is missed? 
P: Weil then, there are going to be consequences, what kind 1 don't 
know (.) you have to be ready for anything. To be on your guard 1 guess. 
l: How deep do you think the gorge is? 
P: H's deep enough that if you fell, you wouldn't know it when you hit 
the bottom. 
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Struggle with bizarre creatures, and a sense of strife with impersonal forces of misfortune 
and brute nature (persecutory objects) shape this narration. The anxiety is over the 
annihilation of the self, in a world that few can make it, on a path that is less traveled, and 
in a quest that is too risky. ln this world, many toil in vain, bearing a stubborn pain (it 
doesn 't go away) that is not unlike his own. The over-toiled people of this story land can 
only hope to be that odd one who makes it (the idealized object). Yet, every rnistake is 
fatal and every threat is so serious that has to be anticipated we1l in advance. He manages 
not to make any mention of death. When asked about mistakes or about falling into the 
abyss, he used euphemism ("It's deep enough that if you fel!, you wouldn't know it when 
you hit the bottom") to avoid mentioning death. The ego feels fighting an assault from an 
impersonal, stubborn force that is associated with pain. Pain appears as part of the 
attacking nameless force. The struggle is in vain, since the ego feels caught for survival 
in a dangerous situation with not so much luck. The denial of death is meant to wards off 
the paranoid-schizoid anxiety that is patently prevalent. 
1: Picture Number 7 
P: Umm. 1don't know (.) this guy 1 think is dreaming about other 
places too. Umm, looking off in the distance, wondering what's on the 
other side 1 think. What's next. Maybe he's got the wanderlust. He wants 
to see what's down the road, a little away, experience a little bit more. 
He's tired of the mom he's in, that's why he's got the lights out. He doesn't 
want to look around anymore, he's lookin' out the window. 
1: Why is he tired of the mom he's in? 
P: Because that's aU he's known. He would like to see something 
different. He's a young man. He hasn't seen much yet and he has a desire 
to see more and experience more. He's just gazing in the distance, trying 
to figure out a way to go do that. 
1: Do you think he's going to find a world he wants out there? 
P: No. 
1: Why? 
P: Because 1 don't think people know how good they have it until 
they leave and then (2) and then they appreciate what they have. [showed 
sadness] 
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There is a desire to escape from the monotony of the present (perhaps the boredom 
imposed by pain), to the thrill of the unknown future. Going beyond, in a novel direction, 
is strongly yearned ("wanderlust"). There is a sense of wanting to get away. However, 
there is also the opposite sense of being tied up to something underappreciated, from 
which the man has to break free to appreciate its true worth. A sense of regret after 
"wanderlust" is described. The ego desires to escape from the annoying boredom with a 
sense of manic defense and acting-out. The ego is however ambivalent and recognizes 
the grievous possibility of loss. 
1: Picture Number 8 
P: Jeez, 1don't know about this guy. Kind of reminds you of the 
horror movies and stuff that you see. Uhh, he's in the middle of a 
graveyard, now is this something that he enjoys death or umm (.) or is he 
mourning il? 1 really don't know. He uhh (.) 1 really don't know what 
kind of impression 1 get from him, could be either one. He could be 
mourning his losses or couId be comfortable with death and he likes to 
surround himself with it. Or (2) 1 really don't know...maybe he fears it and 
he's trying to conquer his fears. 
1: How do you think he can conquer his fears? 
P: By facing it? 
1: By facing death? 
P: Yep. By (... ) 1 really don't know (... ) by facing the fear of dying 
[tense voice] 
1: What else is there? 
P: He looks like he's in pain and he's fearful 1 believe. 
1: In he in pain, of what exactly he might fear? 
P: 1 don't know...death by the looks of it. Uhh (...) 1 don' know. He 
uhh. Could be a bunch of reasons why somebody would be in a 
graveyard. He doesn't seem to be looking at one tombstone in particular 
so that makes me wonder why he's there. CouId be trying to conquer fear 
1 guess (....) or he likes the peace (.... ) maybe he feels peaceful there, in 
death you become part of the earth and return to peace. May be he is in 
pain, so much pain that standing alive is no different than lying dead. His 
face is no different than the tombstones around him. 
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Mr. C tries hard to relate the emotional state of the figure in the picture. InitiaIly, the ego 
reveals its anxiety over death. In fact, death is described as a fearful event that has to be 
conquered, or as a blissful state that can be embraced. Talking about this duality might 
be an attempt to ward off the threat of annihilation, or the paranoid-schizoid anxiety. 
Yet, as soon as pain becomes part of the narration, the threat of annihilation becomes 
undeniably concrete. Pain makes life no more than death, and the ego in pain is no more 
than the gravestones, with which it feels surrounded as the symbol of the lost object. 
1: Picture Number 9 
P: For sorne reason that reminds me of a little cabin up north (...) up 
in the bush...always buried in snow and the chimney was stickin' out and 
there was always smoke comin' out ( ) there was always (...) made you 
feel welcome. Umm (...) it was uhh reaIly peaceful there. It was (... ) life 
was simple (...) no problems (...) you just kept warm and did your work. 
People were friendly. There was no, uhh what's the word T'm lookin' for. 
There was nothing that was politicaIly incorrect or it didn't matter what 
you did, you were accepted, as you were, if you were honest that's aIl that 
mattered. Uh:h (... ) and everybody was right open. You couId count on 
them when somebody said somethin' you knew it was gonna be that. You 
could count on peoples' word. 
1: Is there any pain inside this cabin? 
P: Umm. With pain, there's only loneliness. That's painful and that 
hurts and wounds deep. Everything is against you. When pain cornes, it's 
cold, way colder than what you have been used to. 1 mean dead cold. You 
become alone and that hurts more sometimes. There are things work can't 
fix. Uhh, that's about it, 1 think. 
The narration initiaIly describes an idyIlic place of warmth and togetherness. But, as 1 
inquire about pain, the idyIlic oasis of warmth disappears. The ego feels dead cold, 
wounded, lonely, and helpless. Dread and despair replaces warmth. Paranoid-schizoid 
anxiety suddenly becomes consuming ("everything is against you"). 
1: Picture Number 10 
P: This reminds me of the guy that was looking out the window. He's 
on his way. He's seen sorne things and now he's wishing he was back in 
that window. He's standing on the street, alone, wishing he was home. 
That's what that makes me think of. 
197 
1: How is he feeling? 
P: Lonely. Disappointed. Umm the grass wasn't any greener. And 
he wants to go home. 
1: Is there any pain waiting for him at home. 
P: Not reaIly, no at home. There's pain (.) there's pain where he is 
and home is comfortable. There isn't any pain at home. It's just what has 
always been, uhh, not real exciting, just comfortable, not much to worry 
about at home. 
To return home following a venture alludes to the restoration of a previously broken tie. 
If manic acting-out was a way of evading the damaged object and guilt, returning means 
the possibility of reparation and mourning. The ego recognizes the comforting prospect 
of repairing the object, but calls it "not really exciting." As the ego acknowledges its 
dependence on the damaged object, a deep ambivalence resurfaces. There is the fear of 
stirred-up aggression that can transform reparation to no more than compulsive boredom 
or utter despair. The ambivalence makes home painless, but unexciting as opposed to the 
elsewhere that seems painful, yet exciting. Under the sway of manic defence and 
ambivalence, pain has acquired an ironic quality. 
1: Now, l'Il show you a cardo Use your imagination, and make a 
story, imagine one of your own. 
P: Okay.(6) 
1: Make up something for it even though the card is blank. 
P: Okay. Humph (2), weIl (2) 1 don't really know (2) don't know (2) 
uhh (2) 1 don't know. Makes me think of a future where you can plan 
things but you really don't know what's going to happen. It's a blank 
picture (2) you can try and fill it in with sorne things but the chances of 
them happening are anybody's guess. AIl you can do is put in the effort 
and hope despite the pain. 
1: Where is the pain in the picture? 
P: Uhh. The pain is the unknown 1 guess (2) uhh, it could be good, 
could be bad. 1 guess the pain is the unknown, the worry of what may be 
or the anticipation of what can be. 1 guess it's just not known for sure. 
That is why it is like death. It can be scary and relentless, when attacks. 
Insofar as the blank card is perceived as a void, it can be filled with something. Beneath 
the idea of filling the void, there is the anxiety over reparation. He rullÙnates about the 
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possibility of really being able to do it. He feels much uncertain about filling the void. 
He struggles to ward off the guilt, as he ruminates over the equal possibility of good or 
bad outcome. The ego's deepening ambivalence once again threatens to bring back 
splitting and projective-identification, and revive anxieties of pain as concrete experience 
of annihilation. In the end, he once again speaks of scary and relentless attacks of pain. 
3.2.4. Third Reading 
The First participant begins her narration with depressive feelings. The ego feels being 
beseeched by the object, but is too ravaged to respond. Through ravaging the ego, the 
aggressive impulse, as guilt, torments the object and makes it melt. The same sense of 
helplessness is again repeated in the second cardo In the grip of depressive anxiety, the 
narration begins from the distal elements of the background and retracts to the proximal 
ones. The ego acutely feels the loss of ability to maintain gratifying object-relation. Her 
discourse only reflects disjointedness of elements. A sense of waiting for something to 
happen, sorne unknown doom has replaced hope. In the third card, the depressive 
anxiety continues, as she specifically describes how pain constricts her capacity to care 
for the object. The ego feels withdrawing from, and losing ground with the object, that 
appears as damaged. In the fourth card, thete is a fluctuation and the paranoid-schizoid 
anxiety emerges. Splitting and projective-identification has divided the scene into safe 
and unsafe places to let the figure stand at the threshold, with her back to safety, and peer 
at the other side where threat is looming. The splitting provides the ego with a sense of 
safety at the onslaught of terrifying threat. Paranoid-schizoid anxiety pervades the 
narration. In the fifth picture, the narration reflects the fear of being snatched away, or a 
paranoid anxiety that something threatens to highjack the ego. The ego feels that the 
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good part-object no longer can offer a comforting shield. Her reference clearly indicates 
how she experiences pain as a concrete force that can take her over, and snatch her away. 
Pain is taking on a persecutory character. In the sixth card, the splitting and the sense of 
loorning danger predorninate. Paranoid-schizoid anxiety makes her feel confused, and a 
lü-second-long pause finally mutes her description. For the seventh, she describes a 
menacing darkness with nothing more than a small window of light. There is a sense of 
helplessness. She elaborates directly on her pain and associates it with the "scary 
darkness," which signifies the persecutory anxiety of the ego. The ego can only take 
refuge from the scary darkness to the power of "a pill" that is adrnittedly less than ideal. 
In the eighth, her initial reflection on the loss of control reveals the ego's paranoid 
anxiety over pain as a force that can overtake and destroy her life. She wonders about the 
fundamental duality of life and death, and reflects on her life after pain. As she reflects 
on her loss, she feels the pain snatching her life away. The force "that is overtaking" 
reveals her paranoid-schizoid anxiety of annihilation. In the ninth picture, the ego 
struggles with integrating the darkness and light, and maintain an integrated wholeness. 
Pain is the darkness, at least in part, and there is the light and the hope that she tries to 
integrate. However, the ego cannot bear the integration and the depressive anxiety. She 
resorts to reassuring herself that life is good. An idealized object returns. In the tenth 
card, her attitude to darkness shows a marked change. The ego no longer sees it as purely 
scary and menacing. She is hopeful that the darkness can be illurninated no matter how 
faintly and even enjoyed. There is an attempt to reintegrate darkness with light, however 
she quickly reverts, and reveals her vulnerability, as that of being rejected and abandoned 
in darkness. In effect, although the initial reintegration helps assuage paranoid-schizoid 
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anxiety, the depressive anxiety of abandonment by a damaged object cornes back to 
threaten the ego. In the eleventh card, the ego desperately looks for an abundance of light 
in darkness. Things are suddenly described as bright with no sign of gloom anywhere. 
The denial has managed to supplant darkness. Deniai seems holding sway to dispel 
dread. The white page has provided a blank or erased slate to be written omnipotently. 
The narration of the second participant begins by describing the sad and unhappy feelings 
which she associated with pain. The ego associates suffering from pain with being 
battered, or being subjected to aggression. In effect, the anxiety is over pain as concrete 
aggression, and has a persecutory quality. For the second picture, she seems initially 
confused, and somewhat shaken and doubtful. Her body language shows sorne 
ambivalence regarding the process, and her voice sounds tense. Then, she begins her 
narration from the forefront and moved to the background. Her description offers very 
little story telling to connect the figures and elements together. The background figures 
are split between a rnotherly character and an angry young man ploughing the earth. As 
the story lacks a coherent plot so the ego feels unable to maintain whole-object relation. 
The integration of the whole-object is cornpromised. The ego is struggling to integrate an 
active, angry side and a passive, motherly one. If splitting becomes deeper, it can result 
paranoid schizoid anxieties. In the third picture, the ego is dealing with an object that is 
seething with anger and threatens to leave. The ego is anxious over the well-being of the 
object, and about the pending loss that cannot be repaired. Being abandoned by an angry 
and damaged object alludes to the depressive anxiety. In the fourth, the ego is standing at 
the threshold that splits the good from bad, and is peering at an nameless entity, both 
painful and disgusting. On the other side of the threshold, there is the bad object that 
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causes pain, revulsion and unhappiness. Splitting shapes the core elements of the 
narration, and alludes to paranoid-schizoid anxiety. In the fifth picture, the ego seems 
yearning for fusion with an all-caring abject. There is total bliss with an idealized object, 
free from any anxiety. There is an attempt to escape bad object and pain. For the sixth, 
she names terrifying creatures, from monsters to snakeheads, and clarifies that what she 
is describing is vicious. As anxieties of paranoid-schizoid position come to the surface, 
her voice becomes tense. Then, suddenly, aU horror that she has described become a 
portrait of her pain as concrete terror, hard and vicious. For the seventh, the ego feels 
entrapped in a dreary and suffocating darkness. The darkness of pain is "strangling," 
with little way out. The anxiety of annihilation is presented as images of pain associated 
with a death, as terrible as suffocation by strangling. Pain is dark and strangling. These 
are concrete forms of aggressive attacks that are lived as part of pain experience. For the 
eighth, she mentions suicide that sheds light on the nature of the sadness and anxiety. 
The ego confronts much guilt. The loss is described as pervasive. Losses, caused by 
pain, are making the ego feel surrounded by dead objects, for which the ego feels 
responsible. Life is "sad, lonely, really, really sad, upset" under the spell of pain. Pain 
experience has brought to present depressive anxieties. In ninth, under depressive 
anxiety, the ego feels surrounded by grey winter cold. The scepticism about any warmth 
in the middle of ice and snow implies the ego's concern about the internaI object. 
Psychic reality is grey, cold, and icy. The ego seems caught in irreparable loss and 
depressive anxiety. In the tenth, her depressive anxiety becomes evident as she talks 
about suicide. There is a sense of helpless with utter despair and sadness that is 
consuming the whole story. In the eleventh, Initially, she sees emptiness and blank as a 
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space to be filled and made up for. She, then, reveals the other meaning of emptiness as a 
death-like void, left by pain. In that emptiness, the ego feels as though being "attacked 
and taken." The anxiety of annihilation resurfaces, as the threat to the object disappears 
into the threat to the ego. 
The narration of the third participant begins by describing how the ego feels being 
controlled by the object to the point of helplessness. The ego feels frozen and petrified 
by guill. For the second picture, he starts from the forefront and moves to the 
background figures. He relates a story that connects the elements together, but makes 
little reference to figures in the background. The ego avoids the object and the wards off 
the possibility of aggression and the ensuing guill. The ego is ambivalent about the 
object and struggles with the possibility of integration and reparation. Depressive anxiety 
is salient within the two initial narratives. For the third picture, he initially feels 
confused, for two reasons. First, the ego feels split between love and hate. The love 
struggles for safety, where aggression is a threal. Second, the bad object as the nameless 
"if' both angers and threatens the ego. Splitting and the struggle for control under grave 
threat reveal the paranoid-schizoid anxiety of the ego. For the fourth picture, the object 
seems to be both caring and controlling. However, the narration focuses on the all-caring 
object and describes an absence of fear, threat, and sadness. Suddenly, everything is 
described in much positive light with only a tinge of worry, which he does not specify. 
The ego is ambivalent toward the object, and fears aggression. Depressive anxiety is 
evidenl. In the fifth picture, there is a desire to deny what might be a damaged object, 
and the possibility of loss. He talks about not being good at fulfilling the wishes of the 
object and feeling sad about il. This alludes to an undertone of depressive anxiety. In the 
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sixth picture, struggle with bizarre creatures, and a sense of strife with impersonal forces 
of misfortune and brute nature shape the narration. The anxiety is over the annihilation 
of the self, in a dangerous world. The ego feels fighting an assault is associated with 
pain. Pain appears as part of the attacking nameless force. On the other hand, the denial 
of death is meant to wards off the paranoid-schizoid anxiety that is patently prevalent. In 
the seventh picture, there is a desire to escape from the monotony of the present (perhaps 
partly the boredom imposed by pain), to the thrill of the unknown future. There is a 
sense of wanting to get away. However, there is also the opposite sense of being tied up 
to something underappreciated, from which the man has to break free to, appreciate its 
true worth. The ego desires to escape from the annoying boredom with a sense of manie 
defence and acting-out. The ego is however ambivalent and recognizes the grievous 
possibility of loss. In the eighth picture, the ego initially reveals its anxiety over death. 
In fact, death is described as a fearful event that has to be conquered, or as a blissful state 
that can be embraced. Talking about this duality might be an attempt to ward off the 
threat of annihilation, or the paranoid-schizoid anxiety. Yet, as soon as pain becomes 
part of the narration, the threat of annihilation becomes undeniably concrete. Pain makes 
life no more than death, and the ego in pain is no more than the gravestones, with which 
it feels surrounded as the symbol of the lost object. Depressive anxiety is patently 
prevalent. In the ninth picture, the narration initially describes an idyllic place of warmth 
and togetherness. But, as 1 inquire about pain, the idyllic oasis of warmth disappears. 
The ego feels dead cold, wounded, lonely, and helpless. Dread and despair replaces 
warmth. Paranoid-schizoid anxiety suddenly becomes consuming. For the tenth, he talks 
about returning home following a venture. It alludes to the restoration of a previously 
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broken tie. If manic acting-out was a way of evading the damaged object and gui1t, 
returning means the possibility of reparation and mourning. The ego recognizes the 
comforting prospect of repairing the object. As the ego acknowledges its dependence on 
the damaged object, a deep ambivalence resurfaces. There is the fear of stirred-up 
aggression that can transform reparation to no more than compulsive boredom or utter 
despair. The ambivalence makes home painless, but unexciting as opposed to the 
elsewhere that seems painful, yet exciting. Under the sway of manic defence and 
ambivalence, pain has acquired an ironic quality. For the eleventh, the blank card is 
perceived as a void that can be filled with something. Beneath the idea of filling the void, 
there is the anxiety over reparation. He ruminates about the possibility of really being 
able to do it. He feels much uncertain about filling the void. He struggles to ward off the 
guilt, as he ruminates over the equal possibility of good or bad outcome. The ego's 
deepening ambivalence once again threatens to bring back splitting and projective­
identification, and revive anxieties of pain as concrete experience of annihilation. In the 
end, he once again speaks of scary and relent1ess attacks of pain. 
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CHAPTER4 
Qualitative Study of Suffering in the Discourse of 
Health Psychologists 
4.1. Methodology 
The methodology of this qualitative study involves the analysis of discourses collected by 
the means of semi-structured interviews. As a technique of qualitative data gathering, 
semi-structured interviews are conducted by the means of a thematic guide. The guide 
offers a list of themes that must be introduced and explored by the interviewer in a 
manner compatible with the ongoing conversation between the participants and the 
interviewer. A number of authors (Brener, Brown, and Canter; Kaufman, 1994; King 
1994; Rubin & Rubin, 1995; Kvale; 1996) have favoured this interviewing procedure for 
at least 4 types of research undertakings: 
When the complexity of discourse demands further explorations of 
unpredictable nature; 
When questions have to take into account the information presented during 
the course of interview; 
When participants are interviewed for their in-depth experience with the 
subject under study; 
When interviewer intends to explore areas of tacit knowledge or personal 
attitudes, values, and beliefs. 
The interpreGiven the interpretive goal of the present study, the above reasons are 
likewise valid for the methodology of this research. Thus, the interview procedure in this 
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study is designed to emphasize a conversational approach directed by an interview guide. 
The interviews go beyond a simple question-answer routine. Polio, Henley, and 
Thompson (1997) have argued that dialogue "is an aspect of conversation rather than of 
question-and-answer" (35). The authors maintain that in dialogue, the participants go 
beyond simply answering a question, as they find themselves describing "the experience 
to an involved other". In effect, as opposed to routine questions, dialogue invites the 
participants to reflect on the meaning of their experiences, and "even to realize it for the 
first time during the conversation" (31). In addition, dialogue is the very ground of self­
reflection, as every reflective activity requires the use of external or internaI dialogue. 
Hence, an open and inviting conversation facilitates self-reflection, and fosters deeper 
revelations about the subject matter. 
4.1.1. Participants 
The group of participants consists of one male, and two female health psychologists, who 
are practicing in publicly funded, multidisciplinary pain clinics. Their work revolves, in 
large part, around the assessment, manage, and treatment of chronic pain patients. AH 
participants had weil above 5 years experience in this area. Their intensive therapeutic 
involvement with patients enabled them to play a key role in the process of clinical 
management of chronic pain. In arder to aHow the in-depth discourse analysis required 
for this study, the satiation point for participant group has been set at three. In other 
words, this low satiation point is predicated on the logic of possible as opposed to 
probable truth which denies frequentist notions of quantity for depth. In this manner, 
greater depth in analysis is prioritized in order to meet the interpretive goal of this study. 
4.1.2. Instrument 
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The instrument is a thematic interviewing guide that is used for introducing themes 
within the flow of conversation. The guide includes the following themes and sub­
themes: 
}- The psychology of chronic pain patient;
 
2- The anxieties of chronic pain patients;
 
a. Anxiety over loss 
b. Anxiety over Body-ego 
c. Definition of anxiety as a construct
 
3- The fear of Annihilation
 
a. Aggression 
b. Persecution 
The first theme, the psychology of chronic pain patient, aIIows the participants to provide 
an overview of their observations and the highlights of sufferers' psychological 
condition. The second theme, the anxieties ofchronic pain patients, asks the participants 
to describe two types of threats: a) losing the valued aspects of life or anxiety over loss 
and destruction of the object, and b) losing the body as the medium of pleasure and 
action, anxiety over the body-ego. In addition, the interview makes use of this theme to 
ask for the general definition of anxiety as a construct. The third theme, the fear of 
Annihilation, was used to explore the participants' view on threats of annihilation and 
disintegration. The interview uses this theme to ask for the participant's view about the 
aggressive and persecutory nature of such anxieties. 
4.1.3. Procedures 
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Participants were randomly selected from a group of experienced health psychologists 
who initially agreed to be the interviewed. The participants were asked to take part in a 
study that investigates the relation between pain and anxiety. They were given a consent 
form (Appendix 1) prior to the interviewing session, which provided them with written 
information regarding the objective and the use of this study. Each interview was 
completed within a 40 to 60-ITÙnute period. 
4.1.4. Data and Analysis 
The data consists of transcribed interview recordings. For the purpose of reflecting finer 
verbal elements, Jefferson's (1978) dramaturgical notation system was, in part, adopted 
for this study. 
= Sudden beginning or ending
 
/ Repetitions
 
x: Extension of the preceding sound
 
xx Stressing the underlined utterance
 
XX Loudly uttered
 
(.) Short pause
 
(3)	 Two second pause 
Skipped part 
[] Added explanations 
The model known as sequential organization was used for presenting the material. This 
model emphasizes the sequence of "adjacency pairs" that are defined as discourses 
exchanged in a given turn between the interviewer and the participant (Schegloff, 1977). 
To capture the interplay between the two interlocutors, every research must set these 
pairs according to the nature of the interview and the intended analysis. Hence, each 
adjacency pair may include more than one actual conversational turn and involve a set of 
questions and answers. In this study, every excerpt contains at least one pair of 
interviewer-participant exchange as an adjacency pair, as weil as aIl solicited 
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elaborations. The non-lexical expressions such as "Oh" or "Hm," as weIl as pauses and 
repetitions have been retained to preserve the conversational quality of the speech act. 
Bach transcript undergoes two initial readings for an analysis of discourse. ln 
their studies of metaphor, Lakoff and Johnson (1980:22-24) demonstrate how our choice 
of concepts, definitions, and metaphors can highlight one aspects of experience and hide 
another. Hence, as we talk about ourselves, about others, or about objects, our discourse 
determines what gets to be talked about and what remains out of discourse. Cassell 
(1975) uses a similar argument regarding the clinical thinking in medicine. He argues 
that clinicians use two kind of thinking: analytic and valuational. Analytic thought is 
described as scientific, empirical, and reductionist. On the other hand, valuational thought 
allows us to integrate observations selectively, based on human value conceptions. 
Cassell describes these two modes of thinking as interdependent. The present study uses 
this insight to investigate not only what is selectively integrated and affirmed, but also 
what is excluded and denied value. Analyzing the discourse of the participants, the study 
shows how valuating and devaluating speech acts are performed. The first reading 
identifies aH valuating speech acts, which acknowledge, accept, validate, or highlight the 
interview themes. The second reading explores the devaluating speech acts, which 
invalidate, deny, ignore, or hide certain interview themes. To show how the participants 
move or fluctuate between these two modes of discursive actions, the result section 
presents the first and second readings together. ln this vein, il becomes possible to 
observe the interplay between the valuating (highlighting) and devaluating (hiding) 
discourses in each interview. Following the first two, the third reading is intended to 
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explore the relation between the two speech acts, across the three interviews. In other 
words, the third reading reveals how participants overlap in their treatment of the themes, 
when the analysis is applied across interviews. 
With regard to the question of validity, Giorgi (1975) defines the criterion for 
qualitative research as "whether a reader, adopting the same view point as articulated by 
the researcher can also see what the researcher saw." To satisfy the criterion of validity, 
the reader must be allowed to fully identify the point of view of the researcher. One way 
of facilitating a transparent reading of the researcher's stance is to present the analysis 
from the first-person point of view. Such perspectival clarity is adopted in this research; 
hence the analysis is written from a first-person point of view. In addition, the 
Discussion section presents the interviewer's self-reflective material that was collected as 
part of the journal of research. This practice will allow for an added transparency with 
regard to the author's stance and reactions during the process of interview and analysis. 
4.2. Analysis and Results 
4.2.1. First Interview-First and Second Readings 
The first participant was an experienced, female health-psychologist in her early 40's. 
She has been working with adult chronic pain patients for about 8 years. A public sector 
employee, she has been providing care to a large variety of patients, in a multidisciplinary 
setting. She described herself as a health psychologist, who mainly uses group modality 
of intervention to help patients cope with pain, disability, anxiety, trauma, depression, 
and grief. The interview took place at her office. She appeared as eager to start. The 
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interview began after signing the consent form. l asked her about the psychology of 
chronic pain patients. Initially, she reacted to the immensity of the possible answers. 
Q: AlI right. ln terms of your observations of their psychological 
reactions what do you see in chronic pain patients? 
R: O::h, that's a bi::g question! 
She emphaticalIy pointed out the magnitude of my question, which was seemed to point 
at a single definition. She devaluated any closed definition of the psychology of chronic 
pain, on the ground of its sheer scale. l reassured her and continued. 
Q: An outline would be good because we are going to go into detail. 
R: Ok. Psychological reactions to pain, l think, uh, it runs the 
gamut from depression and anxiety to, l think, um, denial, uh, 
somatization of um, the distressful feelings associated with it. Those are 
the big ones that come to my mind. 
She spoke of a "gamut of psychological reactions," that could entail affects (anxiety and 
depression), defences (denial and somatization), and distressful feelings associated with 
pain which she referred to as "it." At this point, her initial reaction became rather clear, 
as she valuated the psychology of chronic pain as a multitude ("a gamut"), and not a 
singularity. l asked her to elaborate on specific anxieties of pain patients. 
Q: You mentioned anxiety and (.) in fact, that is one of the major 
issues it seems with chronic pain patients. Would you please elaborate on 
that? 
R: Anxiety is/is almost universal with chronic pain patients because 
pain is threatening to people. It threatens their who:le life as they know 
it prior to pain ... 
First, she valuated the pervasiveness of anxiety among chronic pain patients. Then, she 
valuated the threat of pain as one directed toward the patient's "whole life." l asked her 
to elaborate on different anxieties of chronic pain patients and their meaning. 
Q: ... What about threatening the valued facets of their lives, what 
we calI, let's say loved objects, or valued aspects of the patient's life. 
How do you see that? 
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R: Well u:m, 1 guess the way 1 would understand your question is 
by how people invest different aspects of their identity and what they 
invested in. . ..They are kind of the glue and if they end up with a 
chronic pain problem and can't do aH those functions then that threatens 
their relationships and their way they built and derived their identity.... 
In her observation, the loss of love object was described not only as the loss of something 
that is loved, but also as a greater loss of identity. In other words, she valuated the 
symbolic meaning of such loss for patient as the "glue" of identity. However, the 
participant defined identity as "built and derived" from "functions and actual 
relationships." Her discourse makes no note of the primitive and developmental history 
of the self or the ego. Hence, 1continued to the next question. 
Q: ... one other aspect of the loss that you mention uh, might involve 
the comfort level with ones body. How do you see that? 
R: Hm, um (2) interesting question. Sorne people re:ally stand out 
in my mind and there they give a sort of rejection of a, um (2) what's the 
right word for how sorne people actually, (.) ifs almost like their 
identity becomes separated from their body, they reject themselves, they 
don't accept that body anymore because it no longer fulfills the function 
that they expected of it. It almost becomes an other, it is like an othering 
process because of the pain, ... 
She acknowledged the second question as "interesting." She began looking for "the right 
word" to capture what she had in mind. Perhaps she had never articulated this 
observation before. She called it the "othering of the body" to capture one' s the patient' s 
sense of alienation and estrangement regarding the body as an "alien presence." Her 
elaboration valuated the split with the body and the transformation of the body to a 
"thing." 
Q: ... You spoke about how much they distance themselves from 
their own body for example, what do you think in terms of their 
psychological integration, are they staying integrated? 
R: 1 think there is, and (3) 1 think 1 was just saying that, 1 think that 
is what 1 meant to say, there is a sort of disintegration but how aware 
they are of it, but 1do think there is a division in themselves. 
213 
Q: When we talk about anxiety, with regard to this disintegration, as 
a health psychologist how do you explain anxiety or define anxiety? 
R: A couple of ways depending, you know in my seminar, we talk 
about anxiety in a very sort of a physiological way. You know, we talk 
about aIl the physical reactions that people have, when they are 
experiencing anxiety, but 1 think um, we also talk about it as kind of 
akin to fear or threat um, to tell, 1 guess, is the typical way 1 would 
present it to people. 
She once again valuated the split with the body, but added the sense of disintegration to 
iL She valuated the sense of "division" in the patient, even though she was not certain 
about patients being able to recognize it. On the other hand, in defining anxiety, her 
discourse valuated the physiological process of fear response, and took no note of the 
psychological content of anxiety. ln effect, she devaluated any psychological elaboration 
of anxiety (i.e. depressive and guilt-ridden over loss of the object, or persecutory and 
schizoid over the loss of the self). At this point, 1 asked her about to what extent such 
threats might constitute a sense of aggression. In my first attempt at this question, 1 
carefully worded myself to allow her express what cornes to her mind. 
Q: With this threat [disintegration] that you were speaking about, is 
there something that involves aggression for example. 
R: Oh, um (3). You know 1 think, l'rn not sure if 1 understand your 
question but l'Il say when 1 say threat it's not aggression, weIl maybe it 
is, what l'm thinking is sort of people expectations of the future. What 
will 1 be like in the future? Will 1 be in a wheelchair? So those kinds of 
threats to, um, a person perceived level of ability and, um, declining 
ability and so that's what 1 mean by a threat. 
lnitially, she became pensive for 3 seconds. Although she understood my question, she 
appeared not so sure about its significance. First, she devaluated the therne, and then 
modified her response to a partial valuation. Then, she again tried to devaluate the therne 
of aggression by underscoring the loss of future expectations, and by showing such loss 
to be at the core of the problern. Up to this point, her discourse was overal1 expanding to 
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valuate interview themes. This was a shift to a constricted way of talking, and a move 
away from the theme of aggression. 1 used one of her earlier elaborations to reintroduce 
the theme in a manner that includes sorne of her earlier remarks. 
Q: You talked about how the person feels separated from his or her 
body, the chronic pain sufferer. In that case, do you see or bave you 
observed that the chronic pain patient feels at times aggressed by the 
pain? 
R: YES./Yes. 1 think that it is like a battle. And, 1 think, it fits with 
that kind of othering, it's like a war between me, who 1 think 1 should be 
who 1 see myself or expecting myself to be, and then this sick person, 
this unable person, and a rejection like. Here's what 1 want it to be and 
here's what society expected me to be, and here's what 1 am, here's what 
it's going to be in the future, even less able. And, 1 reject that and 1 
resist. ... 
As my question reminded her of the estranged body, her discourse expanded to valuate 
the theme of aggression. She offered the metaphor of a battle, wherein aggression could 
flow between the self and the body. Her battle metaphor went beyond simple aggression, 
and conjured up the image of an enemy invasion or attack. In fact, the metaphor valuated 
the theme of persecution. This was a sudden change in speech-act perspective that 
expanded once again to acknowledge the interview themes of aggression and persecution. 
This came about, when 1 intentionally pointed to the estranged body as the aggressor and 
persecutor. Then, she couId valuate the felt-experience of aggression and attack ("fits 
that kind of othering"). However, her example once again reverted back to the anxiety 
over interpersonal expectations and social feedback, without any reflection on primitive 
history of pain. Finally, 1 introduced the theme of anxiety of annihilation. 
Q: .. .in general, given that part of growing up is in fact about 
dealing with many situations or many occasions of helplessness and the 
anxiety associated with those situations, that are danger situations of 
early childhood that we ail go through, not just those who are 
traumatized, and given the anxiety in those helpless situations of early 
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childhood involves the fear of death, basically, and of annihilation. How 
much do you think, this developmental experience is relevant to feelings 
associated with chronic pain? 
R: Hu::m (2) It's not sort of a um, (.) the way l think about things. l 
don't think it sort of fits with my conception. l think the way that l 
would see it is that, you know, that at least those who l see, you know, 
there are normallevels of threat to self that children have an opportunity 
to learn to master. And these people that l'm seeing, there is, l don't 
know how or who can master this stuff that l see in them. Or, perhaps 
they are a vulnerable group to begin with. Maybe, they were born with 
sorne sort of vulnerability to not cope, because l know there are probably 
other very resilient folks who get through with the chronic pain. Um, 
but, um, as far as your question goes l guess it just doesn't fit with my 
way of thinking about people. 
The theme of my question was how childhood fears of annihilation and helplessness 
might be relevant to adult reaction to similar anxieties in chronic pain. After a long 
pause, she devaluated the theme. Although she earlier talked about disintegration and the 
threat to identity, she reacted with confusion and surprise to my direct question. As she 
regrouped, she talked about her problem with this theme. First, she rejected the idea as 
being far from her mind-frame. Her ensuing explanation revealed sorne degree of 
ambivalence, as she was unsure how to explain the patients' consuming lack of mastery 
over feelings of distress, to which she referred as: "this staff that l see in them." She did 
not qualify what she meant by "the stuff," although it was obviously referring to the 
patients' fears, over which she appeared ambivalent from onset. She acknowledged that it 
is not possible ta say how one can master "this staff that l see in them." Yet, in 
explanation, she evoked the idea of a congenital vulnerability, or a condition developed 
in pre-natal period. This remark devaluated a psychological explanation for the issue of 
anxiety of annihilation. Finally, she acknowledged that the idea "does not fit" her view 
of "people." 
4.2.2. Second Interview-First and Second Readings 
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The second participant was an experienced, male health-psychologist in his mid 40's. He 
has been working with adult patients whose main presentation consisted of pain and 
disability. As part of his job, he managed a large variety of patients who received 
treatment in an active rehabilitation program. He described himself as a health 
psychologist, and specified the modality of his intervention as one-on-one. Pain, 
disability, and anxiety were the reasons why many of his patients needed help. The 
interview took place at his residence. He appeared as eager and welcomed my presence. 
The interview started with signing of the consent form. Then, 1 asked him about the 
psychology of chronic pain patients. 
Q: from your experience with chronic pain patients, what do you 
qualify as the psychological reactions to pain? 
R: As a general outline of their psychological reactions to pain. Um 
(2). Apparently there is a violation of expectations uh, 1 believe that part 
of the expectation ... that, they will come into the health care system and 
there will be sorne cure, sorne uh, ability for health care professionals to 
relieve their pain, and often the belief that medical diagnostic tests can 
reveal the cause of the pain and somehow eliminates constant pain..... 
One of the most corrunon pieces of their discourse uh, at the beginning 
of the program .. .is that ''l'm not the same person 1 used to be". In most 
cases, it's certainly the loss, uh, the threat of loss is quite significant. 
... And the ether is, coming from grieve and bereavement literature that 
have come up with "disenfranchised grief' which happens when one 
can't see the loss, therefore it doesn't exist. There is a parallel, 1 think, in 
the grief experience of chronic pain patient, so that a person can be 
grieving and other people may not know that. ... And with the pain, it's 
there, it's present but, others can't see it, other people can't see it, so they 
disenfranchise the person with such experience. They don't validate 
their experience. 
Q: In terms of feelings, what have you seen? 
R: 1 can name feelings about loss, for example grief, uh, that is 
multi-dimensional and entails, um, sadness, uh, anger/anger at pain 
being present and continuing. The desperation, and frustration, ve:ry 
significant frustration which may tum into anger, or may become a 
completely separate emotional experience for them. Uh, anxiety, um, 
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and that takes in a whole range of different ways of being anxious at 
different points in their journey. 
The participant acknowledged the disturbing violation of hope that pain engenders, as it 
becomes incurable. He pointed to the objectification of pain as something to be removed. 
He recognized the patient's loss of accustomed identity ("1 am not the person l used to 
be"). He described how loss is "multidimensional" and how anxiety may assume 
different forms. In addition, the participant characterized pain and loss as experiences 
that are intangible, and are therefore inaccessible to others for interpersonal validation. 
His description clearly valuates the split and rupture that pain and loss create between the 
patient and others, and between the patient's past and present. He pointed at the 
transformation of frustration to anger as lia completely separate emotional experience" for 
patients. His emphasis on anger, desperation and frustration obviously valuates the 
distressful feelings associated with pain. 
Q: As a health psychologist, how do you define the concept of 
anxiety? 
R: Dm, it is a typically un:wanted emotional experience (.) of 
nervousness of, uh, sometimes, manifests itself as fear to a range of 
things, ah, or to uncertainty of future.... H, somewhat crosses over into 
ah, self-esteem and security, the feeling of security or insecurity ah, 
confidence or lack of confidence. And so, an example would be the 
discharge anxiety, as a person coming to the end of the program, it's not 
uncommon, at ail, to experience anxiousness over separation from the 
program, from the treatment. That means they are out there on their own 
if you will. 
He explained anxiety as an "unwanted" feeling, and made reference to fear reaction about 
future uncertainty, as one concrete example. The participant then made reference to self­
esteem and the feelings of insecurity regarding self, which could suggest the idea of 
threat to the self. He continued by offering an objective example about the patient's 
anxiety over being discharged from the rehabilitation program (termination anxiety). He 
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offered sorne elaboration regarding the content of such insecurities or anxieties, when he 
added, "that means they are out their own if you will." Yet, he did not explain how 
patients experienced the feelings of being eut off from a source of support. In effect, the 
content of anxiety was ignored and devaluated. 
Q: You talked about loss, and you talked about how much loss in 
fact impacts the experience of the patient. There is definitely a loss in 
valued aspects of life for the patients. Valued aspects of life are being 
lost as a result of pain. Now, how do you see the impact of this kind of 
loss on the patient or on their sense of who they are? 
R: For Sorne people 1 think it can become an existential kind of 
angst like, um (.) so what is life anymore, what's the purpose of life... .It 
shows itself in terms of a loss of a sense of future, future possibilities, 
and future hopes. That sorne of the, if you will, secondary losses that 
would happen are the loss of the future, and of dreams and hopes and the 
visions of what again ties into assumptions and expectations about the 
self or about the life.... Particularly, there can be also a loss of the self of 
or self-identity. For the first time when this loss erupts, it would be like 
asking so who am 1 now. Part of the challenge then becomes the process 
of self-redefinition as who they were has changed ... to who are they 
now and what they struggle with. 
He acknowledged existential angst, which by definition, reflects the anxiety of being, 
être, confronted by nothingness or non-being, néant (May, Sartre, Heidegger). However, 
the participant's elaboration of this angst emphasized "the purpose of life" as tied to "the 
assumptions and expectations about the self." ln effect, he highlighted a particular 
meaning of existential angst as the anxiety over self-actualization, or as the worries over 
the "sense of future, future possibilities and future hopes." His elaboration bore no 
reference to the felt-experience of nothingness, and the dread of annihilation. Hence, he 
devaluated this sense of angst. In his view, identity is an expected and valued "role set" 
that a person enacts in interaction with others. Losing this set requires a major revision 
of assumptions and expectations regarding future. Hence, patients can learn to change 
their assumptions to include "who are they now and with what they struggle." He 
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devaluated the anxiety of falling apart or impending destruction. My next question meant 
to clarify that to what extent his notion of existential angst includes the split with the 
body, and the feelings of violent disintegration. 
Q: One of the losses that we see that affects the individuaIs in pain. 
Is the loss of the sense of having a body as the medium of pleasure. The 
relationship changes with body as presumed medium pleasure as a result 
of pain. How do you see that in your patients, can you explain it? 
R: Part of it seems to come through as alrnost (.) a: betrayal (.)/a 
betrayal by the body to the person, that the body doesn't work the sarne 
way because they can't call on the body to do things that it used to do. 
In terms of pleasure, ah, whether it has specifically sornething to do with 
sexuality and sexual pleasure for sorne individuaIs but, you know that 
the presence of pain means that a secondary loss of potentially, ah, 
sexual relationships. If you think of something like a person who in his 
life before pain, before the accident, was involved in sports uh, not quite 
a while ago, quite an active person, then the loss for such individual is 
the body can no longer do things. If they try to do sorne of the things that 
they did before, sorne sports activity, we often use the phrase "They are 
going to pay for it", which means "They are going to pay for it" through 
the pain afterward, and so they can't. Many people feel they can't do 
those things anymore. That's part of the loss as well as part of the 
distress, just in terms of anxiety. The other thing, in terrns of loss, you're 
talking about loss and asking about particular loss but, in the past, the 
emotion of depression and sadness was typically the predominant 
emotion that was related to loss. Actually, what is being debated right 
now, what's being found more and more in the literature and is being 
debated in terrns of redefinition of DSM-IV, is that there is actually a 
large degree of anxiety in loss. 
He referred to the sense of betrayal associated with the loss of agency for the self ("body 
doesn't work the same way because they can't call on the body to do things"). As an 
exarnple, he talked about the loss of sexual pleasure and relationships. However, he did 
not elaborate on the content of the anxiety over betraying body. In his description, the 
sense of being punished by the aching body was clearly reflected ("they are going to 
pay"). He valuated the presence of anxiety in loss and grief. Yet, there was no atternpt to 
see how this anxiety could irnplicate that aforernentioned sense of punishment and 
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betrayal or violation of identity. In short, the participant devaluated the anxiety over an 
attacking, destroying, and devastated body. l felt, therefore, that further elaboration 
could clarify these issues. 
Q: And, ah, with regard to losses of the body or to the body 
suddenly becoming less familiar to the person as a result of pain, what 
do you see happening there? How the patient feels about his or her own 
body with regard to anticipation of harm or pain coming from the body? 
R: UhmlUhm. (.) Weil, l have a strong connection where there is 
the idea of ah, hurt equals harm. In the terms of the program that l work 
in, which is an interdisciplinary program, much of what the physical 
staff tries to educate clients around, is the difference between hurt versus 
harm. Sorne clients have the idea that if something hurts for example 
the body in the rehabilitative process, if it hurts when they try to do it, 
then this is not a good thing. Sorne people equate hurt with harm, 
something damaging happening in the body. This is not obviously the 
case in ail situations, and so part of the education is how rehabilitation, 
in terms of physical conditioning of the body, often entails a soft muscle 
tissues. Obviously, it hurts to rehabilitate muscles, that doesn't mean 
there's physical harm going on, but to sort those two impressions out is 
quite difficult for sorne clients. 
My question was intended to explore the primitive threats experienced due to alienation 
with the aching body. Although he earlier described how the body appears as treacherous 
and punitive, he did not see "harm" as being related to such feelings. In response, he 
recognized that for sorne people hurting feH like harming, which he attributed to a 
cognitive mislabelling without any primitive significance. His discourse devaluated the 
primitive threats that could arise out the aching body. To explore more directly, l asked 
about the split with the body. 
Q: Do also see certain degree of the detachment from body? 
R: Sometimes, not always. For sorne people it is like the 
amputation metaphor that ah, sorne people almost treat a part of the body 
like it is a foreign body, like it is an appendage, it's there but it's not very 
useful. That's more so the cases with people whose limps or body part 
are more and much more severely affected by the accident as opposed to 
soft muscle tissue injuries. 
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The answer to this question was exceptionally short. He used the metaphor of 
"amputation," which certainly exceeded the connotations of "detachment from the body," 
offered in my question. Then, he continued by saying how sorne patients could perceive 
their body as "a foreign body," or "appendage." Further elaboration on the content of the 
patient's feelings about this foreign body could have revealed aggression and persecution. 
However, the participant added that more likely such feelings are related to the severity 
of actual injuries, or the real intensity of tissue and organ damage. Hence, he devaluated 
the aggression and persecution. l, therefore, outlined the sorne of the key themes, and 
asked the last question. 
Q: We talked about the loss of the body as the medium of pleasure. 
We talked about the loss of ah, personhood as a result of losing the 
valued aspects of life. . .. 1 wonder with these losses and with the 
associated anxieties, ah, how much do you see in your patients ah, 
anxiety of annihilation or of falling apart? 
R: U::m (4) Falling apart. Um (2) 1 don't have a clue. Um, (2) 1 
guess, it really depends on what you mean by falling apart and what 
each client would, uh, mean by that would be different. Um, that's. 
There's not so much if they are falling apart. Ifs kind of the concept of 
really losing it, going crazy. Ah, um, not so much that. 1 think most of it 
is about falling apart around the change inlin self-identity, of who the 
person thinks they are or can be. So for example, the falling apart is 
about can 't get to do a role-meaning their previous raIe before being a 
chranic pain sufferer. They have seen themselves quite different as 
active or as maybe a key person in the family, maybe even directing 
things or organizing things, for someone falling apart looks like ah, ah, a 
drastic change in raIes. Whether they, themselves sort of go in the 
direction, or whether the farrùly maybe places them in a different 
position, so they are no longer thought of, in the same raIe. AH/ah, (2) l 
lost the other thought 1 had. (2) O:h, ok. Araund identity that, for sorne 
people, not so much the falling apart, but that, sorne individuals see 
themselves as handicapped or disabled. Sometimes they use those 
words, sometimes not, sometimes they use, you know, a collection of 
words and phrases to depict that disability as a kind of identity. Ah, they 
maybe talk about a limb or part of their body in a sense, that's no good 
anymore, that's gimpy, or that's ah, ah, useless and so there again it's 
kind of a foreign sense, they'll talk about a part of the body as if it was 
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disconnected and a different part or a different ah, uselessness from the 
rest of the body. 
The participant devaluated the theme of annihilation by stating that he does not "have a 
clue." A drawn-out, non-lexical expression ("u::m") and a set of long pauses punctuated 
the statement. Then, he redefined the meaning of annihilation ("really losing it" and 
"going crazy") as "role dispossession," or as being stripped of roles that are essential to 
one's life. As a result, the participant devaluated the theme of annihilation by redefining 
it as the dissolution of role set, and not as the dread of impending destruction. Following 
this redefinition, he confirmed its prevalence in "sorne patients" who have undergone 
serious role changes. In effect, he described the threat of dissolution of self as an 
objective "drastic change in roles." After a moment of confusion where his thoughts 
were interrupted, he gathered his ideas to describe disability as a new kjnd of identity for 
sorne. He described the sense of alienation from a body part, involved in this new 
identity. Although he valuated the alien presence of the body ("it is kjnd of a foreign 
sense"), he could not valuate the anxiety of annihilation or of falling apart as in any shape 
related to such splitting with the body. 
4.2.3. Third Interview-First and Second Readings 
The Third participant was an experienced, female health-psychologist in her late 30's. 
She has been workjng with adult chronic pain patients for 10 years. A public sector 
employee, she dealt with a large variety of patients in a multidisciplinary pain clinic. She 
described herseIf as a health psychologist, who uses one-on-one and group modalities to 
help patients cope with pain, disability, anxiety, and depression. The interview took 
place at her residence. She was eager to begin. The interview started after signing the 
consent form. l asked her about the psychology of chronic pain patients. 
223 
Q: In terms of feelings, what do you see as feelings and 
emotional states associated with chronic pain? 
R: Um, anger, especially the longer people have lived with 
pain. Um, anxiety and depression, um, fear that the pain will never go 
away. Hopelessness, um, that is sort of felt in terms of a gamul. 
She valuated feelings of anger, anxiety, depression, and hopelessness. She called 
hopelessness a gamul. She valuated hopelessness not as a single experience, but as a 
complex one. We continued. 
Q: Would you like to offer sorne explanation with regard to what 
anxiety is from a health psychology point of view, from your practice 
point of view? 
R: Ok, um, the content of what specifically they would experience 
anxiety about or u:m = 
Q: = Yes, the content and as weIl, ah, a sort of general definition of 
what is anxiety. 
R: Ok, um, 1 think in terms of what the patient would experience 
um, with anxiety, is um, anxiety toward the health care profession, um, 
and the inability of others to help them and, um, 1 guess they would be 
very concerned, anxious um, of getting to be in more pain or being told 
that they were fraud. Ah: , is that getti:ng = 
Initially, she seemed uncertain and sought my active involvement as an interlocutor. She 
did not hesitate to ask, if 1 meant the content of anxiety. She, then, explained the 
patient' s helplessness with respect to the inability of healthcare professionals in providing 
solution for pain. She acknowledged that patients are fearful of being dismissed as a 
fraud, since their ordeal is not tangible for others. Her observation reflected the split with 
others that the private experience of pain could impose on patients. She valuated the 
anxiety and helplessness that patients experienced in relation to others understanding of 
their ordeal and the effort to cure il. We continued thereon. 
Q: = Yes/Yes. Now with regard to the actual definition of an 
anxiety from health psychology point of view what do you see or how 
do you define anxiety? 
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R: Oh, that's very interesting. (2) Your talking theory! U::M (.) in 
terms of psychology how do 1 define anxiety. U:M, (2) l guess in a 
specifie application anxiety would stem from a perceived threat towards 
a person and their physical well-being. And, the resulting action to deal 
with, l guess, the fear of physical harm that is coming to them, and 
following that there would be the behavioural manifestations of feeling 
threatened. 
She showed reservation about the theoretical implication of the question. Then, she 
valuated anxiety as feelings of being threatened that would lead to behavioural reactions. 
In her definition, she explained the danger in terms of "threat to person and physical well­
being." The word, "physical," was repeated which emphasized the concrete aspect of the 
threat as a threat to the very existence. 
Q: Ok. So, you spoke about threat and the threat against the being 
of the person and now one of the areas of threat for the chronic patient 
can be, or said to be, the loss of valued aspects of life, how do you see 
that, how do you see the patient reacting to this loss? 
R: WeIl it depends on the patient l guess and their personality prior 
to the pain, um, at times there is hopelessness and a helpless resignation. 
Um, and uh, at times coupled with that is a heavy/heavy/hea::vy reliance 
on the medical profession to help them or someone else to make it better 
for them. Um, the other type would be those that are quite angry at their 
own lirnitations, but then again they will look to others to help them out. 
1 would expect the ones that are more, um, or have more agency or 
would be able to deal with it themselves wouldn't come into my office 
because they would be working really hard on their own, and are 
probably more functional; they wouldn't have the same losses as the 
others. 
She explained how patients' reaction to loss was part of their personality. This statement 
could have meant a valuation of the patient's personal history. She pointed out that 
helplessness drove patients to treat medical professionals as all-powerful healers. When 
frustrated, such desire was reported to turn to anger. Her observations described the 
primitive idealization and denigration that resurfaces as patients desperately plunge inta 
helplessness. Her observations on "helplessness and resignation" acknowledged the 
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overwhelming effect of anxiety on the patient. However, she made no mention of the 
precise nature of the threat felt by the patient. My next question explored the issue 
further. 
Q: So you see them in the situation of being threatened for the loss 
of valued aspects of life. Sorne of them can take care of themselves and 
others tum to you or to other professionals for help, to take care them 
with regard to feelings of loss. How anxious they are about losing 
themselves in front of such threats? 
R: 1 don't think they perce:ive it that way. (2) Dm, (.) perhaps sorne 
are a little more insightful, and would be that their roles are being 
diminished and their ability to fulfill those roles, partners, parents, 
workers that sort of thing. Dm, 1 don't think 1 actually heard a lot of 
people talk about it in that abstract of events, it seems much more 
concrete and immediate. 1 can't perform this act therefore l'm having 
this reaction versus l'm losing parts of myself or parts of my role. Um 
(.), Ya. 
She devaluated the theme of the threat to the self. After a sudden and long pause that 
followed, she acknowledged that more insightful patient could only discem the 
diminishment of their social roles ("partners, parents, workers," etc.). The question asked 
about patients' experience of losing themselves in reaction to important losses in life. In 
response, she dubbed such reaction, "that abstract of events", which was not commonly 
accessible to patients. She valuated in its place the "concrete and immediate" concerns. 
In her view, even insightful patients could only understand the significance of loss as far 
as its impact in diminishing their role set. The loss was, therefore, explained in objective 
terms. 
Q: So, another example of anxiety inducing situation that they might 
face as part of their experience, um, is the threat (.) of not being able to 
use or to enjoy their own bodies. Our bodies are our medium of pleasure 
in a sense, and when the patient's body is in constant pain then what do 
you expect to see in that case, with regard to anguish or with respect to 
anxiety? 
R: U:m, (3) for those people, (.) l'm trying to find the right words (.) 
a sense of betrayal. They feel betrayal um, they feel that there bodies 
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have betrayed them and that in sorne ways they are not one with their 
bodies, but they are one against their bodies. Y:a, and frustration that 
the rest of the world operates differently and yet they have this internaI 
battle um, even though they sort of externalize their body in a way of an 
object to be angry at or frustrated against or feel grief over, like 
bereavement if they know that it will never get better. So 1 think their 
body becomes personified in a way. Y:a. 
She valuated the felt experience of the body as an alien object. Hence, she clearly 
identified the split with the body. First, she acknowledged "a sense of betrayal" that 
could lead to hostility ("they are one against their bodies"). Second, she described how 
such split could turn the body into a concrete object ("externalized", "personified") of 
fear and hostility ("they have this internaI battle"). Finally, she valuated bereavement 
over the irredeemable loss. Her observations acknowledged feelings of alienation, anger, 
and struggle with regard to the pain-ridden body. 
Q: So do you see that [alienation from body] quite often in your 
chronic pain patients? 
R: Only for people who are quite insightful and psychologically 
minded would they be able to delineate things clearly. Um, would 1 see 
it in patients but them not seeing it for themselves? Probably, fairly 
frequently, 1 would say. 
However, as 1 explored the pervasiveness of the split with the body, she devaluated its 
ubiquity and attributed such feelings only to psychologically minded patients who can 
articulate themselves. She made a reference to "them not seeing it for themselves," as 
opposed to her seeing it for them. Her view did not reflect the primitive, non-verbal 
origin of patients' feelings as the possible reason why such states resist articulation. 
Rather, she attributed these states to patients' psychological mindedness. She maintained 
how such feelings could appear more clearly to her, rather than to the patient. 
Q: You basically talked about two types of situations: that of a the 
loss of the person's body, the threat of the loss of the person's body, and 
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the threat of the loss of others. Now, you also talked about patients 
being angry at their bodies. How do you think that this situation of 
feeling their bodies causing them grief, causing them pain, and making 
them feel worried, anxious about their lives, about their existence, 
basica11y impacts the patients. Do you see this as feeling a sort of threat 
of being annihilated? 
R: l'm not sure annihilated would be the appropriate word. (3) Dm, 1 
wou Id see it at a more concrete level. They would get, 1 guess, an 
econornic threat, a social threat, a relational threat that they could 
become anxious about, um, if the pain wouId prevent them from 
working or acting in different capacities in their lives. Dm, (2) l'm just 
thinking about the word annihilation. Dltimately, yes, a deep seated fear, 
but a core fear that a11 these forces; the relational, the occupational, the 
economical, if you would take those to the extreme and they had 
anxieties about ail of these individually, and they were a11 to occur of 
course people can imagine fairly we11 when they are anxious, wouId 
result in their total annihilatioo, because they would have no 
relationship, they would have no financial needs, they would have no 
source of work, if they lost aIl relationships and a11 pUl'}Jose for living. 
So taken at the extreme end of a continuum maybe annihilation could be 
an appropriate word in terms of their anxiety. 
At first, she expressed her doubt about the word and its appropriateness. What seemed 
inappropriate was the intensity of the dread that the word, annihilation, connotes. Hel' 
long pause after her initial devaluation of the theme was significant. However, using the 
word, "ultimately," she initiated a conditional acknowledgement of this theme. She 
spelled out in concrete realistic terms ("the relational, the occupational, the econornical") 
the cumulative process, through which anxiety of annihilation couId come about as a 
result of undergoing intense losses. Despite referring to "core" or "deep seated fear," she 
tried to explain the anxiety of annihilation based on the cumulative effect of real losses. 
On the other hand, she devaluated the primitive significance of such anxiety. 
4.2.4. Third Reading 
The first theme of the interviews, the psychology of chronic pain patient, opened the 
dialogue to the participant's experience with chronic pain patients. The fi l'st participant 
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devaluated a single account for this theme. She qualified the theme as involving a 
"gamut" of experiences that includes anxiety, loss, denial, and somatization. The second 
participant was able to offer a coherent account for this theme that included loss, 
depression, frustration, anger at pain, and anxiety. He called the threat of loss significant, 
and acknowledged its deeply personal and intangible nature as the source of helplessness 
for the patient ("disenfranchised grief'). The third participant pointed out how prolong 
suffering engenders frustration, hopelessness, and anger. She named depression and 
anxiety as important feelings. FinalIy, she described helplessness as a multitude of 
feelings ("a gamut") experienced by the patients. AlI participants recognized the 
complex psychology of chronic pain patients. The participants valuated helplessness, 
depression, anxiety, anger as the main highlights of this theme. 
The second theme, the anxieties of chronic pain patients, allowed the participants 
to describe two types of threats often felt by chronic pain patients: a) losing the valued 
aspects of life, and b) losing the body as the medium of action and pleasure. As weIl, the 
interview made use of this theme to explore the general definition of anxiety as a 
theoretical construct. The first participant recognized the pervasive anxieties of chronic 
pain patients. She valuated the symbolic significance of such losses, and pointed out that 
the loss of valued aspects of life can be experienced as the loss of identity. As weIl, she 
valuated the split with the body, and the sense of alienation and disintegration 
("othering"). However, when asked to define anxiety, she emphasized the physiological 
and physical fear response in concrete terms. In an attempt to seek her opinion about the 
content of anxiety, she was asked, to what extent the fear of disintegration could be 
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experienced as aggression against the self. She expressed her surprise regarding the 
question. She first devaluated the aggression, and emphasized the concrete nature of 
losses as limiting to grief over personal and interpersonal expectations. Then, as the idea 
of split with the body was recapitulated, the participant's discourse changed course and 
valuated aggression, and described the self-body relation as "a baule." Although she 
valuated the theme of disintegrationJaggression, her elaboration focused on how patients' 
felt-experience could only rise from grappling with interpersonal and social expectations. 
The second participant approached the anxieties of chronic pain patients, by 
defining anxiety as an unwanted feeling of fear. He evoked uncertainties of the future 
and insecurities of the self, in order to suggest how this fear might involve the self. In his 
example, he presented the patient' s anxiety of termination, but without any elaboration on 
the content of what is being felt. In an attempt to seek his opinion on the content of 
anxiety, l asked him to elaborate on the anxiety over the loss of valued aspects of life. 
Referring to existential angst or anxiety of being confronted by nothingness, he explained 
how loss could affect the concrete assumptions and expectations about life. Then, he 
valuated the significance of such losses, in threatening the person's assumptions about 
life. When asked about the threat experienced by the patient as a result of living with an 
aching body, he referred to a sense of betrayal and punishment. Finally, l asked the 
participant to explain the violent threats one might experience as a result of living with a 
treacherous and punitive body. In response, he recognized that for sorne people hurting 
felt like harming, which he auributed to a cognitive mislabelling. Hence, he devaluated 
any implied significance. As l probed deeper into the split with the body, he offered the 
metaphor of "amputation." He continued by describing how sorne patients could 
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perceive their bodies as an alienated part or "appendage" as a result of their concrete 
injuries. Hence, he valuated the split with the body. Yet, he tried to show that is clearly 
associated with the extent of actual injuries. 
The third participant approached the anxieties of chronic pain patients, by 
explaining the content of anxiety. She acknowledged helplessness as a gamut that 
includes the patients' worries about being misunderstood by others, even by the treatment 
team. She explained how anger replaces frustration, as patients face significant loss. 
When asked about the general definition of anxiety, she valuated anxiety as feelings of 
being threatened that would lead to behavioural reactions. In her definition, she 
explained the danger in terms of "threat to person and physical well-being." The word, 
"physical," was repeated once again to emphasize the concrete aspect of threat. l ask her 
about the loss of body as the medium of action and pleasure. She valuated the sense of 
alienation from the body. She clearly acknowledged two significance of the split with the 
body. First, she acknowledged "a sense of betrayal" that could lead to hostility, or to 
being "against their bodies." Second, she described how such split could turn the body 
into a concrete object ("externalized", "personified") of fear and hostility (in a "battle"). 
l asked her if she has been confronting such feelings in her practice. However, she 
devaluated the ubiquity of such threats, and attributed such emotional states only to 
psychologically minded patients. She acknowledged that in those lacking psychological 
understanding, the content of patient suffering couId appear more clearly to the 
psychologist, rather than to the patient. In most part, patients were said to fear only the 
loss of concrete abilities that could be important to fulfillment of social raies. 
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The third theme, the anxiety of annihilation, was used to explore the participants' 
view about the threat of dissolution of self. After outlining the threats caused by the loss 
of the valued aspects of life and the body, 1 asked to what such anxieties might pose an 
annihilation threat to the self. After a long pause, she devaluated the therne. My question 
also made a reference to childhood fear of annihilation and helplessness and asked the 
participant to reflect on their relevance to similar adult anxieties in chronic pain. 
Although she earlier talked about the therne of disintegration and the threat to identity, 
she reacted with confusion and surprise to my direct question. Then, she rejected the idea 
as being far fram her rnind-frame. Her ensuing explanation revealed sorne degree of 
ambivalence. To explain the consuming anxieties of chranic pain patients, she evoked 
the idea of concrete, congenital vulnerability. Finally, she admitted that the idea "does 
not fit" her view of patients. 
In answer to a similar question, the second participant devaluated the theme by 
stating that he does not "have a clue." A drawn-out, non-lexical expression ("u::rn") and 
long pauses punctuated his statement. Yet, he recognized the rneaning as "really losing 
it" or "going crazy," which both signified the sense of dissolution of the self. He 
valuated its prevalence in "sorne patients." However, he redefined the self or the identity 
as an objective social role set and interpersonal expectations. He described the threat of 
dissolution of the self as a concrete "drastic change in raIes". Although he went as far as 
valuating the split with the body, he did not valuate the therne of falling apart. Rather, he 
described it concretely in terrns of raIe dispossession following an accident that leaves 
the person in pain. 
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In response to the same theme, the third participant expressed her doubt about the 
word and its appropriateness. The intensity of the ward or the experience seemed to be 
part of the reason, why it was called inappropriate. In the light of what she had 
previously been explaining about the significant losses and fears, the threat of 
annihilation seemed to be a credible anxiety for the patients. However, she offered a 
conditional acknowledgement. While talking about "core fear," or "deep seated fear," 
she struggled to reserve the threat of annihilation for extreme of situations. In other 
words, she valuated anxiety of annihilation only as the accumulation of objectives lasses 
that affect ail areas of the person's life. There was no elaboration of the intrapsychic 
origin of such fear. She reiterated that such anxiety could exist only as the culmination 
of loss into total demise of the patient's "vocational, relational, and financial" life. 
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CHAPTER5 
DICUSSION AND CONCLUSION:
 
Pain, Suffering, and Possibility of Meaning
 
For the participants of this study, the psychological impact of pam IS primarily 
experienced as constriction of the ego's ability to care for the object and to maintain a 
fulfilling relation. To the participants, the discontent of the actual objects contains and 
symbolizes aspects of the damaged primary object. Their stories reflect primitive guilt 
over an object that is damaged. They reveal a deep sense of guilt and ambivalence over 
depending on an object that is damaged. Their narrations reflect how the ego uses 
primitive manie defences to ward off this ambivalence. Contempt, control, and 
triumphalism toward the object are elements that emerge with the image as a response to 
guilt. Predictably, manie defences at sorne point renew the more infantile mechanisms of 
splitting and projective identification, which bring back anxieties of paranoid-schizoid 
position. In effect, the participants narrate stories that make ample references to splitting, 
and indicate projective identification. Their narratives reflect anticipation of a pending 
doom from a pervading darkness and evil. The dread of being attacked and taken over by 
something that has damaged the object and the self becomes the pervasive association. 
The participants cannot help but to describe this menacing force as "painful and 
disgusting," as "vicious and hard," and as "stubborn and relentless." 
In addition to anxieties provoked by loss, the excruciating nature of chronic pain 
causes deep feelings of anguish and revulsion. Sufferers often refer to pain as "if' or as a 
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thing-like entity that is alien from the self. From phenomenological point of view, 
intractable pain is shown to cause fears of dissolution and of the self. The sufferers feel 
"being acted upon" by a cruel and spiteful force that literally nullifies every mundane 
sense of pleasure and comfort. When other perceptions expose us to the harsh reality of 
being, we might avoid paying them much attention. However, every effort to avert 
attention from pain creates only stronger intrusions as a crude reminder of the obdurate 
nature of chronic pain. For many, pain makes living a constant strife for short relief 
between periods of agonizing upsurge. Sufferers always wonder how they are going to 
pay later, for the present moment of relief or joy. They are weary about their prospect 
and feel having no control. Unable to feel joy without the fear of later pain, sufferers feel 
diminished and under attack by a terrifying force. 
This association of pain with aggressive attacks is, in fact, reminiscent of what 
Klein (1952:62) explains regarding the infant' s experience of pain from the very onset 
life after birth: 
"It would appear that pain and discomfort he has suffered, as weil as the
 
loss of the intra-uterine state, are felt by him as an attack by hostile forces,
 
i.e. as persecution. Persecutory anxiety, therefore, enters from the
 
beginning into his relation to objects insofar as he is exposed to privation."
 
Klein does not simply explain the primitive anxiety of persecution as the mere result of
 
the infant' s somatosensory underdevelopment or inability to alleviate discomfort. In
 
tandem with all other factors, Klein recognizes the function of the death instinct as the
 
infant' s aggressive impulse that is projected unto the discomforting and painful aspects of
 
the external events, to create the bad or persecutory object. On the other hand, the life
 
instinct is projected unto the gratifying and comforting aspects, which results in the 
creation of the good or idealized object. As a result, painful experiences of infancy 
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become the concrete container of the death instinct, and as such they are split off from the 
comforting experiences to protect life against the threat of death and annihilation. During 
this period, the self and the object equally lack integration, as the instinctual duality of 
the self is split and projected unto the object to create an object relation, in which pain 
and discomfort becomes a concrete persecutor. Thus, to understand infant's emotional 
life and the primitive mechanism of defences, Klein emphasizes the function of the death 
instinct, as weIl as the instinctual duality between life and death. 
These two elements of primitive object relation are central to the 
understanding of the stories in this study. ln the participants' associations, these two 
features are distinctly recognizable. First, the experience of pain is associated with 
"scary darkness," that is "black, dreary, and suffocating" and "no different from lying 
dead." Every significant upsurge of pain is experienced as a violent, life-destroying attack 
that threatens to snatch life away. The participants' reference to pain is associated with 
images that reflect threats coming from an anonymous and violent element. Their 
imagery reflects paranoid fears and splitting. For them, chronic pain contains and 
symbolizes aspects of the bad, persecutory object that attacks, annihilates the ego. 
Associating the pain with a dark force allows the ego to resort to oral-sadistic phantasies 
against the pain as the bad object. Second, not only an aggressive force capable of 
attacking and annihilating (i.e. "an angry young man ploughing the earth.") appears in the 
narrative associations, but also a good object capable of life giving (i.e. "a maternaI 
figure standing in the background") emerges at the opposite end. The two are at times 
juxtaposed to split the scene between safety and danger, where the ego as the main figure 
is standing in the middle looking wearily at something "disgusting and painful." 
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Therapeutically, the presence of the good object can provide an opportunity for 
integration, and for reducing the oral-sadistic phantasies of the ego. 
As a result, in addition to what research has as yet described, the participants of 
this study reveal intense and crushing anxieties that do not assume overt, panic-like 
manifestations. They rise from the depth of the psyche, and become best accessible 
through thematic storytelling. As stories are related about the cards, participants make 
telltale references to their own pain and anxiety, and draw together their lived experience 
with what they perceive in the cards. Across their stories, wherever the narrative theme 
involves anguish, the images of aggression and death are consistently associated with 
pain that is attacking, overtaking and destroying. The consistency, with which pain 
appears as death and destruction across these narratives, confirms the crucial importance 
of such imagery for understanding the primitive history of pain. For these participants, 
pain becomes the concrete experience of aggression that threatens to destroy the self and 
the object. 
ln other words, the analysis of the stories, in this study, reveals how participants' 
stories fluctuate between anxieties of the annihilation of the self, and those of the 
destruction of the object. Moreover, the present study reveals how pain overpowers the 
ego and undermines the adult object relation that is based on the whole object. Analytic 
approach shows that these anxieties are far from meaningless or exaggerated responses. 
In contrast, they are crucial to the understanding of the primitive significance of anxieties 
associated with pain. In the absence of such understanding, pain loses its infantile history, 
and sufferers are denied the opportunity to grasp the infantile nature of their suffering and 
to integrate projected aspects of their psychic reality. Without such integration, many 
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pain sufferers will be driven to utter despair by constant upsurge of paranoid-schizoid 
anxieties that are followed by the oral-sadistic phantasies of the ego. 
On the other hand, the participating health psychologists acknowledge the 
difficult emotions that beset the patients. However, their discourse bears no reference to 
the notion of suffering and the anxiety of annihilation. Despite its well-recognized place 
in the contemporary conceptualization of pain, suffering does not assume its place in the 
discourse of the participants. In fact, its nearly absence sets the stage for talking about 
the anxieties of the patients, without any reference to the threat of annihilation and the 
horrific preoccupations of the sufferer. Instead, the participants t:irst talk about the loss of 
valued aspects of life, which is identified as a significant cause of anxiety and grief for 
the patients who no longer can enjoy a sense of personal continuity and fulfillment. 
Then, they describe the anxiety over the alienated aching body, and acknowledge how 
patients perceive their bodies with much consternation as a punishing, attacking, or 
betraying entity that is split into an alien presence. Despite their initial observations, they 
do not recognize this estranged, punishing body as a source of violent threat to the 
integrity and constitution of the self. Instead, patient's diminished capability to fulfill 
social raIes is repeatedly emphasized as the main source of anxiety, and as the valid locus 
of its meaning. Thus, if pain engenders anxiety, it is for the reason that sufferers feel 
less capable to fulfil social and interpersonal expectations, with which they identify, and 
through which they self-actualize. Failing to live up to such expectations is the focus of 
the pm1icipants' discourses of anxiety and suffering. 
This view of suffering is justified by a compatible psychological outlook that 
explains the self in terms of the set of raIes that an individual plays as part of social 
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interaction with others. The self is thought to be the shaped by identifying with others' 
perception of oneself (Cooley, 1902), or by enacting and incorporating social raIes 
(Goffman, 1959). In the more recent incarnation of this theory, the self is viewed as a 
social construction that lies not in the individual but in the relationship between 
individuals, which is continually shaped and reshaped by their practices (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987; Kitzinger, 1992). As Fuller (1988: 19-20) states, "account of social 
interaction does not require that social agents have any private mental content such as 
desires or beliefs, distinct fram their publicly defined rale-expectations." Therefore, all 
internaI states must be most readily explainable in terms of observable responses to the 
external world. Likewise, the participants speak of identity as the socially defined raIes 
we play while interacting with others, in order to actualize ourselves. In their view, 
these raIes shape the self according to commitments, hopes, assumptions, and expectation 
that are learned and relearned in social interaction. As a result, understanding the 
sufferers means to explain their emotional states in terms of the patients' inability to 
perform in their habituaI role sets or raIe dispossession. In their view, the anxiety of the 
patient is most readily explainable in terms of their particular role dispossession. This 
view of the person's identity casts the sense of selfhood within the bounds of social and 
interpersonal interaction and limits the meaning of anxiety to "what one can accomplish" 
in such interactional context. As a result, little can be said about the inner world of 
unconscious phantasies, infantile object relations, and primitive anxieties that sufferer 
may bring to social context and project upon reality. 
To the contrary, in suffering, the question is not so much about "what 1 can 
accomplish or enact" as it is about "whether 1 willlast." This distinction becomes clear 
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when one of the participants speaks of existential angst as the anxiety of self­
actualization which he subsequently defines as the question of "what 1 will accomplish." 
However, the existential angst, by definition, refers to the anxiety of being, être, 
confronted by nothingness or non-being, néant (Sartre, 1943; May, 1977). As 
aforementioned, phenomenology and existentialism acknowledge the certainty of 
personal death ("1 will die," rather then "one will die") as an ever-present possibility, and 
as the source of our uniquely human anxiety (Heidegger, 1985). In contrast, health 
psychology offers a view of suffering, wherein aH anxieties associated with pain are 
merely explained on the basis of the actual loss and concrete role dispossession. Hence, 
the anxieties of destruction and annihilation, that are experienced and reported by many 
sufferers, are only viewed as cognitive mislabelling and maladaptive learned responses to 
an otherwise manageable noxious stimulation and its social and interpersonal effects. 
This interpretation of anxiety eliminates any reference to the primitive history of pain, 
and to the intrapsychic dimension of pain experience. In effect, health psychology 
obviates the need to explore the patient' s subjective experience of suffering and makes 
little mention of this key aspect. Consequently, the focus of c1inical attention shifts from 
the subjective content of patient's experience to the concrete behavioural reactions, and 
to the ensuing observable interpersonal consequences. However, illustrating the 
importance of this shift requires further consideration of its clinical implication. 
In a case vignette, Fordyce (1996:41) explains how he and his colleagues respond 
to a pain patient's incessant complaints by negative behavioural consequences to 
discourage his maladaptive pain behaviours. As a result, while doing ward rounds, they 
decide to respond to "any references to pain by looking out the window as a way of 
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modifying social feedback" In another example, Long (1996:8) states, "Discussions 
about pain were not allowed between nurses and patients or with physicians except 
during specifie times at rounds or in therapy sessions" Fordyce states, "Note that staff 
were not to ignore pain behaviors; only to be IIÙnimally socially responsive and to direct 
special attention to patient effort to increase activity Ievels" (44). Fordyce (1989:55) 
argues that such negative feedback "may discourage and inhibit expression of pain or 
suffering behaviors and thereby promote early resolution to pain problem." 
Although nowhere the participants of this study suggest anything remotely similar 
to Fordyce's approach, their inclination to steer clear of discussing the content and 
meaning of patients' anxiety owes much to the prevailing framework of health 
psychology as unequivocally presented by Fordyce and his colleagues. In my self­
reflection on the interviewing process, 1 recognized that as participants were describing 
their direct observations and impressions, 1 felt Iess in need of asking for clarification or 
elaboration. Their candid descriptions conveyed many observations, commonly shared in 
the literature. However, 1 felt anxious to ask for clarifications as the participant changed 
to an explanatory tone. As 1 was listening to their explanations, l felt ambivalent over the 
explanatory model used to elucidate pain patients' internaI states and personal 
expenences. The graduaI shift of discourse from a descriptive to an explanatory tone 
seemed to play a regulatory and prescriptive function in deliIIÙting the signification of 
symptoms. In other words, it diminished the liveliness of the initial observations, and 
rendered them regulated, disambiguated, and reduced. The foreclosure of meaning was 
predicated on making every internaI state a reflection of a real and concrete matter. 
Then, if commensurate to the concrete and beneficial in action, it was deemed not 
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needing any modification. As they switched to the prescriptive mode, the internaI world 
of the patient receded from the foreground of discourse to the backstage. In tandem with 
such change of speech act, 1 realized that my own affective state had to mirror a similar 
disengagement to make room for compatibility and open hearing. As the interview 
continued, it became harder to maintain this emotionally neutral hearing. 
Reducing the subjective ambiguity of symptoms (i.e., pain, suffering, anxiety, and 
fear) is not limited to health psychology (Cassell, 1975). As their prime objective, 
clinicians must identify aIl presentations or symptoms as signs of a diagnosable problem 
(Sebeok 1994:65-82, and Barthes, 1994:202-213). Every clinical discipline is made of a 
corpus of professional discourses that construct a codified and organized way of talking 
about, and looking at symptoms (Foucault, 1976, 1979). This codified talk functions as a 
"gaze" through which symptoms are inspected and seen as an object. Such talks bear a 
shaping influence on public and professional attitudes to human suffering (Foucault, 
1980; Fox 1994). Clinicians learn to conduct themselves within the liroits of professional 
discourses, while patients are encouraged and instructed to grasp their ordeals within 
such limits. In this manner, the discursive practices of today's clinicians shape the liroits 
of what can be considered as a valid signification, and set the liroit for what can be a 
valid problem (Mishler, 1984). Through these discursive practices, the clinicians do 
more than reading various ambiguities of symptoms; they construct a particular 
consciousness of pain and suffering, in which patients struggle to make sense of their 
ordeals and to grasp the meaning of their pain. For many of these patients, the gaze of 
health psychology denies the grievous significance of their searing anxieties, as it leaves 
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them with little opportunity for exploring the suffering beyond its most concrete and 
external significance. 
It has been argued that losses experienced throughout life can reactivate infantile 
anxieties and phantasies. Segal (1964:80) explains that any situation of loss in adult life 
may contain and symbolize infantile object relations, and can reawaken primitive 
anxieties. 
"The depressive position is never fully worked through. The anxletles 
pertaining to ambivalence and guilt, as weIl as situations of loss, which 
reawaken depressive experiences, are always with us. Good external 
objects in adult life always symbolize and contain aspects of the primary 
good object, internaI and external, so that any loss in later life re-awakens 
the anxiety of losing the good internaI object, and with this anxiety, aIl 
anxieties experienced original1y in the depressive position." 
For chronic pain patients, actual losses may likewise contain and symbolize primitive 
anxieties. In view of this argument, the present study asked whether the sufferer's 
anxious and depressive states enfold at its heart a deep intrapsychic significance. 
Although the aetiology of pain is not shrouded in any mystery, its relief and 
al1eviation have been fraught with setbacks and disappointments. Where treatment fal1s 
short of providing satisfactory relief, time is experienced in terms of the episodes of pain 
and daily experience is reduced to pain experience. Without any recourse or remedy, 
being becomes being-in-pain. In a bluntly restrictive manner, the scope of experience 
shrinks to one element, that of pain. This inescapable entrapment in agony brings to 
present the ego' s primitive history of pain. Primitive anxieties, buried deep within the 
self, resurface to be relived, as a terrifying sense of helplessness becomes al1-too­
pervasive. What has been called the shattering or the unmaking of the world of the 
sufferer can be viewed, in analytical sense, as the annihilation of the self and the 
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destruction of the object. As a result, identifying the exact pathophysiology and aetiology 
of the pain does not dispense with body symbolism or does not end the domain of 
unconscious influence. As long as sufferers feel their bodies and have reasons to react 
helplessly to their pain and hurt, their bodies would not be devoid of symbolism. The 
symbolism of the body is the symbolism of the primitive anxieties reawakened in the 
context of the persistent aching body. As these anxieties are reawakened by pain, they 
are the derivative of the somatic experience, and not vice versa. In this manner, body 
symbolism goes beyond the origination and aetiology of symptom and runs parallel to the 
experience of body, which whether in rest or in labour, and whether in comfort or in pain 
retains its symbolism. 
On the other hand, health psychology and behavioural medicine tend to explain 
the sufferer's reaction to pain as a stimulus-bond response that has been elaborated and 
appraised cognitively as part of attempting to fit pain into the social and interpersonal 
environment, based on learned cognitions for processing significant life events. In this 
manner, the anxieties of destruction and annihilation, often repo11ed by sufferers, become 
no more than maladaptive responses to pain that are labelled as disproportionate fears. 
At best, such anxieties are viewed as engendered by a lack of social support or by role 
dispossession. Such anxieties, if acknowledged, are deemed incommensurate to the real 
prospect of chronic pain rehabilitation. This interpretation of anxiety eliminates any 
reference to the primitive history of pain, and to the intrapsychic dimension of pain 
experience. Through this elimination, health psychology obviates the need to explore the 
patient's primitive experience of suffering. As images of destruction and aggression are 
left overlooked, the clinical attention shifts from the patient's subjective experience to the 
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concrete behavioural reactions and observable consequences. In this manner, the 
terrifying meaning of the chranic pain experience is lost in the emphasis on social raIe 
fulfillment that eliminates form its account any reference to the inner experience of the 
sufferer. 
Today's pain management seeks to redefine ail subjective feelings and perceived 
threats in terms of objective behavioural appraisal of the chranic pain, in order to reduce 
the "maladaptive" response. Facing the patients' terrifying helplessness, the 
rehabilitation specialists try to pravide a "dose of reality," by educating the sufferers 
about their pain and the prospect of adaptive rehabilitation. What remains as the lived 
experience of fear, depression, and helplessness have to be corrected by negative 
behavioural feedback and cognitive reframing. In effect, health psychology engenders a 
clinical intervention, in which meaning is prefigured by stressing adaptive behaviour, and 
subjective experience is foreshortened by emphasizing the stimulus-bond response. 
Today's pain management is predicated on seeing every internaI state as a reflection of a 
real, public, or interpersonal experience that is devoid of unconscious phanatsy and that 
must fit the objective economy of social raIe fulfillment and interpersonal recipracity. 
Cognitions as mental activities with objective claims to validity are valued above 
emotions as personal and preverbal experiences (Nussbaum, 2001:93). By emphasizing 
behaviour, the patient's inner world and unconscious phantasy loses its existential gravity 
and plays not even a marginal raIe in explaining the lived experience of chranic pain. 
Subsequently, a listening rich in associational content is replaced by a clinical attitude 
focused on stimulus-bond responses and social raIe fulfillment or raIe dispossession. 
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This study has tried to show to what extent despite the sufferers' graphie 
associations, today's practice of pain management has remained unwilling to recognize 
that suffering chronic pain can potentially contain and symbolize the primitive anxieties 
of annihilation and destruction, reminiscent of the infantile ego. Given the importance of 
the subject matter, there are perhaps two ways to write something that can serve as the 
final comment to this conclusion. The first is to write the final words as an extrapolation 
that merely sums up the findings and arguments of the study. The second is to revisit the 
existential problem behind the conception of the study, and ask whether the problematic 
at the heart of the investigation is still admonishing us in the same fashion as before. In a 
manner closer to the latter but not very far from the former option, it is useful to reiterate 
that the participant's vivid associations reflect primitive anxieties that run contrary to the 
objectifying approach of today's pain management and health psychology. As 
disquieting as it may be, to reveal in the mainstream pain management a resistance 
toward the anxiety of death, this revelation still leaves in dark a greater source of worry. 
Put into a question, it can be asked how we then reach out to life, when the denial of 
anxiety of death, as annihilation and destruction, is so deeply rationalized in our society. 
In his colossal study of Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, Dollimore 
(1998) characterizes the association between death and desire as the preponderant 
metaphor of the pre-modern age. Beginning with the myth of Adam, craving was 
denounced as the source of suffering, pain, and death, or as the ultimate instrument of 
evil in the lapserian interpretation of creation and fall. As desire represents the force of 
human aspiration for living, the association of desire and death ultimately alluded to the 
kinship of life with death. One can therefore conclude that for much of human history, 
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life and death were associated as a necessary and meaningful ontological contradiction. 
However, this metaphor gradually faded away, albeit not entirely, as part of the modern 
reorganization of everyday life and human consciousness. ln what became modern 
consciousness, death became irrevocably separated from desire and life. In fact, a major 
characteristic of modernity lies in our increasing trust in the technologies that can 
eliminate suffering and pain, and find a way to satisfy every individual craving 
(Ferguson, 1995). The single minded pm'suit of happiness engendered a strong 
confidence on our ability to pursue a pain-free life of lasting virility. The idealization of 
the technologies of virility and pleasure followed a decisive splitting of life and death. ln 
our postmodern age, this tendency has reached its zenith. As people face more than ever 
a rapidly shifting system of values and outlooks, they can no longer make sense of 
decease and origination, life and death, being and nothingness, and pleasure and pain 
(O'Neil, 1995). Hence, the grievous meanings (the emphasis on plural) of such 
contradictions are in risk of being actively denied by the prevailing therapeutic 
philosophies that reduce human suffering to a depthless expenence, devoid of any 
dialectic of latent and manifest significations (Nussbaum, 2001:93). 
Pain and suffering constitute a serious challenge to this denial of depth. As there 
is no escape from chronic pain, the sufferer feels that there is nothing beyond the aching 
body. The self shrinks away from the external world and the immediate reality. The 
outlook of the self freezes and hardly expands beyond the skin which no longer can 
contain the self. Chronic pain reactivates terrifying primitive anxieties and triggers a 
reversion to a preverbal state in which the extreme concreteness of experience with the 
object does not allow verbalization. Every effort to objectify pain through language is 
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fraught with disappointment, as pain resists common tropes of communication. In the 
words of Emanuel Levinas (1989:40): 
"In suffering [physical pain] there is an absence of all refuge. It is the fact 
of being exposed to being. It is made of the impossibility of fleeing or 
retreating. The whole acuity of suffering lies in this impossibility of 
retreat." 
Chronic pain ruptures the self-body unity required for the pursuit of pleasure in the world 
shared by others. As a result, chronic pain shatters the idealization of the collected 
consciousness (Das Man) constructed by the technologies of virility and pleasure. It 
makes the sufferer feel overtaken by the aching body, as a persecutory object. To pain, 
there is universally an overpowering sense of estrangement. The bodies of chronic pain 
patients seem no longer their own as they cannot readily submit to reassuring public 
idealizations that define their bodies and their bodily functions. Dnder duress, the 
patients graphically describe their anxieties as a violent monstrosity of aggression and 
annihilation. Suddenly, the forgotten and denied psychic depth, with aU its primitive 
fears, becomes a terrifying part of the present. 
Theories that strive to account for and remedy these anxieties based on reality 
appraisal for adaptive response can hardly offer any sense for the horrific imagery of 
aggression and destruction that permeates the introspective accounts of chronic pain. In 
what is costmary, these terrifying preoccupations are inventoried as cognitive errors, 
without any insight into theil' significance. In fact, the sufferers' imagery of aggression 
and annihilation reflects more than a misappraisal of reality or a panic-l'idden 
exaggeration of events. Chronic pain is a world-shattering experience wherein every 
publicly shared and collective sense of idealization that protects the ego against primitive 
anxiety of annihilation collapses. The mood of anxiety makes the sufferer see death as 
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uncanny beyond the reassuring views of the public. Sufferers feel immediately exposed 
to a menace that can annihilate the self and destroy the object. In fact, what befalls the 
pain sufferer, candidly mirrors what we will see if we look beyond the common-sense 
idealizations (Das Man). 
Contemporary authors have already developed this insight into an extensive 
practice in culture critique (Lasch, 1979, and 1984; Sanchez-Padro, 2003). As a result, it 
is not the purpose of this work to open and to discuss this socio-political dimension. 
However, psychoanalysis as the psychology of depth reminds us that death cannot be 
explained as the mere nullity or the terminal distination of being. Nor, is it clinically 
justifiable to delimit the threat of annihilation to the actual possibility and eventuality of 
death and loss. As a destructive impulse lying deep within our psyche, the death drive 
renders life morbid, before making it moribund. As a drive, death does not simply mean 
ceasing to be alive as much as it becomes the distortion and devastation of life, if it is 
denied. In this manner, the omnipotent denial of death necessitates and forcefully creates 
the total denial of the primitive significance of human suffering, the intrapsychic 
dynamics of human destructiveness, and the psychology of depth. 
Over the recent decades, an untamed permutation in the nosographie categories 
has introduced fibromyalgia, temporomandibular joint disorder, painful bowel disorder, 
chronic fatigue syndrome, chronic pain syndrome, and a number of other less known 
diagnoses. It can be argued that reshaping human suffering into thing-like categories of 
disease has allowed us to ignore suffering and its intrapsychic signification. In the case 
of health psychology, even when the intervention is meant to rehabilitate and not to cure, 
the omnipotent denial of primitive anxieties and subjectivity remains strong. For the 
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chronic pain patients and the society at large, recognizing this omnipotent denial and 
control may mean going beyond the keyhole approach of the ever-growing and ever­
narrowing pain syndromes that have effectively partitioned from our discourse any 
reference to suffering, subjectivity, and psychic reality. On the other hand, looking at 
human suffering as a meaningful experience in intrapsychic sense can perhaps allow us, 
patients and c1inicians, to see that to what extend we are reacting to the primitive 
anxieties of annihilation and destruction whenever we write a research proposaI, seek or 
make a diagnosis, find or offer a treatment, plan or undergo a rehabilitation, or participate 
in a chronic pain advocacy group. 
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APPENDIX� 
Consent Form 
This research is conducted by Farzad Zare-Bawani as part of a Doctoral Thesis in 
Psychology under the direction of Prof. Marie Hazan, Ph.D., at University of Quebec in 
Montreal. This research is about the emotional significance of chronic pain experience. 
As a participant, you can offer this study your understanding and experience with chronic 
pain, through an interview procedure. If you are a chronic pain sufferer, your interview 
involves telling stories about a set of hand drawn pictures. The interviews are transcribed 
and subsequently analyzed. 
Your participation in a semi-structured interview is needed for the completion of 
this study. Your identity will be safeguarded. In no way, the findings of this research 
may harm your personal or professional credibility or reputation. After the completion of 
the project the records are safel y eliminated. You can ask for a copy of the completed 
thesis, if you are interested. 
If you consent to such participation, please complete the next section, and sign 
after printing your name: 
By the present, 1, , agree to participate in this research, based 
upon the above information. l understand that for my participation, l have the option of 
asking for compensation. 
Signature of the Subject. Date: . 
Signature of the Researcher.. .. .. .. . . .. . .. . .. . . Date: . 
